Encanterra Residents Against Annexation v. Town of Queen Creek

• Decision Date: 09 March 2020
• Docket Number: No. 2 CA-CV 2020-0002,2 CA-CV 2020-0002
• Parties: ENCANTERRA RESIDENTS AGAINST ANNEXATION, AN ARIZONA NONPROFIT CORPORATION; CARRAS, GREGORY A & JEANNE M REVISED TRUST, AN ARIZONA TRUST; GAYLE PETERS AND JAMEY PETERS, WIFE AND HUSBAND; AND MICHAEL POWER AND SUSAN POWER, HUSBAND AND WIFE, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. TOWN OF QUEEN CREEK, ARIZONA, A PUBLIC ENTITY, Defendant/Appellee.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

ENCANTERRA RESIDENTS AGAINST ANNEXATION,AN ARIZONA NONPROFIT CORPORATION;CARRAS, GREGORY A & JEANNE M REVISED TRUST, AN ARIZONA TRUST;GAYLE PETERS AND JAMEY PETERS, WIFE AND HUSBAND;AND MICHAEL POWER AND SUSAN POWER, HUSBAND AND WIFE, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. TOWN OF QUEEN CREEK, ARIZONA, A PUBLIC ENTITY, Defendant/Appellee.

No. 2 CA-CV 2020-0002

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION TWO

March 9, 2020

THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f).

Appeal from the Superior Court in Pinal County

No. S1100CV201901736

The Honorable Stephen F. McCarville, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Timothy A. La Sota PLC, Phoenix

By Timothy A. La Sota

Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Dickinson Wright PLLC, Phoenix

By Scott A. Holcomb, Michael S. Rubin, and Bradley A. Burns

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Chief Judge Vásquez authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Staring concurred and Judge Brearcliffe dissented in part and concurred in part.

VÁSQUEZ, Chief Judge:

¶1 Encanterra Residents Against Annexation (ERAA), along with Carras, Gregory A & Jeanne M Revised Trust, Gayle and Jamey Peters, and Michael and Susan Power (collectively, the property owners), appeal from the trial court's dismissal of ERAA's complaint seeking to enjoin the Town of Queen Creek from enforcing its ordinance annexing the Encanterra subdivision. They argue the court erred in concluding that ERAA lacked standing to file the complaint and that its first amended complaint, which added the property owners as plaintiffs, was untimely and did not relate back to the day of the original filing. They additionally contend the court erred in determining that the Town complied with statutory requirements (1) to approve a plan, policy, or procedure to provide Encanterra with infrastructure and services and (2) to provide proper notice of the meeting at which the Town Council passed and adopted the annexation ordinance. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 The relevant facts are undisputed. In June 2018, an application to annex the Encanterra subdivision, a largely developed area in San Tan Valley, was filed with the Town. Six months later, in December 2018, a public hearing on the annexation was held, and the petition sheets were circulated for signature by the residents of Encanterra. In October 2019, the petition sheets with a sufficient number of valid signatures were recorded with the Pinal County Recorder, and the Town adopted Ordinance No. 712-19 to finalize the annexation.

¶3 As part of the annexation process, the Town Council received a staff report discussing Encanterra's needs for public utilities and services, including water, electricity, gas, garbage disposal, and fire and policeprotection. On October 16, 2019, the Town Council held a meeting during which it passed and adopted Ordinance No. 712-19. Of particular relevance here, Section 5 of the ordinance states: "The Town Council approves and affirms that it is the policy of the Town to provide the newly annexed territory with infrastructure and services (to the extent not already provided) commensurate with other areas of the Town within 10 years after the annexation becomes final."

¶4 The following month, on November 14, 2019, ERAA filed its articles of incorporation with the Arizona Corporation Commission. ERAA indicated that it had no members but listed its chairman of the board (Gayle Peters), director (Michael Power), and treasurer (Jeanne Carras), all of whom had addresses within the area to be annexed. ERAA also listed its attorney as the statutory agent and his business address in Phoenix as its "Known Place of Business."

¶5 The following day, ERAA filed its complaint for special action with the trial court, requesting declaratory and injunctive relief.¹ Specifically, it asserted that the Encanterra annexation was "null and void and ineffective" based on three counts: (1) "an insufficient number of real and personal property owners signed the petition sheet," (2) "the Town failed to follow the proper procedures for annexation," in that it "ha[d] not lawfully adopted a plan, policy or procedure" to provide Encanterra with infrastructure and services, and (3) "the Town failed to hold the requisite public hearing to adopt the annexation ordinance" in violation of Arizona's open meeting laws.

¶6 Shortly thereafter, the Town filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Town argued that ERAA was not an "interested party within the territory to be annexed," as statutorily required for standing under A.R.S. § 9-471(C), because "[i]t owns no property within the annexed area" and "was incorporated . . . after the annexation ordinance was adopted." It further asserted that ERAA lacked associational standing, in part, because it had no members to represent in that capacity. The Town also maintained that counts two and three should be dismissed because ithad approved an infrastructure plan and had fully complied with Arizona's open meeting laws.

¶7 Along with its response to the motion to dismiss, ERAA filed a first amended complaint, adding the property owners as plaintiffs and asserting they all "own real and personal property within the Encanterra Annexation area." The trial court heard oral argument on the motion to dismiss and took the matter under advisement. ERAA later voluntarily dismissed count one of its complaint alleging an insufficient number of valid signatures.

¶8 In its subsequent ruling, the trial court granted the Town's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that ERAA lacked standing to file the complaint because it was not an interested party within the meaning of § 9-471(C). It explained, "The Arizona Legislature has made it clear that property owners within the annexation area are the only parties . . . entitled to challenge an annexation ordinance after it has been adopted." The court further reasoned that the first amended complaint did not correct any deficiencies because it needed to be filed within thirty days after adoption of Ordinance No. 712-19, pursuant to § 9-471(C). The court observed that if "any party without standing who brought a complaint was given additional time to then search for 'an interested party' after the 30 days has expired," the "statutory purpose of ensuring these matters are resolved on an expedited basis" would be "defeat[ed]."

¶9 Although it determined standing was "dispositive," the trial court nonetheless addressed the other two substantive issues, rejecting ERAA's claims that the Town had failed to adopt a plan, policy, or procedure for infrastructure and services and had failed to comply with the open meeting laws for the October 16, 2019 meeting. The court's ruling included finality language pursuant to Rule 54(c), Ariz. R. Civ. P. Thisappeal followed.² We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 9-471(C), 12-120.21, and 12-2101(A)(1).³

Standard of Review

¶10 We review issues of law, including those of statutory interpretation, de novo. Premier Physicians Grp., PLLC v. Navarro, 240 Ariz. 193, ¶ 6 (2016). Similarly, we review a trial court's order granting a motion to dismiss de novo. Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, ¶ 7 (2012). In doing so, "we assume the truth of the allegations set forth in the complaint and uphold dismissal only if the plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief under any facts susceptible of proof in the statement of the claim." Mohave Disposal, Inc. v. City of Kingman, 186 Ariz. 343, 346 (1996).

Standing

¶11 ERAA and the property owners argue the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss based on a lack of standing. They maintain that ERAA has standing both "in its own [r]ight" and in a representational capacity. They also contend the court erred in concluding that the first amended complaint was untimely and did not relate back to the date of the original filing.

¶12 "Any incorporated city or town may annex territory in an adjacent county pursuant to the provisions of § 9-471." A.R.S. § 9-134. Pursuant to § 9-471(C), "[a]ny city or town, the attorney general, the county attorney or any other interested party within the territory to be annexed may on verified petition move to question the validity of the annexation for failure to comply with this section." The language "within the territory to be annexed" was added to § 9-471(C) in May 2019. 2019 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 205, § 2. Whether ERAA has standing in this case hinges on the meaning of "any other interested party within the territory to be annexed."

¶13 "We interpret statutes to give effect to the legislature's intent." Parrot v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 212 Ariz. 255, ¶ 7 (2006). A statute's plain language is the best indicator of legislative intent, and, if that language is plain and unambiguous, we will apply it as written without resorting to other methods of statutory interpretation. Mathews ex rel. Mathews v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 217 Ariz. 606, ¶ 6 (App. 2008).

¶14 ERAA and the property owners argue that the trial court improperly interpreted "any other interested party within the area to be annexed," § 9-471(C), to mean "property owners within the annexation area." They reason that if the legislature had intended such a meaning, it could easily have said so. By contrast, relying on other provisions of § 9-471, the Town argues that "the only reasonable interpretation" of the statute "is that the only 'interested parties' with standing are the property owners subject to taxation by the municipality."

¶15 As our starting point, we note that the phrase "any other interested party within the territory to be annexed" is not statutorily defined. See A.R.S. §§ 9-471 to 9-479. We must therefore apply the commonly accepted meaning and may use dictionary definitions as a...