Emj Corp. v. Hudson Specialty Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 26 August 2014 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:11-cv-00228-GHD-JMV |
Parties | EMJ CORPORATION and WESTCHESTER FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY PLAINTIFFS v. HUDSON SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY DEFENDANT |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
Presently before the Court in this declaratory judgment action are Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on insured status [78], Defendant's second motion for summary judgment [96], Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on priority of coverage [98], and Defendant's motion to bifurcate trial [120].1 Upon due consideration of the parties' motions, responses, replies, corresponding briefs, exhibits, and authorities, the Court finds that the four motions should be denied. Genuine disputes of material fact still exist that preclude the granting of summary judgment, and bifurcation of the trial on Plaintiffs' bad faith/punitive damages claim is not warranted.
Summary judgment "should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Weaver v.CCA Indus., Inc., 529 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2008). The rule "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548.
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the Court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. See id. at 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548. Under Rule 56(a), the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to "go beyond the pleadings and by . . . affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' " Id. at 324, 106 S. Ct. 2548; Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 282 (5th Cir. 2001); Willis v. Roche Biomedical Labs., Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995).
Where the parties dispute the facts, the Court must view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007) (internal citations omitted). "However, a nonmovant may not overcome the summary judgment standard with conclusional allegations, unsupported assertions, or presentation of only a scintilla of evidence." McClure v. Boles, 490 F. App'x 666, 667 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Hathaway v. Bazany, 507 F.3d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 2007)).
On or about February 15, 2005, EMJ Corporation ("EMJ") and Contract Steel Construction, Inc. ("Contract Steel") entered into a subcontractor agreement for the execution of work on a JC Penney Project in Southaven, Mississippi (the "Project"). EMJ was the general contractor on the Project. Contract Steel was the subcontractor, performing, in relevant part, theinstallation of a steel stairway, which was designed and constructed by another entity. With regard to requisite liability insurance coverage, the subcontractor agreement provides in relevant part:
[Contract Steel] shall maintain, at its own cost, such insurance as will protect it and [EMJ] from . . . any claim for bodily injury, . . . both physical and loss of use, which may arise from the Work or any performance under the [subcontract, whether such work or performance are by [Contract Steel] or its officers, agents, subcontractors, suppliers, employees[,] or those with whom it controls for any part of the Work . . . . This indemnification shall only be applicable to the conduct attributable to [Contract Steel] or anyone directly or indirectly employed, contracted[,] or supervised by [Contract Steel] or by anyone for whose acts [Contract Steel] may be liable.
Subcontractor Agreement [1-1] at 2, ¶ 5. In accordance with the subcontractor agreement, Contract Steel took out insurance policies, including one from Hudson Specialty Insurance Company ("Hudson Specialty"). In relevant part, the Hudson Specialty Policy provides that an insured under the policy includes:
[a]ny person or organization for whom you [Contract Steel] have agreed in writing prior to any "occurrence" or "offense" to provide insurance such as is afforded by this policy, but only with respect to operations performed by you [Contract Steel] or on your behalf, or facilities owned or used by you [Contract Steel].
Hudson Specialty Policy [1-4] at 22, Part III(2)(f).
Thereafter, Contract Steel installed a steel stairway at the Project and tendered the installation of the stairway to EMJ, which accepted it. Approximately two weeks later, JC Penney apparently engaged Professional Services Industries, Inc. to inspect an entrance canopy at the construction site. John Meeker, an employee of Professional Services Industries, Inc., was assigned the job. In the course of conducting the inspection, Meeker fell while descending thesteel stairway previously installed by Contract Steel. Meeker sustained injuries that rendered him a paraplegic.
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