Emerald Pointe, LLC v. Taney Cnty.
| Docket Number | 6:21-cv-03222-RK |
| Decision Date | 24 August 2022 |
| Parties | EMERALD POINTE, LLC, Plaintiff, v. TANEY COUNTY, MISSOURI, TANEY COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION, TANEY COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
Plaintiff Emerald Pointe, LLC, seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after Defendants Taney County, Missouri, Taney County Planning Commission, and Taney County Board of Adjustment unlawfully imposed a Stop Work Order for road construction in Plaintiff's county-approved subdivision development project. Plaintiff alleges the unlawful Stop Work Order violated its due process property rights. Prior to seeking damages for its alleged constitutional injury, however Plaintiff sought judicial review of the Stop Work Order in the Circuit Court of Taney County, Missouri, and was ultimately successful. The Circuit Court of Taney County entered a judgement in that action granting Plaintiff relief under a writ of certiorari pursuant to § 64.870.2, RSMo as to the unlawfully imposed Stop Work Order. However because nothing prohibited Plaintiff from also seeking damages for any constitutional injury from the unlawful Stop Work Order alongside its earlier claim for judicial review Plaintiff's § 1983 claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata under Missouri law.
Now before the Court are three motions filed by Defendants: (1) a motion for summary judgment relying on res judicata (Doc. 30); (2) a motion for leave to amend their answer out of time to assert the affirmative defense of res judicata (Doc. 39); and (3) a motion to dismiss pursuant to the Colorado River doctrine[1] (Doc. 45.) The parties have fully briefed each motion. (Docs. 31, 38, 40, 42, 43, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50.)
After careful consideration and for the reasons explained below, the Court ORDERS as follows: (1) Defendants' motion for summary judgment on res judicata grounds (Doc. 30) is GRANTED, and (2) Defendants' motion for leave to amend answer (Doc. 39) and motion to dismiss pursuant to the Colorado River doctrine (Doc. 45) are DENIED as moot.
In 2008, the Taney County Planning Commission approved a residential subdivision development project, “Emerald Pointe.” The subdivision was designated as a gated community with private roads. Eight years after approval, the Taney County Planning Commission issued a Stop Work Order for road construction in the subdivision, requiring that Plaintiff, as the developer, comply with state and county bond requirements for certain public improvements. Plaintiff appealed the Stop Work Order to the Taney County Board of Adjustment, which affirmed the Stop Work Order and denied Plaintiff's appeal.
Plaintiff then filed suit against the Taney County Planning Commission and Taney County Board of Adjustment in the Circuit Court of Taney County, Missouri, challenging the legality of the Stop Work Order and seeking judicial review pursuant to § 64.870.2, RSMo.[2] (Doc. 30-2); Emerald Pointe, LLC v. Taney Cty. Planning Comm'n, No. 1746-CC00091 (Cir. Ct. of Taney Cty.) The circuit court initially dismissed Plaintiff's petition for failure to state a claim for relief under § 64.870.2, RSMo, which the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed. (Doc. 30-8); Emerald Pointe, LLC v. Taney Cty. Planning Comm'n, 578 S.W.3d 390 (Mo.Ct.App. 2019) (“Emerald Pointe I”). On remand, the circuit court ultimately entered judgment in favor of the county defendants, and Plaintiff again appealed. (Doc. 30-8); Emerald Pointe, LLC v. Taney Cty. Planning Comm'n, 621 S.W.3d 188 (Mo.Ct.App. 2021) (“Emerald Pointe II”).
For a second time, the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court. Emerald Pointe II, 621 S.W.3d at 196. Specifically, the state court of appeals found that Plaintiff was entitled to relief on judicial review under § 64.870.2 because the Taney County Planning Commission “did not have the authority to enter the Stop Work Order in 2016,” and therefore the Taney County Board of Adjustment's decision affirming the Stop Work Order “[was] not authorized by law.” Id. Accordingly, the court of appeals remanded the case to the circuit court “with directions that the cause be remanded back to the Board [of Adjustment] with directions that the Board [of Adjustment] grant Emerald Pointe's appeal of the [Planning] Commission's Stop Work Order.” Id. Finally, on May 20, 2021, the Circuit Court of Taney County entered judgment in the case granting Plaintiff a writ of certiorari and ordering that the Taney County Board of Adjustment grant Plaintiff's appeal of the Stop Work Order. (Doc. 30-9.)
Then, nearly nine months later, on January 28, 2022, Plaintiff sought to amend its complaint in the state action to add Taney County as a defendant along with a claim for damages under § 1983. (Doc. 46-3); see Emerald Pointe, LLC v. Taney Cty. Planning Comm'n, No. 1746-CC00091-01 (Cir. Ct. of Taney Cty.). The circuit court denied Plaintiff's request, finding that its earlier May 20, 2021 judgment granting Plaintiff a writ of certiorari was a final judgment in the matter and it therefore lacked jurisdiction over the case. (Doc. 38-3 at 5-9). Plaintiff appealed the circuit court's denial on July 1, 2022. (Id. at 1-4.) This latest appeal remains pending. See Emerald Pointe, LLC v. Taney Cty. Planning Comm'n, No. SD37630 (Mo.Ct.App.) (“Emerald Pointe III”).
On August 26, 2021 - three months after the circuit court's May 20, 2021, judgment and five months before Plaintiff's motion to amend its petition in the state litigation - Plaintiff filed this civil rights action against Defendants, seeking damages under § 1983, alleging that the unlawful Stop Work Order violated its constitutional due process property rights. (See generally Doc. 1.) Shortly before the deadline in the Court's amended scheduling order, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff's § 1983 claim is barred by res judicata as to the earlier state lawsuit. (Docs. 30, 31.) In response, Plaintiff argued that (1) Defendants waived the affirmative defense of res judicata by failing to include it in their answer, and (2) its § 1983 claim is not barred by res judicata. (Doc. 38.) Less than a week later, Defendants sought to amend their answer out of time to add the affirmative defense of res judicata. (Doc. 39.) Finally, while these two motions were pending, and apparently based on Plaintiff's July 1, 2022 appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals (Emerald Pointe III), Defendants sought dismissal of this action under the Colorado River doctrine, arguing that the Court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction in light of the parallel state proceedings. (Doc. 45.)
Because it is potentially dispositive, the Court first considers the res judicata issue.
The parties do not disagree that res judicata is generally considered an affirmative defense. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. Lobrano, 695 F.3d 758, 763 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c)(1)) (other citation omitted); Christenson v. Freeman Health Sys., 71 F.Supp.3d 964, 96869 (W.D. Mo. 2014) () (citing Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 55.08). Nor do the parties disagree that generally affirmative defenses must be asserted in an answer or risk waiver. First Union Nat'l Bank v. Pictet Overseas Trust Corp., Ltd., 477 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir. 2007); Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c) () Generalities aside, however, the Eighth Circuit does not impose an absolute or legalistic strict-compliance regime to pleading affirmative defenses in general, least of all the affirmative defense of res judicata.
In First Union National Bank, for instance, the Eighth Circuit held that a defendant's “technical failure to comply with Rule 8(c) is not fatal” to its reliance on an affirmative defense, particularly “when [the] affirmative defense is raised in the trial court in a manner that does not result in unfair surprise.” 477 F.3d at 622 () (citations and quotation marks omitted). Moreover, as to res judicata specifically, the Eighth Circuit has repeatedly recognized that the preclusion issue may be raised even sua sponte when necessary “to avoid ‘unnecessary judicial waste.'” Meyers v. Roy, 714 F.3d 1077, 1080 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Hanig v. City of Winner, 527 F.3d 674, 678 (8th Cir. 2008)); Bechtold v. City of Rosemount, 104 F.3d 1062, 106869 (8th Cir. 1997) (). As the Eastern District has explained: district courts “may raise the issue [of preclusion] sua sponte because doing so is consistent with policies that underlie the purpose of preclusion: avoiding the burdens of a party unnecessarily litigating an action twice and preserving judicial resources.” J.Y.C.C. v. Doe Run Res. Corp., 370 F.Supp.3d 1031, 1038 (E.D. Mo. 2019); see Johnson v. LaSalle Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 663 F.Supp.2d 747, 765-66 (D. Minn. 2009) ().
In Hanig v. City of Winner, for example, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment on the basis of res judicata in favor of the defendant in a § 1983 claim even though the defendant failed to properly plead res judicata as an affirmative defense. 527 F.3d 674, 678 (8th...
To continue reading
Request your trial