Employers' Liability Assur. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins.

• Decision Date: 27 January 1887
• Parties: EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ASSUR. CO. v. COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

31 N.W. 542

64 Mich. 614

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ASSUR. CO. v. COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE.

Supreme Court of Michigan

January 27, 1887

Mandamus.

Isaac Marsten, for relator.

CAMPBELL C.J.

Relator a British company, applied to the insurance commissioner for a license to transact business in this state, which he refused to allow without a deposit of securities to the amount of $100,000, which is required by statute where no similar deposit has been made at such other place as is contemplated by law Relator showed proper evidence that such a deposit had been made in the state of New York upon the conditions required by our legislation. The only question is whether, under the statute which governs this case, and which was fully discussed on the argument, a deposit in New York is a sufficient compliance. The statute (Laws 1881, p. 279) requires a deposit of at least $100,000 with the state treasurer of this state, or with the chief financial officer or commissioner of insurance of the state where such company or association is organized, duly assigned to such officer in trust for the benefit of all policy-holders. Said deposit shall consist of bonds or stocks of the United States, or of the state where such company or association is organized, or of bonds and mortgages on improved unincumbered real estate worth double the sum loaned thereon. It is not disputed that the statute designs to allow licenses to companies formed under the laws of foreign governments, as well as to those created in other states of the Union. They are all covered expressly by more than one section of the statute. But the right to rely on a deposit of securities elsewhere is in terms confined to deposits in the state in which a company is "organized," It is not claimed that this relator was organized in New York; but it is insisted that obtaining authority to do business there satisfied sufficiently the essentials of organization. It is further claimed that the insurance department has practically construed this statute by licensing companies on that theory, and that the present commissioner had done the same thing until his attention was directed to the question in such a way as to lead him to doubt its correctness.

Much respect is due to practical construction when it does no violence to language, and has been so long continued as to show general acquiescence; but in this case the present refusal is from the same officer whose predecessors have given the other construction, and who has refused to recognize it. The law has not been in force long enough to make it evident that this construction has been brought home to the attention of the various departments of the government, and approved by their acquiescence. It would require a very clear case of practical acquiescence to authorize us to compel the head of a bureau to follow precedents which he does not himself regard as binding unless they are at least so harmonious...