Empire State Ins. Co. of Watertown, N.Y. v. Guerriero
Decision Date | 09 November 1949 |
Docket Number | 5. |
Citation | 69 A.2d 259,193 Md. 506 |
Parties | EMPIRE STATE INS. CO. OF WATERTOWN, N.Y. et al. v. GUERRIERO. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Suit by Mary Guerriero against Empire State Insurance Company, of Watertown, New York, and others, to recover under extended coverage provision of fire policies insuring against damage by explosion.
The Baltimore City Court, Michael J. Manley, J., entered judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appealed in one record.
The Court of Appeals, Collins, J., held that expert testimony that rupture of pipe was due to explosion and not freezing was admissible and with appearance of pipe was sufficient to take question to jury and that failure to specify in proofs of loss, claim for damage by explosion did not preclude recovery under extended coverage provision and affirmed the judgment.
Jacob Kartman, Baltimore (Makover & Kartman, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellants.
Paul L Cordish, Baltimore, for appellee.
Before MARBURY, C.J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, GRASON, HENDERSON and MARKELL, JJ.
Mary Guerriero, as plaintiff, appellee here, sued the three appellants jointly on three policies of fire insurance, in standard form, covering her property on Forrest Street in Baltimore. From a judgment in favor of the appellee the appellants appeal to this Court.
Each policy contained an extended provision to cover, among other things, 'explosions.' The trial judge in his charge to the jury gave the following definition of 'explosion,' to which no exception was taken by any of the parties:
The appellants contend (1) that the trial judge erred in admitting in evidence the testimony of Henry E. Kreis who has been engaged in the heating and power plant construction business for the past forty years and who testified as an expert in the case; (2) that the court erred in refusing to direct a verdict for each defendant; (3) that the trial judge erred in his charge to the jury with respect to proofs of loss and waiver thereof.
As we must pass upon the demurrer prayers it is necessary that we recite the evidence at some length. Between the hours of 7:30 and 8:00 a. m. on January 20, 1948, the husband of the appellee visited the unheated building, covered by the insurance policies, and used as a warehouse incident to the grocery business conducted by the appellee. The temperature in Baltimore on that day varied from a minimum of 21 to a maximum of 38 degrees. In order to heat water to wash bottles, clothes, and rags, he lit the gas burner under the hot water heater which he testified had been in good condition. He saw nothing wrong with it at that time. He said that there was no gas escaping and no water around the heater then. In about forty-five minutes he returned to the building and found water dripping from the second to the first floor. He ran upstairs, smelled gas and turned the heater off, and then observed a stream of water coming from a hole in the coil. The loss was immediately reported to the appellants.
Mr Henry E. Kreis, whose qualifications as an expert were not questioned, testified that he has been in the heating and power plant construction business since 1909, and has sold and installed a great many heaters of this type and has had experience with explosions of heating and hot water equipment. As a result of a telephone call he visited the appellee's warehouse shortly after January 20th. He found the particular coil lying on a table. He examined it and saw the rupture in the bottom of the coil. He examined the coil and testified that in his opinion He testified that, even if the water has frozen in a solid mass of ice during the night and expanded and broken the coil, there probably would have been some drippage which would have been observed on the gas burner and which would have made it difficult to light. He said that in his opinion the coil burst because of an explosion and that is why so much water came out of the coil, because when the burner was lit probably all of the ice in the coil thawed out, and the pipe leading from the heater to the tank was still frozen because there was no circulation up there, and when that burst the water ran freely. Of course, no one heard an explosion. When asked by the Court whether he had ever heard 'of one of these things exploding,' he answered, 'No, Your honor, I have never, in that type.' He evidently meant that he had never heard of an explosion in that particular design. However, he testified that he had had experience with from seventy-five to one hundred explosions in heating and water equipment. When asked how he reconciled the statement that this was an explosion, with the statement that if the water in the coil froze and the coil expanded it resulted in a bursted coil, he answered, He emphasized in his testimony that the 'blooming out' of the pipe indicates an explosion and not a freezing and if the pipe had frozen it would have split along its length. He said if the break had been caused by freezing it would split parallel with the sides of the tubing and the metal would be somewhat parted to relieve the pressure caused by the ice.
The appellants contend that the facts to be proven were within the ordinary knowledge and experience of man and were not the subject of expert testimony, and the failure or inability of the appellee to produce proof of facts to support a finding of an explosion did not permit the substitution of expert testimony for factual testimony. They further contend that even though expert testimony were admissible there was no factual basis shown or stated, upon which expert testimony could be predicated, and it was improper to permit the expert to characterize the occurrence as an explosion. They contend that there were not sufficient physical facts to permit an expression of opinion and when the expert testified that in his opinion there had been an explosion, he usurped the function of the jury.
It is of course well settled that the evidence of an expert witness is not admissible if the jury is able to decide or determine the question before it without special expert testimony. The witness must not usurp the province of the jury. Baltimore Belt R. Co. v. Sattler, 100 Md. 306, 334, 59 A. 654, 3 Ann.Cas. 660; Hanrahan v. City of Baltimore, 114 Md. 517, 527, 80 A. 312; Capital Traction Co. v. Contner, 120 Md. 78, 83, 84, 87 A. 904; Griffith v. Pullman Co., 142 Md. 514, 521, 121 A. 362; Blinder v. Monaghan, 171 Md. 77, 87, 188 A. 31; Bode v. Carroll-Independent Coal Co., 172 Md. 406, 418, 191 A. 685; Long v. Joestlein, Md., 66 A.2d 407, 411. If a matter is within the knowledge and experience of persons of ordinary judgment and experience, opinion evidence, expert or otherwise, should not be admitted. If the facts can be intelligently understood by the jury and they can form a reasonable opinion from those facts for themselves, there is no reason to admit the opinion evidence of anyone. However, when the question involved is such that jurors of ordinary judgment and experience are incompetent to draw their own conclusion from the facts presented and intelligently decide the question before them without the aid of expert testimony, this opinion testimony is a notable exception to the well known rules of evidence. This exception should be applied with the greatest caution and discrimination. Harris v. Consolidation Coal Co., 111 Md. 209, 219, 72 A. 805. It was said by this Court in the case of Langenfelder v. Thompson, 179 Md. 502, at page 505, 20 A.2d 491, at page 493, 136 A.L.R. 960,
In the case before us the coil was was admitted in...
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Chapter 8 The Need for a Prompt Notice of Claim
...3d 566, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).[6] . Id. (emphasis added).[7] . Md. Code Ann., Ins. § 19-110.[8] . Empire State Ins. Co. v. Guerriero, 193 Md. 506, 69 A.2d 259 (1949).[9] . Fire Ins. Co. v. Merrick, 171 Md. 476, 489, 190 A. 335 (1937).[10] . Auto. Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 153 Md. 253, 261, 13......