Emory v. Miller

• Decision Date: 20 April 1992
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 91-0045L.
• Citation: 790 F. Supp. 368
• Parties: Pamela G. EMORY, Individually and in Her Capacity as Administratrix of the Estate of Charles E. Emory, and as Parent and Guardian of Kristin M. Emory, a Minor, Plaintiffs, v. Charles MILLER and Hanson Systems, Inc., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

790 F. Supp. 368

Pamela G. EMORY, Individually and in Her Capacity as Administratrix of the Estate of Charles E. Emory, and as Parent and Guardian of Kristin M. Emory, a Minor, Plaintiffs, v. Charles MILLER and Hanson Systems, Inc., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 91-0045L.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

April 20, 1992.

Jeffrey B. Pine, John S. Foley, Decof & Grimm, Providence, R.I., for plaintiffs.

David E. Maglio, Morrison, Mahoney & Miller, Providence, R.I., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LAGUEUX, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on the motion of defendant Charles Miller for summary judgment. This lawsuit grows out of an automobile accident in Drummondville, Quebec Province, Canada, in which Charles Emory died. Emory was Miller's subordinate at Hanson Systems, Inc. (a Massachusetts corporation), and a passenger in a car owned by Hanson Systems and driven by Miller when the accident occurred. Emory's family and estate brought this suit against Miller,¹ alleging negligence. The Emorys are Massachusetts residents, and Miller is a Rhode Island resident.

All parties agree that Massachusetts law controls this dispute. The determinative issue is whether the plaintiffs' losses are compensable under the Massachusetts workers' compensation system. If workers' compensation is available, then the "fellow employee" rule precludes a tort remedy, and summary judgment in this forum is appropriate. Saharceski v. Marcure, 373 Mass. 304, 306, 366 N.E.2d 1245 (1977); Comeau v. Hebert, 352 Mass. 634, 635, 227 N.E.2d 475 (1967); Frassa v. Caulfield, 22 Mass.App.Ct. 105, 107, 491 N.E.2d 657, rev. denied, 398 Mass. 1101, 495 N.E.2d 310 (1986). Conversely, if workers' compensation is unavailable, then this negligence suit can be maintained and summary judgment must be denied.

For the reasons that follow, this Court cannot presently conclude that the plaintiffs' losses are compensable under Massachusetts' workers' compensation system. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment must be denied.

II. DISCUSSION

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The parties agree on the following description of events. At the time of his death, Emory was a sales engineer for Hanson Systems. Miller was the owner and sole stockholder of that company. During the months leading up to the accident Emory was assigned to work on a machine assembly project at the Drummondville plant of the Siemens Corporation, a Hanson Systems client.

This business required Emory to live away from home for extended periods. When working at the Siemens site he lodged at the Universal Motel in Drummondville. Hanson Systems reimbursed Emory for his hotel and mileage expenses, and the company also provided him with a per diem living allowance for meals and incidental expenses. Emory's normal weekday routine included work between 7:30 a.m. and 5:30 p.m., followed by dinner and occasionally a few hours at a local sporting event, bar, or nightclub. He often spent these evenings out with Michael Lavoie, a fellow Hanson Systems employee, and Francois Viger, a Siemens employee.

On July 11, 1990, Miller and Daniel Szczurko, Hanson Systems' vice president for sales and marketing, came to Drummondville for business meetings with Siemens officials. On the evening of their arrival Miller drove Emory, Szczurko, and Lavoie to a local restaurant for dinner and a discussion of the next day's business. After dinner the foursome spent several hours in a nearby nightclub, L'Avenir, before returning to the Universal Motel.

After work the next day, July 12, the same group of four joined several Siemens employees for dinner at a local restaurant, at the request of Jacques Nadeau, Siemens's president. They discussed business and social topics. During dinner Nadeau invited the Hanson Systems group to his home for drinks, and they accepted the invitation.

After about one hour at Nadeau's home—around eleven o'clock—the four Hanson Systems employees departed in the company car, with Miller at the wheel, to return to the Universal Motel. As the car approached the hotel, however, Miller announced that he was taking the others to the nightclub that they had visited the previous night. He asked for directions, which Emory supplied, and the car continued past the hotel in the direction of L'Avenir. Emory did not openly object to the new plan. En route on Rue St. Joseph, Miller lost control of the car, and Emory died in the resulting single-car accident.

Emory, Miller, Szczurko, and Lavoie all had workers' compensation insurance coverage, pursuant to Mass.Gen.L. ch. 152. Neither Emory nor any of the others had opted, under Mass.Gen.L. ch. 152, § 24, to retain common law rights to tort remedies.

B. ANALYSIS

1. Summary Judgment Standard

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the standard for ruling on a summary judgment motion:

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

This Court cannot grant a motion for summary judgment if genuine issues of material fact exist. Any fact that could affect the outcome of the suit is material. Ryan, Klimek, Ryan Partnership v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 728 F.Supp. 862, 866 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 916 F.2d 731 (1st Cir.1990). The Court must view the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, here the plaintiff, indulging all inferences favorable to that party. King v. Sullivan, 776 F.Supp. 645, 649 (D.R.I. 1991).

The burden of showing that this motion should be granted rests on the defendant. An injured party who seeks workers' compensation normally has the burden of proving that the injury occurred in the course of employment. Belyea's Case, 355 Mass. 721, 723, 247 N.E.2d 372 (1969); Judkins's Case, 315 Mass. 226, 230, 52 N.E.2d 579 (1943). But here the injured party does not want workers' compensation. It is the employer's representative who has raised the fellow employee rule as an affirmative defense to the common law negligence claim, and he is also the movant for summary judgment. Consequently, a defendant moving for summary judgment on the basis of the fellow employee defense has the burden of proving the defense. See Williams v. Shell Oil Co., 677 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087, 103 S.Ct. 570, 74 L.Ed.2d 933 (1982).

2. Legal Framework

The line between an employee's personal and occupational activities determines whether or not workers' compensation is available. Although many activities have mixed purposes, workers' compensation law cannot function without defining where work ends and personal time begins. This necessary distinction is often difficult to make, but it must exist in every case. The Court's task is to draw the line that is most consistent with the standards set forth in the relevant statutory and case law.

The Massachusetts Workers' Compensation Statute, Mass.Gen.L. ch. 152, provides the starting point for the analysis. This law, enacted in 1930, states:

If an employee who has not given notice of his claim of common law rights of action under section twenty-four, or who has given such notice and has waived the same, receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, or arising out of an ordinary risk of the street while actually engaged, with the employer's authorization, in the business affairs or undertakings of his employer, and whether within or without the commonwealth, he shall be paid compensation by the insurer or self-insurer....

Mass.Gen.L. ch. 152, § 26 (West 1988) (emphasis added). This statute continues:

For the purposes of this section any person, while operating or using a motor or other vehicle, whether or not belonging to his employer, with his employer's general authorization or approval, in the performance of work in connection with the business affairs or undertakings of his employer, and whether within or without the commonwealth, and any person who, while engaged in the usual course of his trade, business, profession or occupation, is ordered by an employer, or by a person exercising superintendence on behalf of such employer, to perform work which is not in the usual course of such work, trade, business, profession or occupation, and while so performing such work, receives a personal injury, shall be conclusively presumed to be an employee....

Id. (emphasis added). Since 1941, however, the statute has not allowed recovery for:

any injury resulting from an employee's purely voluntary participation in any recreational activity, including but not limited to athletic events, parties, and picnics, even though the employer pays some or all of the cost thereof.

Id. § 1(7A) (emphasis added).

Case law gives greater content to these statutory phrases. The Massachusetts courts have interpreted "in the course of his employment" very broadly. See Kemp's Case, 386 Mass. 730, 736, 437 N.E.2d 526 (1982) ("the trend of the cases over the years has been to broaden the reach of the phrase `arising out of and in the course of ... employment'"). The cases uniformly agree that "an injury arises out of the employment if it arises out of the nature, conditions, obligations or incidents of the employment; in other words, out of the employment looked at in any of its aspects." Caswell's Case, 305 Mass. 500, 502, 26 N.E.2d 328 (1940), quoted in Papanastassiou's Case, 362 Mass. 91, 93, 284 N.E.2d 598 (1972), Souza's Case, 316 Mass. 332, 334, 55 N.E.2d 611 (1944), Frassa, 22 Mass.App.Ct. at 110, 491 N.E.2d 657, Swasey's Case, 8 Mass.App.Ct. 489, 493, 395 N.E.2d 884 (1979).

Travel, like all other activities, can be either personal or occupational. When an employee travels "with the employer's authorization, in the business affairs or undertakings of his...