Endler v. United States
Decision Date | 16 February 1953 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 17-50. |
Citation | 110 F. Supp. 945 |
Parties | ENDLER v. UNITED STATES. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Grover C. Richman, Jr., U. S. Atty., Newark, N. J., by Edward V. Ryan, Asst. U. S. Atty., Jersey City, N. J., for defendant.
This case is submitted on stipulated facts and briefs. The question here is whether the purchaser of real estate from the United States is liable for documentary stamp taxes on a deed from the United States under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
Plaintiff Endler, in 1947, purchased from the defendant United States the old Post Office and Court House site at Louisville, Kentucky, for a price in excess of $1,000,000.00, the Government delivering its deed to him therefor. The Government required Endler to pay to the Collector of Internal Revenue $1,943.85, the cost of U. S. documentary stamp taxes, which the Government insisted be affixed to such deed. Endler claimed refund therefor, and on the rejection of such claim, brought the present suit.
By Section 3483 it is provided that Section 1809 of chapter 11 of Title 26 shall apply to the taxes imposed by the above provisions. 26 U.S.C. § 3483 (1946).
Except for the last sentence of Section 1809, supra, referring specifically to the United States, the substance of the above provisions were incorporated in the earlier Revenue Acts, at least as far back as the Revenue Act of 1898, or more specifically, in separate chapters of same.1 But it would simply confuse to make more detailed reference thereto. Each of these separate chapters refers in its own provisions, so far as pertinent hereto, to the other chapter, so they must all be read in pari materia.
Since Section 1809, supra, in its last sentence makes it clear that the United States, as a party to a deed, is not liable for the tax, the specific question is whether the above provisions render plaintiff Endler, the grantee of the United States, liable therefor, as such grantee.
The Treasury Regulations also provided:
Plaintiff's contention is, in substance, that the above provisions make the grantor only (save the United States) liable for the tax, and that the grantee is never liable for the tax under the statute. Accordingly, the above Treasury Regulations making the tax payable "by any of the parties", including the grantee, and making taxable "a conveyance * * * by the United States", are illegal, as contrary to the terms of the statute. Hence, as to the instant deed, neither party was liable for the tax, it was a non-taxable transaction, and plaintiff is entitled to be refunded the amount claimed.
The Government contends, on the other hand, that the tax is imposed on the "instruments" themselves "in respect of the vellum, parchment, or paper upon which such instruments * * * are written or printed". Section 3480, supra. That in describing the deeds to be taxed it is the grantee, "the purchaser", who is specifically mentioned. Section 3482, supra. And finally, that in Section 1809, supra, it is not only the "person who makes" etc. the instrument, but the "person * * * for whose use or benefit the same are made" etc. upon whom "the tax is imposed". Thus, defendant United States claims the above Treasury Regulation is not contrary to, but in accord with the provisions of the statute, in making the tax "payable by any of the parties", save the United States.
In the face of these conflicting contentions as to the meaning of these statutes, we turn to the underlying purpose and theory of their enactment. The clear purpose was to raise revenue. Again, Congress intended to make sure that, save as to certain specifically exempted situations, this revenue should be certain and inescapable. This the Congress made doubly clear. For it provided, by Section 1809, supra, that "the tax * * * shall be paid by any person who makes * * * any of the documents including deeds * * * or for whose use or benefit the same are made * * *." The person who "makes" the deed is obviously the vendor. Further, the person "for whose use or benefit" the deed is made means the vendee. Referring thereto, in Home Title Insurance Company of New York v. Keith, D.C.E.D.N.Y.1916, 230 F. 905, 907, the Court, in holding that the purchaser of property was liable for the stamp tax on the deed, said "The transfer of title and the paper evidencing that transfer is issued for the use and benefit of the person who gets the title." To the same effect, are Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Council Bluffs Gas & Electric Light Co., C.C.Iowa 1898, 90 F. 806; Crawford v. New South Farm & Home Co., D.C., S.D.Fla.1915, 231 F. 999. Furthermore, by Section 3480, supra, the tax is to be "levied, collected, and paid, for and in respect of the * * * documents * * * or for or in respect of the vellum, parchment, or paper upon which such instruments * * * are written or printed * * *." In other words, in general the tax is imposed not on the person, but on the transaction itself, regardless of the person.
Indeed, this tax on the transaction of transferring title by mere...
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