Emerich v. Phila. Center for Human Dev.

• Decision Date: 25 November 1998
• Parties: Ronald B. EMERICH, Administrator of the Estate of Teresa M. Hausler, Appellant, v. PHILADELPHIA CENTER FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, INC. and Albert Einstein Medical Center, Appellees. Ronald B. EMERICH, Administrator of the Estate of Teresa M. Hausler, Appellant, v. PHILADELPHIA CENTER FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, INC., Albert Einstein Healthcare Foundation, Albert Einstein Medical Center, Harvey Friedrich, ACSW, Anthony J. Scuderi, M. Div., Cac and Hacan Ulus, Administratrix of the Estate of Ahmet Ulus, M.D., Appellees.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

720 A.2d 1032

554 Pa. 209

Ronald B. EMERICH, Administrator of the Estate of Teresa M. Hausler, Appellant, v. PHILADELPHIA CENTER FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, INC. and Albert Einstein Medical Center, Appellees.

Ronald B. EMERICH, Administrator of the Estate of Teresa M. Hausler, Appellant, v. PHILADELPHIA CENTER FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, INC., Albert Einstein Healthcare Foundation, Albert Einstein Medical Center, Harvey Friedrich, ACSW, Anthony J. Scuderi, M. Div., Cac and Hacan Ulus, Administratrix of the Estate of Ahmet Ulus, M.D., Appellees.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued December 11, 1996.

Decided November 25, 1998.

Reargument Denied January 13, 1999.

David W. Fischer, Philadelphia, for Ronald B. Emerich.

Paul A. Lauricella, Philadelphia, for Amicus, PA Trial Lawyers.

Joseph Goldberg, Deborah L. Doyle, Philadelphia, for Hacan Ulus.

Claire Neiger, for Albert Einstein Health Care Foundation, Harvey Freidrich and Albert Einstein Medical Center.

Peter S. Miller, Charles W. Craven, Philadelphia, for Phila. Center for Human Development and Anthony J. Scuderi.

Robert B. Hoffman, Harrisburg, for Amicus, Pa. Medical Soc.

Nory Miller, Washington, DC, for Amicus, Pa. Psych. Ass'n.

Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO and NEWMAN, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

CAPPY, Justice.

We granted allocatur limited to the issues of one, whether a mental health professional has a duty to warn a third party of a patient's threat to harm the third party; two, if there is a duty to warn, the scope thereof; and finally, whether in this case a judgment on the pleadings was proper.

This admittedly tragic matter arises from the murder of Appellant's decedent, Teresa Hausler, by her former boyfriend, Gad Joseph ("Joseph"). At the time of the murder, Joseph was being treated for mental illness and drug problems. Appellant brought wrongful death and survival actions against Appellees. Judgment on the pleadings was granted in favor of Appellees by the trial court and was affirmed on appeal by the Superior Court.

A detailed recitation of the facts is necessary to analyze the complex and important issues before us. The factual allegations raised in Appellant's complaint, which we must accept as true, are as follows.¹

Ms. Hausler and Joseph, girlfriend and boyfriend, were cohabitating in Philadelphia. For a substantial period of time, both Ms. Hausler and Joseph had been receiving mental health treatment at Appellee Philadelphia Center for Human Development (the "Center" or "PCHD"), which is owned and operated by Appellees Albert Einstein Healthcare Foundation and Albert Einstein Medical Center. Appellee Ahmet Ulus, now deceased, was a psychiatrist at the Center, Appellee Anthony Scuderi was a counselor at the Center, and Appellee Harvey Friedrich was the executive director of the Center.

Joseph was diagnosed as suffering from, among other illnesses, post-traumatic stress disorder, drug and alcohol problems, and explosive and schizo-affective personality disorders. He also had a history of physically and verbally abusing Ms. Hausler, as well as his former wife, and a history of other violent propensities. Joseph often threatened to murder Ms. Hausler and suffered from homicidal ideations. Several weeks prior to June 27, 1991, Ms. Hausler ended her relationship with Joseph, moved from their Philadelphia residence, and relocated to Reading, Pennsylvania. Angered by Ms. Hausler's decision to terminate their relationship, Joseph had indicated during several therapy sessions at the Center that he wanted to harm Ms. Hausler.

On the morning of June 27, 1991, at or about 9:25 a.m., Joseph telephoned his counselor, Mr. Scuderi, and advised him that he was going to kill Ms. Hausler. Mr. Scuderi immediately scheduled and carried out a therapy session with Joseph at 11:00 that morning. During the therapy session, Joseph told Mr. Scuderi that his irritation with Ms. Hausler was becoming worse because that day she was returning to their apartment to get her clothing, that he was under great stress, and that he was going to kill her if he found her removing her clothing from their residence.

Mr. Scuderi recommended that Joseph voluntarily commit himself to a psychiatric hospital. Joseph refused; however, he stated that he was in control and would not hurt Ms. Hausler. At 12:00 p.m., the therapy session ended, and, as stated in the complaint, Joseph was permitted to leave the Center "based solely upon his assurances that he would not harm" Ms. Hausler.

At 12:15 p.m., Mr. Scuderi received a telephone call from Ms. Hausler informing him that she was in Philadelphia en route to retrieve her clothing from their apartment, located at 6924 Large Street. Ms. Hausler inquired as to Joseph's whereabouts. Mr. Scuderi instructed Ms. Hausler not to go to the apartment and to return to Reading.

In what ultimately became a fatal decision, Ms. Hausler ignored Mr. Scuderi's instructions and went to the residence where she was fatally shot by Joseph at or about 12:30 p.m. Five minutes later, Joseph telephoned Mr. Scuderi who in turn called the police at the instruction of Director Friedrich.²

Joseph was subsequently arrested and convicted of the murder of Ms. Hausler. Based upon these facts, Appellant filed two wrongful death and survival actions, alleging, inter alia, that Appellees negligently failed to properly warn Ms. Hausler, and others including her family, friends and the police, that Joseph presented a clear and present danger of harm to her.

The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of Appellees finding, inter alia, that the duty of a mental health professional to warn a third party had not yet been adopted in Pennsylvania, but that even if such a legal duty existed, Mr. Scuderi's personal warning discharged that duty. The Superior Court affirmed, reiterating that mental health care providers currently have no duty to warn a third party of a patient's violent propensities, and that even if such a duty existed, Appellant failed to establish a cause of action as his decedent was killed when she ignored Mr. Scuderi's warning not to go to Joseph's apartment.

Initially, we must determine if in this Commonwealth, a mental health care professional owes a duty to warn a third party of a patient's threat of harm to that third party, and if so, the scope of such a duty. While this precise issue is one of first impression for this court, it is an issue which has been considered by a number of state and federal courts and has been the subject of much commentary.³ Supported by the wisdom of decisions from other jurisdictions, as well as by analogous decisions by this court and lower court case law in this Commonwealth, we determine that a mental health care professional, under certain limited circumstances, owes a duty to warn a third party of threats of harm against that third party. Nevertheless, we find that in this case, judgment on the pleadings was proper, and thus, we affirm the decision of the learned Superior Court, albeit, for different reasons.

Under common law, as a general rule, there is no duty to control the conduct of a third party to protect another from harm. However, a judicial exception to the general rule has been recognized where a defendant stands in some special relationship with either the person whose conduct needs to be controlled or in a relationship with the intended victim of the conduct, which gives to the intended victim a right to protection. See, Restatement (Second) of Torts §315 (1965). Appellant argues that this exception, and thus, a duty, should be recognized in Pennsylvania.

Our analysis must begin with the California Supreme Court's landmark decision in Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 17 Cal.3d 425, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334 (1976) which was the first case to find that a mental health professional may have a duty to protect others from possible harm by their patients. In Tarasoff, a lawsuit was filed against, among others, psychotherapists employed by the Regents of the University of California to recover for the death of the plaintiffs' daughter, Tatiana Tarasoff, who was killed by a psychiatric outpatient.

Two months prior to the killing, the patient had expressly informed his therapist that he was going to kill an unnamed girl (who was readily identifiable as the plaintiffs' daughter) when she returned home from spending the summer in Brazil. The therapist, with the concurrence of two colleagues, decided to commit the patient for observation. The campus police detained the patient at the oral and written request of the therapist, but released him after satisfying themselves that he was rational and exacting his promise to stay away from Ms. Tarasoff. The therapist's superior directed that no further action be taken to confine or otherwise restrain the patient. No one warned either Ms. Tarasoff or her parents of the patient's dangerousness.

After the patient murdered Ms. Tarasoff, her parents filed suit alleging, among other things, that the therapists involved had failed either to warn them of the threat to their daughter or to confine the patient.

The California Supreme Court, while recognizing the general rule that a person owes no duty to control the conduct of another, determined that there is an exception to this general rule where the defendant stands in a special relationship to either the person whose conduct needs to be controlled or in a relationship to the foreseeable victim of that conduct, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §315-320. Applying that exception, the court found that the special relationship between the defendant therapists and the patient could support affirmative duties for the benefit of third persons. Tarasoff 17 Cal.3d at 436, 131 Cal.Rptr. at 23, 551 P.2d at 343.⁴

The court made an analogy to cases which have imposed a duty upon physicians to diagnose and warn about a patient's contagious disease and concluded that "`by...