Employers Mutual Casualty Company v. Maggart

• Decision Date: 28 December 1966
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 66-71-SA.
• Citation: 261 F. Supp. 768
• Parties: EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY v. Sarah W. MAGGART et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

261 F. Supp. 768

EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY v. Sarah W. MAGGART et al.

Civ. A. No. 66-71-SA.

United States District Court W. D. Texas, San Antonio Division.

December 28, 1966.

Edward P. Fahey, Groce, Hebdon, Fahey & Smith, San Antonio, Tex., for plaintiff.

Frank R. Southers, Southers & Mendelsohn, San Antonio, Tex., Glasscock & Glasscock, San Antonio, Tex., for defendants.

SPEARS, Chief Judge.

This is a workmen's compensation case arising out of the death of Raymond Maggart. Defendants, Sarah W. Maggart and Charlotte Kay Maggart, are the surviving spouse and minor daughter, respectively, of the deceased employee.

The Texas Industrial Accident Board awarded the widow and the minor child $17.50 per week each for 360 consecutive weeks, less attorneys' fees, and ordered funeral expenses paid to the extent of $500.00. Although the amount awarded each defendant was $6,300.00, the plaintiff insurance company in this diversity action, contends that, for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction on this Court, the two sums should be aggregated.¹

The defendants have filed a plea challenging the jurisdiction of this Court, in which they allege that the wage rate of the deceased would entitle each of them to the death benefit of $6,300.00 awarded by the Board, and contend that since the total amount recoverable by each could not be in excess of $10,000.00 to a legal certainty, this cause should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

If the amount in controversy, determined under federal standards, is more than $10,000.00, this Court, of course, has jurisdiction.² The question for decision, therefore, is whether or not the widow and minor child of the deceased have separate claims for death benefits under Texas law.³

The pertinent portions of the Texas Workmen's Compensation Law read, in part, as follows:

"If death should result from the injury the association hereinafter created shall pay the legal beneficiaries of the deceased employee a weekly payment equal to sixty per cent (60%) of his average weekly wages, but not more than Thirty-five Dollars and no/100 ($35) nor less than Nine Dollars and no/100 ($9) per week, for a period of three hundred and sixty (360) weeks from the date of the injury."⁴

"The compensation provided for in the foregoing section of this law shall be for the sole and exclusive benefit of the surviving * * * wife, * * * and of the minor children * * *; and the amount recovered thereunder shall not be liable for the debts of the deceased nor the debts of the beneficiary or beneficiaries and shall be distributed among the beneficiaries as may be entitled to the same as hereinbefore provided according to the laws of descent and distribution of this State; provided the right in such beneficiary or beneficiaries to recover compensation for death be determined by the facts that exist at the date of the death of the deceased and that said right be a complete, absolute and vested one. Such compensation shall not pass to the estate of the deceased to be administered upon, but shall be paid directly to said beneficiaries when the same are capable of taking, under the laws of this State, or to their guardian or next friend * * *." (Emphasis mine.)⁵

Texas Courts have construed these statutes to mean that the compensation payable to the beneficiary never becomes a part of the estate of the deceased, and is not liable for his debts, but is the exclusive property of the beneficiary. Texas Employees Insurance Association v. Morgan, 289 S.W. 75 (Tex.Civ.App., Waco 1927, Affd. Tex.Com.App., 295 S.W. 588).

In Nunnery v. Texas Casualty Insurance Company, 362 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Civ.App., Austin 1962, no writ history) the Court denied recovery to a surviving widow, who failed to file her claim within the time required by law, but did award one half of the entire amount of compensation to the minor child.⁶

The case of Purdy v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 296 F.2d 196 (5 Cir. 1961) is clearly distinguishable from this case. The Court simply held, in the light of Horton,⁷ that in view of the counterclaim for $11,600.00, the district court had jurisdiction, and rejected the objection that the 1958 amendment of the diversity statute proscribed maintenance of the suit. It is true that the claimants were a widow and two minor children, but they made no...