Emmanuel Baptist Church v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.

• Decision Date: 21 August 2012
• Docket Number: NO. CIV-11-594-D,CIV-11-594-D
• Citation: Emmanuel Baptist Church v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., NO. CIV-11-594-D (W.D. Okla. Aug 21, 2012)
• Parties: EMMANUEL BAPTIST CHURCH, Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma

EMMANUEL BAPTIST CHURCH, Plaintiff,

v.STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant.

NO. CIV-11-594-D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

Dated: August 21, 2012

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment [Doc. No. 32]. Plaintiff timely responded, and Defendant filed a reply.

I. Background:

Plaintiff asserts causes of action alleging breach of two insurance contracts covering structures which sustained hail and other storm damage on May 16, 2010. In the first count of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant breached an insurance contract covering the primary church building and adjacent structures located at 2401 North Kelley in Oklahoma City (the "North Kelley property"), and it breached a separate insurance contract covering a house owned by Plaintiff at 2008 N.E. 30th Street in Oklahoma City (the "N.E. 30th property"). The second count of the Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant also breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing and acted in bad faith in handling the two insurance claims. As to these contentions, Plaintiff seeks both actual and punitive damages.

Defendant moves for summary judgment on the breach of insurance contract claim involving the policy covering the N.E. 30th property. It also seeks judgment on the bad faith allegations relatedto both insurance claims and Plaintiff's demand for punitive damages as to those claims. Defendant expressly does not seek judgment on Plaintiff's breach of insurance contract claim involving the North Kelley property.

II. Summary judgment standards:

Summary judgment shall be granted where the undisputed material facts establish that one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A material fact is one which may affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). To avoid summary judgment, a plaintiff must present more than a "mere scintilla" of evidence; the evidence must be such that "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Id. The facts in the record and reasonable inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Swackhammer v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 493 F.3d 1160, 1167 (10th Cir. 2007); MacKenzie v. City & County of Denver, 414 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir. 2005). However, to establish the existence of a "genuine" material factual dispute, the nonmoving party must present evidence to show more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 45 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).

Where the undisputed facts establish that a plaintiff cannot prove an essential element of a cause of action, the defendant is entitled to judgment on that cause of action. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. However, it is not the responsibility of the summary judgment movant to disprove the plaintiff's claim; rather, the movant need only point to "a lack of evidence for the nonmovant on an essential element of the nonmovant's claim." Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 671 (10th Cir. 1998). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to "go beyond the pleadings and 'set forthspecific facts' that would be admissible in evidence in the event of trial from which a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant." Id. (citations omitted).

In opposing a summary judgment motion, a plaintiff cannot rely on the allegations in his complaint, his personal beliefs, or conclusory assertions; rather, he must come forward with evidence outside the pleadings sufficient to create a factual dispute with regard to the issue on which judgment is sought. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The facts must be identified by reference to affidavits, deposition transcripts, or specific exhibits incorporated therein. Adler, 144 F.3d at 671 (citing Thomas v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1013 (1992)). Conclusory arguments in the nonmovant's brief are not adequate to create an issue of fact, and are insufficient to avoid summary judgment. Harvey Barnett, Inc. v. Shidler, 338 F.3d 1125, 1136 (10th Cir. 2003). It is not the responsibility of the Court to attempt to locate evidence not cited by a plaintiff which could support his position. Adler, 144 F.3d at 671.

"The purpose of a summary judgment motion is to assess whether a trial is necessary." Berry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 490 F. 3d 1211, 1216 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 360 (10th Cir.1995)). "In other words, there 'must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.'" Id. (quoting Panis v. Mission Hills Bank, N.A., 60 F.3d 1486, 1490 (10th Cir.1995)).

III. The record before the Court:

The record reflects the following facts are not disputed or are established by the evidence submitted as exhibits to the parties' summary judgment briefs.

Defendant issued Policy No. 96-12-3581-9, providing coverage for the North Kelley property located at 2140 North Kelley in Oklahoma City. A separate policy, No. 96-64-4346-1,provides coverage for the N.E. 30th property ("N.E. 30th Policy"). Both policies provided coverage for hail and wind damage, and both were effective on May 16, 2010, when the insured properties sustained damage. A copy of Policy No. 96-12-3581-9 (the "North Kelley Policy") is submitted as Defendant's Exhibit 1.¹ It is not disputed that the North Kelley Policy has a deductible of $5,000.00, and the N.E. 30th Policy deductible is $500.00.

The N.E. 30th property:

Plaintiff notified Defendant of the damage to the N.E. 30th property on July 28, 2010. Defendant's Reply Ex. 2, p. 12.² The N.E. 30th property was inspected by Defendant on August 3, 2010. Based on that inspection and Defendant's estimate of the costs of repair, less the deductible and depreciation, Defendant issued a $4,809.13 check to Plaintiff on August 3, 2010. Id. at pp. 10, 12.

On or about October 12, 2010, Plaintiff's counsel contacted Defendant and advised that his law firm had been retained by Plaintiff with regard to the N.E. 30th Policy claim.³ Defendant's Ex. 3. He requested copies of the N.E. 30th Policy and any documents regarding Plaintiff's claim andDefendant's communications with Plaintiff regarding the claim. Id. On November 3, 2010, Defendant sent the requested copies to counsel, and enclosed a copy of the August 3, 2010 check for $4,809.13, along with Defendant's estimate of the loss to the N.E. 30th property.

On January 20, 2011, Plaintiff's counsel sent a letter to Defendant in which Plaintiff accused Defendant of improperly handling the N.E. 30th property insurance claim, and demanded $2,289.03 in additional costs of repair for the property. Defendant's reply Ex. 5 at p. 2. In response, Defendant asked Plaintiff's counsel to furnish a copy of the estimate for the additional repair costs, and Plaintiff's counsel sent the estimate on April 18, 2011. Defendant's reply Ex. 7. A copy of Plaintiff's estimate, reflecting a total cost of $7,597.16, was submitted. Defendant's reply Ex. 8. The estimate was received by Defendant on April 26, 2011 and, on May 9, 2011, Defendant issued to Plaintiff an additional check in the amount of $2,085.16. Defendant's reply Ex. 2, p. 4. The August 3, 2010 check for $4,809.13 plus the May 9, 2011 check for $2,085.16 comprise the total payment by Defendant of $6,894.29 paid to Plaintiff on its claim for the N.E. 30th property.

Plaintiff contends the May 16, 2010 damage to the N.E. 30th property was $7,597.16, which consisted of all repairs on that structure. The evidence reflects that Defendant agreed the replacement cost was $7,597.16. Defendant's Ex. 22, p. 3. Defendant's Ex. 22, p. 3. Its total payment to Plaintiff was based on that amount, with a reduction of $500.00 for the deductible and $202.87 for depreciation, resulting in a total payment by Defendant of $6,894.29. Id. Following Plaintiff's receipt of the May 9, 2011 check of $2,085.16, Plaintiff made no additional demand for insurance coverage for the N.E. 30th property.

The North Kelley property:

On June 22, 2010, Plaintiff notified Defendant of its claim for the May 16, 2010 damage tothe North Kelley property. With respect to the North Kelley property, the evidence of record reflects the damage to the church building and auxiliary buildings was significantly greater than the damage to the N.E. 30th property. The record also reflects that there remains a dispute as to whether Defendant's several payments to Plaintiff are sufficient to satisfy Defendant's obligations under the contract of insurance for the North Kelley property and whether it breached the contract of insurance. Because Defendant does not seek judgment on the breach of contract claim regarding the North Kelley property, the Court will not detail the evidence in the record regarding the ongoing dispute about the nature of the damage sustained, the repair work performed, or the propriety of the amounts paid. However, some of these facts are material to Plaintiff's bad faith cause of action regarding this insurance claim, as Plaintiff contends the manner in which Defendant handled the claim and the delay in making various payments constitute bad faith.

The record reflects that Defendant has issued several checks to Plaintiff for repairs related to the North Kelley Policy claim. A total of $154,397.53, consisting of several separate checks, has been paid to Plaintiff during the pendency of its claim. Defendant's Ex. 20. Plaintiff contends that the total loss was $310,101.93, although it agrees that the $5,000.00 deductible applies, thus reducing its claimed loss amount to $305,101.93. Defendant's Ex. 9. Subsequent estimates from Plaintiff from EDC Contracting Consultants ("EDC") and from Jim Kotter reflected a total repair cost of $314,190.91. Defendant's Ex. 14...