Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith

• Decision Date: 17 April 1990
• Docket Number: No. 88-1213,88-1213
• Citation: 110 S.Ct. 1595,108 L.Ed.2d 876,494 U.S. 872
• Parties: EMPLOYMENT DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES OF OREGON, et al., Petitioners v. Alfred L. SMITH et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

494 U.S. 872

110 S.Ct. 1595

108 L.Ed.2d 876

EMPLOYMENT DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES OF OREGON, et al., Petitioners

v Alfred L. SMITH et al.

No. 88-1213.

Argued Nov. 6, 1989.

Decided April 17, 1990.

Rehearing Denied June 4, 1990.

See 496 U.S. 913, 110 S.Ct. 2605.

Syllabus

Respondents Smith and Black were fired by a private drug rehabilitation organization because they ingested peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of their Native American Church.Their applications for unemployment compensation were denied by the State of Oregon under a state law disqualifying employees discharged for work-related "misconduct."Holding that the denials violated respondents' First Amendment free exercise rights, the State Court of Appeals reversed.The State Supreme Court affirmed, but this Court vacated the judgment and remanded for a determination whether sacramental peyote use is proscribed by the State's controlled substance law, which makes it a felony to knowingly or intentionally possess the drug.Pending that determination, the Court refused to decide whether such use is protected by the Constitution.On remand, the State Supreme Court held that sacramental peyote use violated, and was not excepted from, the state-law prohibition, but concluded that that prohibition was invalid under the Free Exercise Clause.

Held: The Free Exercise Clause permits the State to prohibit sacramental peyote use and thus to deny unemployment benefits to persons discharged for such use.Pp. 876-890.

(a) Although a State would be "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" in violation of the Clause if it sought to ban the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts solely because of their religious motivation, the Clause does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a law that incidentally forbids (or requires) the performance of an act that his religious belief requires (or forbids) if the law is not specifically directed to religious practice and is otherwise constitutional as applied to those who engage in the specified act for nonreligious reasons.See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States,98 U.S. 145, 166-167, 25 L.Ed. 244.The only decisions in which this Court has held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action are distinguished on the ground that they involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but that Clause in conjunction with other- constitutional protections.See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut,310 U.S. 296, 304-307, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903-905, 84 L.Ed. 1213;Wisconsin v. Yoder,406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15. Pp. 876-882.

(b)Respondents' claim for a religious exemption from the Oregon law cannot be evaluated under the balancing test set forth in the line of cases following Sherbert v. Verner,374 U.S. 398, 402-403, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1792-1794, 10 L.Ed.2d 965, whereby governmental actions that substantially burden a religious practice must be justified by a "compelling governmental interest."That test was developed in a context—unemployment compensation eligibility rules—that lent itself to individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct.The test is inapplicable to an across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct.A holding to the contrary would create an extraordinary right to ignore generally applicable laws that are not supported by "compelling governmental interest" on the basis of religious belief.Nor could such a right be limited to situations in which the conduct prohibited is "central" to the individual's religion, since that would enmesh judges in an impermissible inquiry into the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith.Cf.Hernandez v. Commissioner,490 U.S. 680, 699, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 2148-2149, 104 L.Ed.2d 766.Thus, although it is constitutionally permissible to exempt sacramental peyote use from the operation of drug laws, it is not constitutionally required.Pp. 882-890.

307 Or. 68, 763 P.2d 146, reversed.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, STEVENS, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined.O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in Parts I and II of which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined without concurring in the judgment, post, p. 891.BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 907.

David B. Frohnmayer, for petitioners.

Craig J. Dorsay, Portland, Or., for respondents.

Justice SCALIAdelivered the opinion of the Court.

This case requires us to decide whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment permits the State of Oregon to include religiously inspired peyote use within the reach of its general criminal prohibition on use of that drug, and thus permits the State to deny unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs because of such religiously inspired use.

I

Oregon law prohibits the knowing or intentional possession of a "controlled substance" unless the substance has been prescribed by a medical practitioner.Ore.Rev.Stat. § 475.992(4)(1987).The law defines "controlled substance" as a drug classified in Schedules I through V of the Federal Controlled Substances Act,21 U.S.C. §§ 811-812, as modified by the State Board of Pharmacy.Ore.Rev.Stat. § 475.005(6)(1987).Persons who violate this provision by possessing a controlled substance listed on Schedule I are "guilty of a Class B felony."§ 475.992(4)(a).As compiled by the State Board of Pharmacy under its statutory authority, see, § 475.035, Schedule I contains the drug peyote, a hallucinogen derived from the plant Lophophora williamsii Lemaire.Ore.Admin.Rule 855-80-021(3)(s)(1988).

RespondentsAlfred Smith and Galen Black(hereinafter respondents) were fired from their jobs with a private drug rehabilitation organization because they ingested peyote for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of the Native American Church, of which both are members.When respondents applied to petitionerEmployment Division(hereinafter petitioner) for unemployment compensation, they were determined to be ineligible for benefits because they had been discharged for work-related "misconduct."The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed that determination, holding that the denial of benefits violated respondents' free exercise rights under the First Amendment.

On appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court, petitioner argued that the denial of benefits was permissible because respondents' consumption of peyote was a crime under Oregon law.The Oregon Supreme Court reasoned, however, that the criminality of respondents' peyote use was irrelevant to resolution of their constitutional claim—since the purpose of the "misconduct" provision under which respondents had been disqualified was not to enforce the State's criminal laws but to preserve the financial integrity of the compensation fund, and since that purpose was inadequate to justify the burden that disqualification imposed on respondents' religious practice.Citing our decisions in Sherbert v. Verner,374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965(1963), andThomas v. Review Bd., Indiana Employment Security Div.,450 U.S. 707, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624(1981), the court concluded that respondents were entitled to payment of unemployment benefits.Smith v. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources,301 Or. 209, 217-219, 721 P.2d 445, 449-450(1986).We granted certiorari.480 U.S. 916, 107 S.Ct. 1368, 94 L.Ed.2d 684(1987).

Before this Court in 1987, petitioner continued to maintain that the illegality of respondents' peyote consumption was relevant to their constitutional claim.We agreed, concluding that "if a State has prohibited through its criminal laws certain kinds of religiously motivated conduct without violating the First Amendment, it certainly follows that it may impose the lesser burden of denying unemployment compensation benefits to persons who engage in that conduct."Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,485 U.S. 660, 670, 108 S.Ct. 1444, 1450, 99 L.Ed.2d 753(1988)(Smith I ).We noted, however, that the Oregon Supreme Court had not decided whether respondents' sacramental use of peyote was in fact proscribed by Oregon's controlled substance law, and that this issue was a matter of dispute between the parties.Being "uncertain about the legality of the religious use of peyote in Oregon,"we determined that it would not be "appropriate for us to decide whether the practice is protected by the Federal Constitution."Id., at 673, 108 S.Ct., at 1452.Accordingly, we vacated the judgment of the Oregon Supreme Court and remanded for further proceedings.Id., at 674, 108 S.Ct., at 1452.

On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court held that respondents' religiously inspired use of peyote fell within the prohibition of the Oregon statute, which "makes no exception for the sacramental use" of the drug.307 Or. 68, 72-73, 763 P.2d 146, 148(1988).It then considered whether that prohibition was valid under the Free Exercise Clause, and concluded that it was not.The court therefore reaffirmed its previous ruling that the State could not deny unemployment benefits to respondents for having engaged in that practice.

We again granted certiorari.489 U.S. 1077, 109 S.Ct. 1526, 103 L.Ed.2d 832(1989).

II

Respondents' claim for relief rests on our decisions in Sherbert v. Verner, supra, Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., supra,andHobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida,480 U.S. 136, 107 S.Ct. 1046, 94 L.Ed.2d 190(1987), in which we held that a State could not condition the availability of unemployment insurance on an individual's willingness to forgo conduct required by his religion.As we observed in Smith I, however, the conduct at issue in those cases was not prohibited by law.We held that distinction to...