Enbridge Pipeline (Illinois), LLC v. Hoke
Decision Date | 28 January 2019 |
Docket Number | No. 4-15-0545,No. 4-15-0544,4-15-0544 |
Citation | 429 Ill.Dec. 212,2019 IL App (4th) 150544 -B,123 N.E.3d 1271 |
Parties | ENBRIDGE PIPELINE (ILLINOIS), LLC, n/k/a Illinois Extension Pipeline Company, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edward HOKE ; Sonna H. Hoke; Non-Record Claimants; and Unknown Owners, Defendants (Thomas J. Pliura, Appellant). Enbridge Pipeline (Illinois), LLC, n/k/a Illinois Extension Pipeline Company, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PMC Farms, LLC; Charles Murphy, Tenant; Non-Record Claimants; and Unknown Owners, Defendants (Thomas J. Pliura, Appellant). |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Thomas J. Pliura, of LeRoy, appellant pro se.
Gerald A. Ambrose, of Sidley Austin LLP, of Chicago, and John M. Spesia and Jacob E. Gancarczyk, of Spesia & Ayers, of Joliet, for appellee.
¶ 1 In the summer of 2014, Enbridge Pipeline (Illinois), LLC, now known as the Illinois Extension Pipeline Company, LLC (IEPC), brought an easement condemnation action against (1) Edward Hoke and Sonna H. Hoke and (2) PMC Farms, LLC, and its tenant, Charles Murphy (collectively, landowners). See Enbridge Pipeline (Illinois), LLC v. Hoke , 2017 IL App (4th) 150544, ¶ 2, 414 Ill.Dec. 664, 80 N.E.3d 807. Landowners subsequently filed traverse motions. Id. .) Ultimately, the trial court denied landowners' traverse motions, and landowners appealed. Id. ¶ 2
¶ 2 In July 2017, this court vacated the trial court's ruling and remanded the proceeding for the trial court to consider "only two matters on remand, which are landowners' claims challenging (1) the rebuttable presumptions of public use and public necessity and (2) the [Illinois Commerce] Commission's determination as to good-faith negotiations[.]" Id. ¶ 134. This court retained jurisdiction to review the trial court's ruling on remand. Id. ¶ 146 ; Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967).
¶ 3 In January 2018, Thomas J. Pliura, the attorney representing landowners, filed a memorandum entitled "Evidence Landowners Seek To Present To Rebut The ‘Good-Faith Negotiation’ Presumption" (memorandum) in support of landowners' traverse motions. In this memorandum, Pliura argued that, based on the totality of the circumstances, IEPC did not negotiate in good faith. One of the factors which Pliura cited was that IEPC gave landowners only a 10-day time frame in which to respond to the final offer. In May 2018, after conducting a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied landowners' traverse motions.
¶ 4 Also in May 2018, IEPC filed a motion for sanctions against Pliura pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018). In July 2018, the trial court sanctioned Pliura, concluding that his memorandum "was not objectively reasonable and was filed solely to harass, to cause unnecessary delay, and/or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation."
¶ 5 Pliura appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sanction him, (2) IEPC's motion for sanctions was procedurally insufficient, (3) the trial court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing before imposing sanctions, and (4) the trial court abused its discretion by sanctioning him. We disagree with Pliura and conclude that (1) the trial court had jurisdiction, (2) Pliura forfeited his argument that the motion for sanctions was procedurally insufficient, (3) Pliura forfeited his argument regarding the need for an evidentiary hearing, and (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by sanctioning him.
¶ 6 Also in this appeal, IEPC (1) suggests that this court should sanction Pliura pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 375(b) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) and (2) requests oral argument pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018). We decline both IEPC's suggestion and request.
¶ 9 In the summer of 2014, IEPC brought an easement condemnation action against landowners. See Hoke , 2017 IL App (4th) 150544, ¶ 28, 414 Ill.Dec. 664, 80 N.E.3d 807. Landowners subsequently filed traverse motions, arguing that IEPC's condemnation suit should be dismissed. Id. ¶¶ 29-31. Ultimately, the trial court denied landowners' traverse motions. Id. ¶ 41. Landowners appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by denying them the ability to conduct discovery. Id. ¶ 122. In July 2017, this court concluded that "landowners were entitled to present relevant evidence to rebut these specific presumptions and to refute the good-faith finding." Id. ¶ 133. This court remanded the case back to the trial court to consider "only two matters on remand, which are landowners' claims challenging (1) the rebuttable presumptions of public use and public necessity and (2) the [Illinois Commerce] Commission's determination as to good-faith negotiations[.]" Id. ¶ 134. We further concluded that "[c]onsistent with the limited nature of a traverse motion as well as our limited remand, we direct the trial court to assume control of the discovery proceedings in the instant case[.]" Id. ¶ 136. This court retained jurisdiction to review the trial court's ruling on remand. Id. ¶ 146 ; Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967).
¶ 11 In January 2018, Pliura filed his memorandum in support of the traverse motions in which he argued that, based on the totality of the circumstances, IEPC did not negotiate in good faith. One of these factors was "[t]he 10 day timeframe, from the date of the offers mailing, [IEPC] gave to the landowners to respond to the offers." Another factor was the "failure by [IEPC] to base their offers to the landowners on an appraisal[.]"
¶ 12 In April 2018, IEPC filed a response to Pliura's memorandum in which it argued that it had negotiated in good faith. In that response, IEPC also noted that it had previously informed landowners that it had based its final offer to landowners on a professional market analysis of current property values and provided landowners a "compensation worksheet" showing how it determined the final offer. IEPC also argued that it (1) was not required to provide more than 10 days to accept the final offer and (2) Pliura's memorandum was contrary to existing law and not supported by the evidence.
¶ 13 In May 2018, the trial court conducted a traverse hearing. After hearing argument from both sides, the court concluded that landowners failed to rebut (1) the presumption of public use and public necessity and (2) the presumption that the condemnor negotiated in good faith. Accordingly, the trial court denied landowners' traverse motions.
¶ 15 Also in May 2018, citing Pliura's memorandum, IEPC filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018), in which IEPC asserted that (1) Pliura knowingly made legal arguments that are contrary to binding precedent and (2) there was no good-faith basis in fact to support Pliura's arguments. Pliura filed a response in which he (1) rejected IEPC's assertions and (2) alleged that IEPC had filed its motion for sanctions for an improper purpose. Later that month, the trial court conducted a hearing on IEPC's motion for sanctions. After hearing argument from both sides, the trial court granted IEPC's motion because it concluded that Pliura's motion In June 2018, IEPC filed a "Verified Accounting of Fees and Expenses" and requested the trial court to order Pliura to pay $ 162,465 in attorney fees, as well as $ 56,246.25 in additional fines.
¶ 17 In July 2018, the trial court sanctioned Pliura in the amount of $ 61,516.10 and further ordered that Pliura could not bill his clients for this amount. The court concluded that Pliura's memorandum "was not objectively reasonable and was filed solely to harass, to cause unnecessary delay, and/or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation." The court explained that one of the reasons why it sanctioned Pliura was because his 10-day argument had been previously rejected in Enbridge Energy, Ltd. Partnership v. Fry , 2017 IL App (3d) 150765, ¶ 48, 413 Ill.Dec. 897, 79 N.E.3d 246, and in Forest Preserve District v. First National Bank of Franklin Park , 2011 IL 110759, ¶ 68, 356 Ill.Dec. 386, 961 N.E.2d 775.
¶ 18 Later in July 2018, Pliura filed a motion to reconsider in which he argued that (1) the trial court did not have jurisdiction to sanction him and (2) IEPC's Rule 137 motion for sanctions was procedurally insufficient. In August 2018, the parties tried to schedule a hearing on the motion to reconsider, but the trial court declined this request, concluding that it was without jurisdiction because the circuit clerk had already certified the record and returned it to the appellate court.
¶ 19 This appeal followed.
¶ 21 Pliura appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sanction him, (2) IEPC's motion for sanctions was procedurally insufficient, (3) the trial court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing before imposing sanctions, and (4) the trial court abused its discretion by sanctioning him. We disagree with Pliura and conclude that (1) the trial court had jurisdiction, (2) Pliura forfeited his argument that the motion for sanctions was procedurally insufficient, (3) Pliura forfeited his argument regarding the need for an evidentiary hearing, and (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by sanctioning him.
¶ 22 Also in this appeal, IEPC (1) suggests that this court should sanction Pliura pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 375(b) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) and (2) requests oral argument pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. ...
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