Empiremining Developing Company v. Kennedy Hanley

• Decision Date: 15 May 1905
• Docket Number: No. 604,STATE-IDAHO,604
• Citation: 198 U.S. 292,25 S.Ct. 691,49 L.Ed. 1056
• Parties: EMPIREMINING & DEVELOPING COMPANY and the American Bonding Company of Baltimore, Appts. , v. KENNEDY J. HANLEY
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

198 U.S. 292

25 S.Ct. 691

49 L.Ed. 1056

EMPIRE STATE-IDAHO MINING & DEVELOPING COMPANY and the American Bonding Company of Baltimore, Appts.,

v KENNEDY J. HANLEY.

No. 604.

Submitted May 1, 1905.

Decided May 15, 1905.

Hanley brought this bill in equity in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Idaho, setting up diversity of citizenship as the ground of jurisdiction, and asserted owner- ship of an undivided one-eighth interest, and of an undivided one-third interest in the Skookum mining claim, Shoshone county, Idaho. As to the one-third interest, Hanley claimed under certain proceedings in the probate court of that county, which were, without notice to him, as he said, set aside, and the interest conveyed to the Chemung Company, and by the latter to the Empire State etc. Mining Company. Hanley's title to the one-eighth interest was derived through mesne conveyances from the original grantee under a patent from the United States. This interest Hanley had conveyed to Sweeny and Clark by a deed deposited in the Exchange National Bank of Spokane, to be delivered on certain specified conditions, and he averred that Sweeny and Clark obtained possession of the deed wrongfully, and contrary to the escrow agreement, and afterwards made a pretended deed of the interest to the Empire State Company.

On hearing, the circuit court decreed against Hanley as to both interests. Hanley carried the case to the circuit court of appeals, which held that he was not entitled to relief as to the one-third interest, but that he was as to the one-eighth interest. The decree was therefore reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings. 48 C. C. A. 612, 109 Fed. 712. The case went back and was referred to a master for an accounting as to the eighth interest, who reported a large amount of money as due to Hanley. The circuit court reduced the amount by deducting the cost of working the property while Hanley was excluded from the mine, and entered a decree quieting Hanley's title to the one-eighth interest, and giving him judgment against the Empire State Company for the last-named amount. Defendant appealed from this decree, and filed a supersedeas bond with the American Bonding Company of Baltimore as surety, and Hanley prosecuted a cross appeal, questioning the deduction. The circuit court of appeals sustained the cross appeal, and held that the circuit court erred in allowing defendants their working costs. 61 C. C. A. 153, 126 Fed. 97. The case was remanded with directions to modify the decree. This was done and recovery of the original amount decreed, and also recovery on the bond of the amount it was given to secure, and another appeal was taken by the companies to the court of appeals, which affirmed the decree. The pending appeal having been subsequently allowed, was submitted on motion to dismiss.

Messrs. George Gurner, W. B. Heyburn, and F. T. Post for appellants.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 294-295 intentionally omitted] Mr. M. A. Folsom for appellee.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 295-296 intentionally omitted] Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court:

We are of opinion that the jurisdiction of the circuit court was dependent entirely upon diversity of citizenship, and that this appeal must be dismissed. Appellants' contention is that the allegations of Hanley's complaint as to the one-third interest amounted to the assertion that he had been deprived of that interest by the probate court without due process of law, and were sufficient to support the jurisdiction of the circuit court on this ground, irrespective of diversity of citizenship. We do not so regard the allegations. What Hanley asserted was that his title to the third interest was good because he had purchased it from the administrator under the decree of the probate court, and that the subsequent decree of that court, annulling the prior decree, was invalid for want of jurisdiction to render it at a subsequent term, for want of...