Empire Laundry Mach. Co. v. Brady

• Decision Date: 23 November 1896
• Citation: 164 Ill. 58,45 N.E. 486
• Parties: EMPIRE LAUNDRY MACHINERY CO. v. BRADY.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

164 Ill. 58

45 N.E. 486

EMPIRE LAUNDRY MACHINERY CO.

v.BRADY.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 23, 1896.

Appeal from appellate court, First district.

Action by Sarah A. Brady, administratrix of the estate of Stafford N. Brady, deceased, against the Empire Laundry Machinery Company to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's intestate, caused by defendant's negligence. From a judgment of the appellate court (60 Ill. App. 379) affirming a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.G. L. Shorey and J. A. & H. R. Baldwin, for appellant.

Kavanagh & O'Donnell, for appellee.

This was an action on the case, brought by appellee against appellant, to recover damages for the death of her husband and intestate, Stafford N. Brady. In March, 1889, the deceased was an employé of the firm of Wilson & Fuchs, who were engaged in the operstion of a laundry, their principal business being the cleaning of soiled towels and cloths, which, when cleansed, were used for wiping machinery. Brady was salesman and superintendent of the laundry, in which two other employés were engaged. At that time appellant was engaged in the manufacture and sale of laundry machinery, washers, and wringers. In February or March, 1889, Wilson & Fuchs purchased from appellant's company an ordinary laundry wringer, consisting of two wooden rollers in an iron frame, and weighing from 75 to 100 pounds. It rested on four feet, which were arranged for castors, and also each of the feet had an opening to receive the screws or bolts by which it might be fastened to the floor. At the time of the accident the wringer was fastened to the floor by two wooden screws or bolts. When sold, the wringer had a handle on the fly wheel with which to operate it. Appellant was told, at the time, that it might be desired to use it for power, and was informed that it could be done by taking off the handle and putting on pulleys for a belt. In a few days after its purchase it was changed to a power machine by taking off the handle and placing upon the shaft pulleys, and belting it to a line shaft which furnished power to a washing machine in the same room. On March 29th Fuchs requested appellant to send a man to put on a larger pulley, in order to increase the speed, and this necessitated also splicing the belt to make it longer. Complying with this request, appellant sent out one of its machinists, Hayton, who proceeded to do the work required. When the work had been completed, Hayton requested Brady to assist him in adjusting the belt on the pulley to start the machinery. As soon as the belt was adjustend the wringer was pulled from its fastenings on the floor, the belt flew off, and in some manner wrapped itself about Brady, and he was whirled around the shaft, his body striking the joist and pulley with such force that he died from his injuries in a short time. The negligence charged in the declaration is that the defendant did not use reasonable skill and diligence in setting up themachinery, etc., and so unskillfully set it up, and constructed and fastened it to the floor, that it was insecure and unsafe, whereby it gave way, and caused the injury complained of, while he was working for appellant, and at its request. An additional count was in substance the same, except that it charged negligence in defendant not having a sufficient number of skilled men in setting up such machinery to be used for laundry purposes. Wilson & Fuchs were joined as codefendants in the case, but the suit was not pressed as to them. On the trial a number of special findings were submitted to the jury by appellant, answers to which were returned by them, finding that the wringer was not properly set up and fastened to the floor, with reference to the purpose for which it was intended and adapted; that the death of deceased was caused by insecure fastening; that he was not a mere volunteer, assisting appellant's agent, when injured; and that he could not have avoided the injury by the exercise of ordinary care and prudence. At the close of plaintiff's evidence, a motion was made by defendant to instruct the jury to find for it, but was refused by the court. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff of $5,000. A motion for a new trial was overruled, and judgment entered on the verdict. On appeal to the appellate court of the First district, this judgment was affirmed, and appeal was prosecuted by the appellant to this court.

PHILLIPS, J. (after stating the facts).

A number of reasons are urged by appellant for the reversal of this judgment, which, to the extent it is consistent or proper for this court to consider, will be noted. The question as to whether the decedent was guilty of contributory negligence, resulting in the injuries received by him, is a question of fact which has been settledadversely to appellant by the special finding of the jury, its verdict, and by the judgment of the appellate court. There was, without doubt, evidence tending...