Emmons v. Shaw

CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
Writing for the CourtMORTON, J.
CitationEmmons v. Shaw, 171 Mass. 410, 50 N. E. 1033 (Mass. 1898)
Decision Date22 June 1898
PartiesEMMONS et al. v. SHAW, State Treasurer.

The following is the agreed statement of facts "In the above-entitled cause it is hereby agreed: (1) That Thomas B. Wales, formerly of Boston, in said county of Suffolk, died seised and possessed of a certain parcel of land situate in the rear of Federal street, and known as a 'Wales Wharf.' (2) That by his will, which was duly allowed in the probate court for this county in 1853, he devised an undivided half of said wharf to his son George W Wales for life, and subject to his disposal by will; but, if he died intestate, with further limitations as to the fee not now material. (3) That during the life of said George W Wales a portion of said undivided half of said wharf was sold by leave of court, after appropriate proceedings, and the proceeds thereof invested, according to the order of the court, in the erection of buildings upon the remainder of said wharf estate. (4) That said George W. Wales died in 1896, testate, and by his will, which was duly allowed in this county, appointed said undivided half of said Wales wharf, and the proceeds of that portion thereof which was sold and invested as aforesaid, to said Nathaniel H. Emmons and Gardiner P. Gates in trust to pay the net income therefrom to his wife, Maria W. Wales, during her life, and after her decease to convey the same in fee to his nephews, Thomas B. Wales, Joseph H. Wales, Robert W. Emmons, Nathaniel H. Emmons, Samuel F. Emmons, George B. Emmons, and Arthur B. Emmons, and to his niece, Annie W. Brewster, and provided further that, if any of said nephews or niece should die before his said wife, his or her share should be transferred to his or her children then living, and the issue then living of any deceased child by right of representation, and, if any of them should so die without leaving issue alive at his said wife's death, his or her share should be transferred and conveyed to the survivors, and to the issue of any deceased nephew or niece by right of representation. (5) By a codicil to his said will, duly allowed in this county, said George W. Wales changed the terms of the trust created by his said will as set forth in the preceding paragraph, so far as it related to his said nephew Samuel F. Emmons, by making the following provision: 'If my nephew Samuel F. Emmons should die before my said wife, or before me, if I should survive her, without leaving issue who survive both my wife and me, and he should leave a widow who shall survive both my wife and me, then I direct my said trustees to hold what would have been my said nephew's share of said estate in trust during the life of said widow, and to pay her the net income of such share during her life, and upon her decease to transfer and convey said share to my other nephews and niece then living, and the issue of any deceased nephew or niece by right of representation.' (6) That the wife of said Samuel F. Emmons, who was living at the time of the execution of said codicil, has recently deceased, and said Samuel F. Emmons is at present unmarried. The said Maria W. Wales is still living. (7) Said nephews and niece are the grandchildren of said Thomas B. Wales, the original testator, under the power in whose will said George W. Wales acted in making said appointment. (8) Said George W. Wales left property owned in his own right valued at over one hundred thousand dollars, and at his death there were no known claims against his estate, except the usual small bills which are ordinarily found after a man's death; and there is no possibility, so far as the executors know, of there ever being any necessity of resorting to the said undivided half of Wales Wharf for the payment of claims against said estate."

COUNSEL

Frank Brewster, for plaintiffs.

H.M. Knowlton, Atty. Gen., and F.T. Hammond, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

OPINION

MORTON J.

The question in this case is whether George W. Wales, the donee of the power, is to be regarded as the decedent whose property passed by will, or whether Thomas B. Wales, the donor of the power, is to be regarded as the decedent; for it is manifest, we think, from the act, that the property referred to as passing by will is that of the decedent, and that it is the relationship of the parties described in the act to the decedent which determines whether the property is subject to or exempt from taxation. In a sense, perhaps, one executing a power by will, so as to effect the disposition of property thereby, might be said to have caused its transmission by will, and therefore to be the decedent. It is settled in this commonwealth that if one has a general power of appointment, and executes it by will, the property so appointed will be regarded as assets of his estate, and his creditors will be entitled to it, in preference to his voluntary appointees. Clapp v. Ingraham, 126 Mass 200; Olney v. Balch, 154 Mass. 318, 28 N.E. 258. See Crawford v. Langmaid (Mass.; May, 1898) 50 N.E. 606. It is also settled that, for the purposes of administration, it is more simple and convenient that the property should be administered by the executor of the will of the party exercising the power. Olney v. Balch, supra. In some other respects the consequences which follow the exercise of the power of appointment would seem to tend to support the contention of the defendant that the donee of the power should be regarded as the decedent. Hole v. Escott, 4 Mylne & C. 187, 192; Duke of Marlborough v. Lord Godolphin, 2 Ves.Sr. 61, 78, 79; Rous v. Jackson, 29 Ch.Div. 521, 526, Chitty, J., quoting Sugd. Powers; Jackson v. Davenport, 20 Johns. 537, 551; 2 Sugd. Powers (3d Am.Ed.) 19. Nevertheless we think that the donor of the power, rather than the donee, must be regarded as the decedent. The legislature has not defined the word "decedent" as used in the statute, and has not attempted, in terms, to deal with property passing under powers of appointment, general or otherwise. It simply has enacted, among other things, that the property of a decedent, passing by will, shall pay a tax, except in certain cases. The construction of the statute must be determined, therefore, by the application to the subject-matter of the ordinary rules of law relating to powers of appointment, and by considering the manner in which...

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1 books & journal articles
  • The federalist dimension of regulatory takings jurisprudence.
    • United States
    • Yale Law Journal Vol. 114 No. 2, November 2004
    • November 1, 2004
    ...A. 725 (Me. 1922) (holding that a contingent remainder does not constitute property for state inheritance tax purposes); Emmons v. Shaw, 50 N.E. 1033, 1035 (Mass. 1898) (holding that property subject to the power of appointment is the donor's property for inheritance tax purposes, but conce......