Emery, to Use of Calvert Ins. Co. v. F.P. Asher, Jr., & Sons, Inc., 193

• Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
• Citation: 75 A.2d 333,196 Md. 1
• Docket Number: No. 193,193
• Parties: EMERY, to Use of CALVERT INS. CO., Inc., et al. v. F. P. ASHER, Jr., & SONS, Inc.
• Decision Date: 19 July 1950

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196 Md. 1 75 A.2d 333 EMERY, to Use of CALVERT INS. CO., Inc., et al.
v.
F. P. ASHER, Jr., & SONS, Inc. No. 193. Court of Appeals of Maryland. July 19, 1950.

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[75 A.2d 335] Earl H. Davis, of Washington, D. C., and C. Maurice Weidemeyer, of Annapolis, for appellants.

Robert D. Bartlett, of Baltimore, and William J. McWilliams, of Annapolis, for appellee.

Before MARBURY, C. J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON, and HENDERSON, JJ.

COLLINS, Judge.

This is an appeal by Norman B. Emery and Lonnie E. Polson, two bricklayers, plaintiffs below, from judgments for costs rendered on verdicts by a jury in favor of F. P. Asher, Jr., & Sons, Inc., defendant below, appellee here, in automobile accident cases resulting in personal injury to appellants and property damage. The cases were tried together.

On January 8, 1949, the appellants were passengers in a Kaiser automobile being driven by Polson, and owned by Emery, on the Central Avenue road from the District of Columbia to Annapolis between 6:00 and 6:30 A.M. They planned to spend that day in a duck blind on the South River near Annapolis. At that time it was still dark. After the automobile had rounded a righthand curve in the road and had come onto a straight stretch in the highway the headlights showed an obstruction on the highway. This obstruction, with which their automobile collided, proved to be a tractor-trailer combination owned by the appellee, the rear end of which was against an embankment on the south side of the highway for the purpose of loading on the trailer a bulldozer for transportation to another location. The front of the tractor was facing north across the highway.

After each side had exhausted its four strikes and twelve persons were seated in the jury box, the appellants requested permission to examine the prospective jurors on their voir dire and, on refusal, submitted ten questions to be propounded to them. The trial judge personally asked the twelve prospective jurors two of the questions submitted, one being: 'Are you, or any members of your immediate family, employed by the defendant corporation?' The other question asked by the trial judge was: 'Do you know anything about the facts of this accident, either from personal knowledge or from having read of same in the newspapers?' The trial judge refused to ask the prospective jurors, as requested, whether they knew either of the plaintiffs; either of the counsel for plaintiffs; Mr. Asher, any of his sons, or other officers of the defendant

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corporation; or any of the counsel for the defendant. The trial judge also refused to ask them whether they were bricklayers by trade; whether they had participated in litigation arising out of motor vehicle collision, either as plaintiffs or defendants; whether any other reason suggested itself to them, which might embarrass them as jurors; and whether they could render a fair and impartial verdict, based upon the evidence alone, 'and the law as the court shall give [75 A.2d 336] it to you?' The appellants argue that these refusals constitute reversible error.

It has been definitely held by this Court that it is proper for the court to propound submitted questions to jurymen. Handy v. State, 101 Md. 39, 43, 44, 60 A. 452, 109 Am.St.Rep. 558; Whittemore v. State, 151 Md. 309, 312, 134 A. 322. Chief Judge Bond, in Whittemore v. State, supra, said, beginning, 151 Md. at page 313, 134 A. at page 323: 'This court, in Handy v. State, quoted several decisions in English and American courts, opposing examinations of jurymen which they characterized as speculative, inquisitorial, catechizing, or fishing, to aid in deciding on peremptory challenges, and definitely decided that this was improper. Judge Pearce, writing the opinion for the court, said: 'We are aware that there are decisions to the contrary in other courts of equal authority and reputation, but such knowledge as we possess of the experience in practice under those decisions does not commend them to our adoption,'--in this referring, presumably, to reports from other jurisdictions of seemingly unreasonable incumbering and prolongation of the work of securing a jury to proceed with trial. It is true, as counsel points out, that the court in Handy v. State held that whether the juryman questioned was or was not a married man was immaterial, so that the particular question asked was objectionable because of that fact, but that holding does not detract from the fact that the court decided that questions not specifically directed to some reasonable cause for disqualification, and so merely for peremptory challenge, should not be asked.

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And see Gillespie v. State, 92 Md. 171, 174, 48 A. 32.' The examination of a juror which a party is entitled to have made is for the purpose of ascertaining the existence of cause for disqualification and for no other purpose. Cohen v. State, 173 Md. 216, 224, 195 A. 532, 196 A. 819.

The appellants rely on the case of Alexander v. R. D. Grier & Sons Co., 181 Md. 415, 30 A.2d 757, 758. In that case the liquidator of Keystone Indemnity Exchange sought to enforce an assessment against a subscriber. The liquidator asked to examine the jurors on their voir dire on the question 'as to whether or not they, or any of their immediate families, are assessables in the Keystone Indemnity Exchange.' The trial judge refused the request. This Court, in reversing the case held that the fact that a prospective juror or a member of his immediate family was an 'assessable' in the Keystone would create bias or prejudice in the juror's mind. His financial interest 'would theoretically incline him in favor of recovery of verdict for the Liquidator'. On the other hand, he...