Employment Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com'n

• Court: California Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: CARTER; GIBSON; SPENCE
• Citation: Employment Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com'n, 263 P.2d 4, 41 Cal.2d 676 (Cal. 1953)
• Decision Date: 13 November 1953
• Parties: EMPLOYERS MUT. LIABILITY INS. CO. OF WISCONSIN v. INDUSTRIAL ACC. COMMISSION et al. L. A. 22765.

Page 4

263 P.2d 4

41 Cal.2d 676

EMPLOYERS MUT. LIABILITY INS. CO. OF WISCONSIN v. INDUSTRIAL ACC. COMMISSION et al.

L. A. 22765.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Nov. 13, 1953.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 10, 1953.

Spray, Gould & Bowers and C. W. Bowers, Los Angeles, for petitioner.

Edmund J. Thomas, Jr., and T. Groezinger, San Francisco, for respondents.

CARTER, Justice.

A panel of the Industrial Accident Commission denied workmen's compensation to the applicant, Fred E. Gideon, employee of Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc., on the ground that, while the head injury suffered by him occurred in the course of his employment, it did not arise out of it. On reconsideration, it found the injury both occurred in the course and arose out of the employment and awarded compensation. That award is here for review.

The facts are not disputed. Gideon was on the job on his employer's premises and working for his employer. He was suffering from a headache after returning from the employer's dispensary where he had obtained aspirin to relieve it, and while walking down an aisle on his employer's premises, he had an idiopathic seizure not connected with his employment, which caused him to fall to the concrete floor and strike his head thereon, causing the injuries to his head for which compensation was awarded. There is no question that the injury occurred in the course of the employment. The dispute is whether it arose out of his employment.

It is settled in this state and elsewhere that an injury suffered from a fall on the employer's premises, in the course of employment, from a height or on or against some object, arises out of the employment and is compensable, even though the fall was caused by an idiopathic condition of the employee (National Automobile & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 75 Cal.App.2d 677, 171 P.2d 594, where numerous authorities are cited), and it is pointed out that Brooker v. Industrial Accident Commission, 176 Cal. 275, 168 P. 126, L.R.A.1918F, 878, to the contrary, is no longer the law since George L. Eastman Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 186 Cal. 587, 200 P. 17 and California Notion & Toy Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 59 Cal.App. 225, 210 P. 524 (see cases collected in Horovitz on Workmen's Compensation, pp. 144 et seq.; Horovitz, Current Trends in Workmen's Compensation, pp. 649 et seq.; Schneider's Workmen's Compensation (Text Perm.Ed.), § 1376). The reasoning of those authorities is that the injury for which compensation is sought, was caused by the impact of the employee's body with an object or surface of the employer's premises, and hence arose out of the employment, because such injury was an incident thereof, although the fall may also have been a causal factor which had no connection with the employment. That reasoning is equally applicable where the fall is merely to the floor or ground, in the course of the employment, and death or injury results from striking the floor or ground. It has been held that such injury arises out of the employment, and is compensable, although the fall was caused by a disease of the employee, having no relation to the employment. See Barlau v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement Co., 214 Minn 564, 9 N.W.2d 6; President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Stone, 61 App.D.C. 200, 59 F.2d 875; Savage v. St. Aeden's Church, 122 Conn. 343, 189 A. 599; Rockford Hotel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 300 Ill. 87, 132 N.E. 759, 19 A.L.R. 80; General Ins. Corp. v. Wickersham, Tex.Civ.App., 235 S.W.2d 215, writ of error refused, 149 Tex. 679; Tapp v. Tapp, 192 Tenn. 1, 236 S.W.2d 977; Burroughs Adding Mach. Co. v. Dehn, 110 Ind.App. 483, 39 N.E.2d 499; Burton-Shields Co. v. Steele, 119 Ind.App. 216, 83 N.E.2d 623, 85 N.E.2d 263; Watson v. Grimm, Md., 90 A.2d 180; New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Hoage, 61 App.D.C. 360, 62 F.2d 468, certiorari denied, 288 U.S. 608, 53 S.Ct. 400, 77 L.Ed. 982; Protectu Awning Shutter Co. v. Cline, 154 Fla. 30, 16 So.2d 342; Horovitz, Stepping and Falling, 4 N.A.C.C.A. Law Journal 64; Schneider's Workmen's Compensation (Text Perm.Ed.), § 1376. In General Ins. Corp. v. Wickersham, supra, the court said (235 S.W.2d 217): 'The conflicting views in the cases where the employee is injured by falling on the floor or ground, as distinguished from falling from ladders, or into holes, or against objects other than the floor or ground, are exemplified by the majority and dissenting opinions in Andrews v. L. & S. Amusement Corporation, 253 N.Y. 97, 170 N.E. 506, where compensation was denied, and in Savage v. St. Aeden's Church, 122 Conn. 343, 189 A. 599, where compensation was awarded. * * *

'The cases denying compensation do so on the theory that a floor presents no risk or hazard that is not encountered everywhere, and that such risks and perils as they do present are only those which confront all members of the public. The cases allowing compensation do so on the theory that the injury need not be the product of a peril or hazard which exposes the employee to extraordinary risk, in order to be compensable, and that the hazard presented by the floor renders the injury compensable, not because it should have been foreseen or expected, but because it is a hazard that is peculiar to the employment, and is one that is incidental to and grows out of the employment. * * *

'It is our belief, and we so hold, that the attempted distinction between cases where the employee falls from a ladder, or into a hole, or against some object, and those where the employee falls to the ground or floor, is without a reasonable basis.' There are cases to the contrary but the modern trend is definitely in accordance with the view above expressed.

The contrary holdings in denying compensation overlook several important principles. Though an injury to be compensable must arise out of the employment, that is, occur by reason of a condition or incident of employment, the injury need not be of a kind anticipated by the employer nor peculiar to the employment in the sense that it would not have occurred elsewhere. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 26 Cal.2d 286, 158 P.2d 9, 159 A.L.R. 313; Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 19 Cal.2d 622, 122 P.2d 570, 141 A.L.R. 798. If we look for a causal connection between the employment and the injury, such connection need not be the sole cause; it is sufficient if it is a contributory cause. Colonial Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 29 Cal.2d 79, 172 P.2d 884. Where a person is required to be on the streets in the course of his employment and falls to the street, the resulting injury arises out of the employment. State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Industrial Accident Commission, 194 Cal. 28, 227 P. 168. And finally '* * * reasonable doubts as to whether an injury is compensable are to be resolved in favor of the employee.' Truck Insurance Exchange v. Industrial Accident Commission, 27 Cal.2d 813, 816, 167 P.2d 705, 706; Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Industrial...