Enck v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA
| Docket Number | Civil Action 5:22-CV-00073-KDB-DCK |
| Decision Date | 02 August 2023 |
| Parties | SEAN P. ENCK, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 26), Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 32) and Defendant's Motion to Strike an exhibit to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 42). The Court has carefully considered these motions and the parties' briefs and exhibits. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will in part GRANT and in part DENY the Parties' cross motions for summary judgment and will DENY Defendant's Motion to Strike.
In this action, Plaintiff, an employee of Verizon, Inc. seeks “underinsured motorists” (“UIM”) insurance coverage under Verizon's multistate and multi-coverage motor vehicle insurance policy with Defendant (the “Policy”) for injuries that he suffered in a serious traffic accident in North Carolina. Whether or not the Policy provides UIM coverage turns on whether the Policy is subject to North Carolina's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act of 1953, N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 20-279.1, et seq. (the “FRA” or “Act”), which was enacted, in part, to require that motor vehicle insurers provide coverage for “uninsured” and “underinsured” motorists.
Specifically, the issue before the Court is whether the Policy is “applicable solely to fleet vehicles,” in which event it would not be subject to the FRA. The Court finds that the Policy does not meet this narrow exception. Rather than being “solely” applicable to fleet vehicles, the Policy, through an endorsement providing “Drive Other Car Coverage,” is also applicable to vehicles that are not owned, hired or borrowed by Verizon or even used in Verizon's business (and which are thus not “fleet vehicles”). Therefore, the Policy is subject to the FRA and must provide “underinsured motorists” coverage. Accordingly, the Court will grant summary judgment to Plaintiff on his claims seeking such coverage pursuant to the FRA.
However the Court agrees with Defendant that its denial of coverage and the ongoing coverage dispute between the Parties does not, as a matter of law, constitute bad faith or an unfair trade practice claim under North Carolina law. Simply put the parties have a bona fide disagreement over the coverage afforded by the Policy, which, at least prior to this ruling,[1] was not a settled legal issue. Thus Defendant's denial of coverage, without additional wrongful conduct that Plaintiff has not shown, does not amount to bad faith or an unfair trade practice. Finally, the Court will deny Defendant's Motion to Strike an amicus brief (from a different case) which Plaintiff attached as an exhibit to one of its memoranda. The Court has considered the already publicly available amicus brief only for the purpose for which it was properly filed (to provide the full context of the relevant Fourth Circuit opinion which cites it). Therefore, there are no grounds for striking the exhibit.
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” United States v. 8.929 Acres of Land in Arlington Cnty., Virginia, 36 F.4th 240, 252 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)); see United States, f/u/b Modern Mosaic, LTD v. Turner Construction Co., et al., 946 F.3d 201, 206 (4th Cir. 2019). A factual dispute is considered genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); 8.929 Acres of Land, 36 F.4th at 252. “A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id., (quoting Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013)).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact through citations to the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits in the record. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (); United States ex rel. Gugenheim v. Meridian Senior Living, LLC, 36 F.4th 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2022). If the movant satisfies his initial burden to demonstrate “an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case,” the burden shifts to the nonmovant to “present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 8.929 Acres of Land, 36 F.4th at 252, quoting Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P. v. Lessard Design, Inc., 790 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 2015). “The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. Hixson v. Moran, 1 F.4th 297, 302 (4th Cir. 2021).
Rather, the nonmoving party must establish that a material fact is genuinely disputed by, inter alia, “citing to particular parts of the materials of record” and cannot rely only on “conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A); 8.929 Acres of Land, 36 F.4th at 252, quoting Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013).
Still, summary judgment is not intended to be a substitute for a trial of the facts. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. In determining if summary judgment is appropriate, “courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and refrain from weigh[ing] the evidence or mak[ing] credibility determinations.” Variety Stores, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 888 F.3d 651, 659 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lee v. Town of Seaboard, 863 F.3d 323, 327 (4th Cir. 2017). “Summary judgment cannot be granted merely because the court believes that the movant will prevail if the action is tried on the merits.” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 568-69 (4th Cir. 2015) ().
In the end, the relevant inquiry on summary judgment is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52. “When faced with crossmotions for summary judgment, the court must review each motion separately on its own merits to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law.” Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Plaintiff Sean Enck was formerly employed as a Senior Telecom Specialist for Verizon, one of the largest telecommunications companies in the United States. In April 2017, while Enck was driving to a Verizon customer for a service call (within the course and scope of his employment), he was involved in an automobile accident in which Morgan Myers, the driver of the other vehicle, was found to be at-fault (the “Accident”). Indeed, it is alleged that the driver at fault was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident. (See Doc. No. 1 at pp.12). Enck suffered serious and debilitating injuries to his right shoulder and neck as a result of the Accident.[2]
In October 2019, Enck filed a complaint in Iredell County Superior Court seeking damages resulting from the Accident against Ms. Meyers, Mark S. Graham (the owner of the vehicle which Ms. Meyers was driving), and the bar where it was alleged that Ms. Meyers was drinking immediately prior to the accident in a case captioned Sean Enck v. Blue Parrot at the Grove, LLC; Blue Parrot Grill Inc.; Blue Parrot at Lake Norman, LLC; Peter Gjuraj; Morgan Diane Meyers; and Mark Shannon Graham, 19 CVS 3060 (the “Underlying Action”). (See Doc. No. 1-3). Ultimately, Enck settled his claims resulting from the Accident for the limits of Ms. Meyers' and Mr. Graham's liability insurance policies as well as his dram shop claims against the other defendants. The Underlying Action has been stayed pending resolution of this action and a determination of whether there is UIM coverage available to Plaintiff under Verizon's business auto insurance policy issued by Defendant National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA's (“National Union” or “Insurer”), Policy Number CA 774-21-38.
The Policy was issued to Verizon for the policy period of June 30, 2016, through June 30, 2017, and provided coverage to Verizon's fleet of more than 20,000 vehicles located in forty-four states, including North Carolina. (See Doc. Nos. 1, 34) In every state where Verizon could reject UIM coverage, it did so. In every state where Verizon was unable to reject UIM coverage outright, it selected the minimum amount of coverage. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 33-1 at p. NUFIC 000220). With regard to coverage in North Carolina, Verizon purported to reject UIM coverage in a document entitled, “North Carolina Notice Uninsured and Underinsured Motorists Coverage.” (Doc. No. 33-2 at pp.2-3).[3]
On or about March 19, 2020, counsel for Enck sent a letter to a third-party claims administrator for Verizon requesting UIM coverage under the Policy. (Doc. No. 33-7). National Union initially denied Plaintiff's UIM claim in May 2020. Counsel for Enck and the Insurer...
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