Emrit v. Jules
| Docket Number | 4:23-cv-00908-MTS |
| Decision Date | 24 July 2023 |
| Parties | RONALD SATISH EMRIT, Plaintiff, v. SABINE AISHA JULES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter comes before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Ronald Satish Emrit for leave to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. (Docket No 2). Having reviewed the motion, the Court finds that it should be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss this action without prejudice. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) ( that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not required to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).
When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should construe the plaintiff's complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). However, even pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (). In addition, affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
Plaintiff is a self-represented individual and an extremely prolific litigant in the federal court system. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida has counted 338 lawsuits that he has filed. See Emrit v. Jules, No. 4:23-cv-8-WS-MAF (N.D. Fla.). Meanwhile, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana tallied 674 cases initiated by plaintiff in the federal courts over the last ten years. See Emrit v. Jules, No. 1:23-cv-1197-RLY-MKK (S.D. Ind.). When this Court searched for plaintiff on the government's Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) website, the Court found plaintiff to have originated 420 federal civil cases all across the country. The Court will take judicial notice of these filings.[1]
Due to plaintiff's history of abusive litigation, several United States District Courts have barred him from filing new complaints, unless certain conditions are met. See Emrit v. University of Miami School of Law, 2023 WL 2910903, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 29, 2023) (); Emrit v. DeVos, 2020 WL 9078298, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2020) (); Emrit v. Trump, 2019 WL 935028, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2019) (enjoining and prohibiting plaintiff “from filing any additional complaints in the Southern District of Ohio which have not first been certified to have been filed in the correct venue by an attorney in good standing,” or in which the full filing fee is paid); Emrit v. Simon, 2017 WL 11483905, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 8, 2017) (); and Emrit v. Social Security Administration, 2015 WL 4597834, at *1 (D. Nev. July 29, 2015) ().
Beginning in January 2023, plaintiff began filing lawsuits in various federal district courts against defendant Sabine Aisha Jules. More specifically, the Court has found thirty separate lawsuits, many of them nearly identical, all naming Jules - plaintiff's ex-wife - as defendant, and generally accusing her of tortious interference with family relations. Of these cases, two were transferred,[2]thirteen were dismissed prior to service,[3]and fifteen are pending initial review.[4]
Plaintiff filed the instant action on July 17, 2023, by which point thirteen prior cases against defendant Jules had already been dismissed on initial review by eleven different United States District Courts. As noted by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, there are 94 judicial districts in the United States of America, and plaintiff is clearly “making the rounds” in an attempt to find one that will entertain his case. See Emrit v. Jules, No. 1:23-cv-1197-RLY-MKK (S.D. Ind. July 14, 2023).
As noted above, plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who has filed a civil action against Sabine Aisha Jules, who is identified as plaintiff's ex-wife. The complaint is not on a Court-provided form. Plaintiff states at the outset that he is looking “to obtain an injunction as an equitable remedy in the form of an annulment regardless of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine or the previous divorce granted in 2006” by Judge Susan Greenhawt in Broward County Florida. (Docket No. 1 at 1).
In the section of the complaint titled “Nature of the Case,” plaintiff asserts that “Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas would agree that the plaintiff has a First Amendment freedom of association to get married to a Caucasian woman from the Ukraine,” and to have that fundamental right protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, “pursuant to a broad interpretation of the stare decisis of Loving v. Virginia.”[5]Docket [1] at 1-2. He further states that “Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito would agree that it is a form of witchcraft reminiscent of the Salem Witch Trials...to deprive an American man of the opportunity to have one legally-recognized marriage to a Caucasian woman from the Ukraine.” Id. Plaintiff contends “that the American family structure is of the utmost important and that if an American man wants a Stepford wife from the Ukraine to be his only legally recognized marriage, then this implied fundamental right is also protected by” the Fourth Amendment's right to privacy, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery and indentured servitude. Id. at 2.
Plaintiff blithely admits that he “is now forum shopping in several federal courts to obtain an annulment of a previous marriage.” Id. Specifically, as noted above, he was divorced in 2006 pursuant to an order by Judge Greenhawt of the 17th Judicial Circuit of Broward County, Florida. At that time, a $5,000 child support order was also entered, which he appealed. Eventually, in 2009, his parental rights were terminated, rendering the child support order “null and void as if the plaintiff had given his daughter up for adoption.” Id. The termination of parental rights took place in Deerfield Beach, Florida. Plaintiff also mentions litigating against a foster care agency in Utah and Hawaii.
Despite getting married in Las Vegas, Nevada, on August 31, 2002, and getting divorced in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, in 2006, “plaintiff argues that he can obtain an annulment anywhere in the United States based on a theory of federal question of Equal Protection, Due Process, Freedom of Association, Right to Privacy, Privileges and Immunities and/or diversity of jurisdiction.” Docket [1] at 3.
In the section of the complaint titled “Parties to this Litigation,” plaintiff explains that he “is an indigent, disabled, and unemployed resident of” both Florida and Maryland. He states that he splits his time evenly between those two states, and that his current mailing address is Bowie, Maryland. As to defendant, plaintiff “believes” that she “lives in the vicinity of Fort Lauderdale and/or Broward County,” but that he does...
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