Emerick v. Coakley

Decision Date15 February 1872
Citation35 Md. 188
PartiesCATHERINE V. EMERICK v. DANIEL COAKLEY, and others, trading as COAKLEY BROTHERS.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City.

In 1869, William H. Emerick and Catherine V. Emerick, his wife assigned a policy of life insurance upon the life of the former, for the sole and separate use of the latter, in the Charter Oak Life Insurance Company, to Coakley Brothers, for the purpose of securing to them the payment of certain notes of William H. Emerick, given in liquidation of an indebtedness of the firm of which he was a member, and in consideration of an extension of time for the payment of the same. In 1870, William H. Emerick died, and thereupon his widow and Coakley Brothers both claimed the whole amount of the insurance, the latter, however, agreeing to pay over to the widow the balance remaining after the settlement of the liquidated indebtedness of the decedent to them. The Insurance Company filed a bill of interpleader against both parties, and paid the money into Court. The widow was then made complainant, and Coakley Brothers defendants, and after proceedings, a final decree was passed adjudging to Coakley Brothers the amount of their claim, and the balance, after paying costs, to Mrs. Emerick. From this decree the latter appealed.

The cause was argued before BARTOL, C.J., STEWART, BRENT, BOWIE and GRASON, J.

Sebastian Brown and William A. Fisher, for the appellant.

Bernard Carter and Thomas M. Lanahan, for the appellees.

GRASON J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented upon this appeal is, whether the assignment by the appellant and her husband to the appellees of a policy of insurance on her husband's life, obtained for her sole and separate use, is valid.

Its validity is questioned upon several grounds, and first, because it was not understood by the appellant, and was without consideration.

We have carefully examined and considered the evidence contained in the record, and we think that it clearly shows that the firm of Ross & Emerick, of which William H. Emerick, the husband of the appellant, was a member, was indebted to the appellees, and that in order to obtain an extension of time for payment, he proposed to them to give his individual notes for the payment thereof, to be secured by an assignment of the life policy. This offer was accepted by the appellees; the notes were given, the assignment was prepared and fully explained to the appellant, who thereupon freely and voluntarily executed it, and in view of these facts, it cannot be said that she did not fully understand the nature and effect of her act.

An agreement to forbear, for a time, proceedings at law or in equity to enforce a well founded claim is a valid consideration for a promise. 1 Parsons on Cont., 365, (5 th ed., 440.) Nor is it material that the party making the promise, in consideration of such forbearance, should have a direct interest in the suit to be forborne, or be directly benefitted by the delay; for the benefit to the defendant will be supposed to extend to him, and it would be enough to make the consideration, valid that the creditor is injured by the delay. 1 Pars. on Cont., 368, (5 th ed., 443.) The forbearance of the appellees, and the granting to William H. Emerick an extension of time for payment of the debt, constitute a good and valid consideration for the assignment, and it must be supported unless there is some statute or principle of law which forbids it.

That a wife may assign or incumber her separate property for her husband's debt, is fully established by the decisions of this Court in the cases of Tiernan vs. Poor, 1 G. & J., 216; Brundige, et al., vs. Poor, 2 G. & J., 1; Price vs. Bigham, 7 H. & J., 296; Berrett vs. Oliver, 7 G. & J., 191.

But it is said that an assignment of a life-policy is not authorized by sections 8 and 9 of Article 45 of the Code, inasmuch as those sections are, in their nature and character, enabling and do not expressly authorize the wife to assign the policy. It is true that the wife was not, before the enacting of those sections, authorized to insure the husband's life; yet, those sections must be construed with the other sections of the same Article, as well as with reference to the decisions of this Court in regard to the rights of married women to, and disposition of, their separate property. By section 11 of Article 45, they are empowered to dispose of their separate property, both real and personal, by conveyance, in which their husbands join; and, therefore, it was not necessary, in sections 8 and 9, to again give the power of disposition, which they already possessed, with respect to all their property of every description, under section 11. In the case of The New York Life Insurance Co. vs. Flack, 3 Md., 341-354, this Court has said, that a life-policy is like any other chose in action, assignable by the person in whose favor the contract is made. See also Harrison vs. McConkey, 1 Md. Chan. Dec., 34; Mutual Protection Ins. Co. vs. Hamilton, 5 Sneed's Rep., 269. It has also been held by this Court, that a married woman may act as a féme sole with reference to her separate property, and that the right to dispose of it accompanies the ownership, unless she is restrained from so doing by the express language of the instrument under which she holds. Cooke vs. Husbands, 11 Md., 503, 504-507; ...

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5 cases
  • Mente v. Townsend
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • October 27, 1900
    ...such policies as a man or single woman can transfer. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. v. Brant, 47 Mo. 419; Baker v. Young, 47 Mo. 453; Emerick v. Coakley, 35 Md. 188; Pomeroy v. Ins. Co. 40 Ill. Kerman v. Howard, 23 Wis. 108; Rison v. Wilkerson, 3 Sneed 565; Williams v. Corson, 2 Tenn.Ch. 269. Th......
  • Exchange Bank of Macon v. Loh
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • July 18, 1898
    ...Id., 102 N.Y. 647; Mowry v. Insurance Co., 9 R. I. 346; Scott v. Dickson, 108 Pa. St. 6; Insurance Co. v. Allen, 138 Mass. 27; Emerick v. Coakley, 35 Md. 188. the doctrine that such contracts are not strictly contracts of indemnity, yet are in the nature of indemnity, where a creditor insur......
  • Bishop v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • June 10, 1936
    ...made in the wife's sole and separate estate by the Code." Venable's Syllabus of Law of Property (Brodie Ed.) pp. 37-40; Emerick v. Coakley (1872) 35 Md. 188, 191. Gebb v. Rose (1874) 40 Md. 387, 392, the grantor, a married woman, who held title since 1856 under a deed which did not convey i......
  • Hieston v. National City Bank
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • April 2, 1918
    ...person to pay the debt of another, even though no actual benefit accrue to the party undertaking. Thomas v. Delphy, 33 Md. 373; Emerick v. Coakley, 35 Md. 188; Bowen Tipton, 64 Md. 275, 1 A. 861. The plaintiff's second prayer, we think, correctly stated the propositions of law applicable to......
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