Emmons Coal Mining Co. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co.
Decision Date | 10 January 1925 |
Docket Number | No. 3181.,3181. |
Citation | 3 F.2d 525 |
Parties | EMMONS COAL MINING CO. et al. v. NORFOLK & W. RY. CO. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Conlen, Acker, Manning & Brown, of Philadelphia, Pa. (J. T. Manning, Jr., of Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for plaintiff in error Emmons Coal Mining Co.
William G. Wright, of Philadelphia, Pa. (J. T. Manning, Jr., of Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for plaintiff in error Fidelity & Casualty Co.
J. Hamilton Cheston, F. M. Rivinus, and Theodore W. Reath, all of Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant in error.
Before BUFFINGTON, Circuit Judge, and BODINE and GIBSON, District Judges.
In the court below the Norfolk & Western Railway Company brought its action against the Emmons Coal Mining Company and the Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York to recover an amount alleged to be due as demurrage upon certain cars of coal shipped over the line of the plaintiff by the first-named defendant. The Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York was surety upon the bond of the Emmons Coal Mining Company, conditioned that the principal should pay all freight charges, demurrage, etc., due from it to the railway company.
The defendants each filed an affidavit of defense, raising questions of law, in effect a demurrer to plaintiff's statement. These defenses were overruled by the court below, with leave given to defendants to answer as to the facts. Thereupon defendants obtained a rule upon the plaintiff to show cause why the latter should not furnish certain information relative to the cars upon which demurrage was claimed. This rule was made absolute as to part of the information demanded, and discharged as to the other matters of which discovery was sought. Then defendants each filed an affidavit of defense, in effect the same, and plaintiff moved for judgment by reason of the alleged insufficiency of such affidavits. This motion was granted and judgment entered for the plaintiff.
The assignments of error in the instant case set forth the overruling of the defendants' affidavits of defense raising questions of law, the discharge, in part, of the rule to show cause, and the entry of judgment for want of sufficient affidavits of defense. The facts material to our present inquiry, as they appear from the pleadings, are substantially as follows:
The Emmons Coal Mining Company, in December, 1920, and January, February, and March, 1921, shipped a number of cars of coal over the lines of the Norfolk & Western Railway to Lambert's Point, Va., for transshipment in vessels. At the time these shipments were made a tariff of changes of demurrage on cars containing coal for transshipment at Norfolk and Lambert's Point, Va., duly filed and published, was in effect on the Norfolk & Western Railway. The parts of the tariff applicable to our present inquiry are the following:
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At the time the aforementioned shipments of coal were made, the Emmons Coal Mining Company was a member of the Lambert's Point Coal Exchange, the object of which appears in the second of its articles of organization and rules, which follows:
The Lambert's Point Coal Exchange, with its rules, was recognized by the Norfolk & Western Railway Company, which appointed and paid its manager. Under the rules of the organization, each member shipped his coal to himself, care of the Lambert's Point Coal Exchange Pool. After the coal had passed Bluefield, W. Va., it was credited to the shipper, and thereafter coal to an equal amount could be delivered at any time to a vessel, provided his order was placed with the manager of the exchange. By the agreement of the members of the exchange, the manager was not required, in obeying the order of a member for the transshipment of his coal, to take such coal from cars shipped by that member and standing in the yards of the Norfolk & Western Railway at the point of transshipment, but was permitted to dump cars shipped by another member which contained coal of a quality equal to that ordered out. It will be remembered that rule 3 (b) 2 of the demurrage tariff, quoted supra, allowed a substitution of a car of a shipper of later arrival for one of earlier arrival at the point of transshipment, and by the agreement of the members of the exchange a further substitution of the car of one member for that of another was permitted.
Around this power of substitution centers the main controversy...
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