Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. MFA Mutual Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 12 October 1967 |
Docket Number | No. 9293.,9293. |
Citation | 384 F.2d 111 |
Parties | EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY, a corporation, Appellant, v. MFA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation, Peggy Offill and William E. Anderson, Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Edwin Dudley Smith, Topeka, Kan. (David H. Fisher and Donald Patterson, of Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Summers, Topeka, Kan., were with him on the brief), for appellant.
Lawrence J. Nelson, Topeka, Kan., (Harold E. Doherty and James E. Benfer, of Doherty & Benfer, Topeka, Kan., were with him on the brief), for appellees.
Before PHILLIPS, LEWIS and HILL, Circuit Judges.
The endorsement further provided that for such other person:
Anderson's 1964 Dodge was insured by appellee MFA under a $25,000 liability policy that contained an endorsement entitled "Drive Other Cars-Broad Form." This endorsement provided in pertinent part:
Peggy Offill was injured in the subject collision and brought an action for damages against Anderson in the District Court of Douglas County, Kansas where she obtained a judgment for $10,000. MFA defended the suit after Employers Mutual refused to do so and incurred expenses of $2160 over and above the amount of the judgment. MFA then instituted this diversity action3 against Employers Mutual, Peggy Offill and William Anderson for a declaratory judgment to determine the nature and extent of coverage afforded Anderson under the two respective policies. Upon motions for summary judgment by both sides, the District Court concluded that both insurance companies stood on an equal footing in connection with their respective "other insurance" clauses and that equity thus required equal division of the judgment and expenses in the Offill-Anderson litigation. Judgment was entered accordingly. Employers Mutual appeals urging that the existence of MFA's admitted coverage, either primary or excess, operated to withdraw any coverage by Employers Mutual under the express terms of its insurance contract with Shortman Motor Company.
The conclusions of the District Court were premised upon, among other things, two critical determinations concerning the Employers Mutual policy. The first was that it would have provided Anderson with full primary coverage up to $200,000 but for the existence of the MFA policy and the second was that its "other insurance" provision, like that of MFA's, was in the nature of an "excess clause." We consider both of these determinations to be erroneous.
As we read the omnibus endorsement in appellant's policy, and there is nothing elsewhere in the policy or in the record to aid in interpretation, primary coverage of persons in the class and status of Anderson was expressly limited to "the applicable minimum limit of liability for bodily injury or property damage specified in the financial responsibility law of the state in which the automobile is principally garaged." The State of Kansas requires that after an accident occurs the persons involved, at the direction of the vehicle department of the state highway commission, shall provide either proof of automobile liability insurance or a deposit of security. Minimum limits in effect at the time of the subject accident are specified as follows:
Aside from any consideration of other insurance, therefore, we deem the intent and purpose of Employers Mutual, as reflected in the cited policy provisions and in the recitation that limited coverage was provided in consideration of a reduced premium on the policy, were to provide permissive users like Anderson only with insurance sufficient to meet the $5,000 minimum. Any liability in excess of this amount would have had to come from elsewhere, including the permissive user himself if he did not happen to have adequate excess coverage. The primary coverage of up to $200,000 was applicable solely to Shortman Motor Company, its officers, stockholders, employees and members of their households, and the record is clear that Anderson did not fall into any of these categories.
So,...
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