Endowment Rank of Order of K. P. v. Steele

Decision Date20 April 1901
Citation63 S.W. 1126
PartiesENDOWMENT RANK OF ORDER OF K. P. v. STEELE.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

F. P. Poston, for plaintiff in error. Greer & Greer, for defendant in error.

WILKES, J.

This is a suit against the Endowment Rank of the Order of Knights of Pythias to recover $3,000, the amount of a benefit certificate in the fourth class upon the life of J. K. Steele, payable to his wife, as beneficiary. The application contains the clauses usual in such certificates, to wit, that the assured would punctually pay all dues and assessments, and be governed and controlled by all the rules, laws, and regulations of the order governing the rank then in force, or that might afterwards be enacted, or submit to the penalty therein contained, and any violation of the conditions and requirements of the laws governing the rank should render the certificate and all claims under it void, and the order should not be liable for the sum named in the certificate, nor any part of the same. The order had at the time this certificate matured a by-law or regulation as follows: "If the death of any member heretofore admitted shall result from suicide, whether voluntary or involuntary, or whether such member shall be sane or insane, or if such death shall be caused or superinduced by the use of liquors or narcotics or opiates, then the amount to be paid upon such member's certificate shall be a sum only in proportion to the whole amount as the matured expectancy is to the entire expectancy at the date of admission; the expectancy of life based upon the American Experience Table of Mortality in force at the time of death to govern." It is conceded that this by-law is binding upon the beneficiary under said certificate. The order, by its plea, averred that Steele's death was brought about by himself by an act of self-destruction or suicide, or was caused or superinduced by the use of liquors, narcotics, or opiates, within the meaning and terms of the by-law, and it was therefore under obligation to pay no more than the pro rata provided in the by-law, of $780.12, and this it was willing and offered to pay. There have been three trials of the case before juries. The first trial resulted in a verdict of $3,000. The court suggested a remittitur to $780.12, and, on that being declined, set aside the verdict and awarded a new trial. The second trial resulted in a verdict for the same amount, and upon it judgment was rendered, and, a new trial having been refused, an appeal was taken to this court, and the judgment of the court below was reversed at the April term, 1900, and a new trial awarded. This reversal was upon an error in the charge of the court. The third or present verdict was for $3,000, and upon it judgment has been rendered and an appeal prayed.

It is said the trial judge erred in his charge to the jury when he told them: "A witness is only valuable to the extent that his evidence establishes some material fact or circumstance which aids in making clear and plain to your minds some question involved in this litigation." Criticism is made of several expressions used in this charge, and that, as a whole, the rule is stated too rigorously. It is said that in civil cases a litigant cannot be required to establish any material fact or circumstance, but it is sufficient if the evidence preponderates in favor of or against such fact, and that evidence may be valuable which aids to make this preponderance, although the fact may not be made clear and plain; that it is not incumbent on a litigant in court cases to make the questions involved in the litigation clear and plain, but it is sufficient if the evidence preponderates in favor of the view of either party, although it may not establish any material fact or circumstance, and although the questions involved may not be made clear and plain. In the case of Gage v. Railroad Co., 88 Tenn. 724, 14 S. W. 73, it was said, criticising and correcting the charge of the court below: "It is sufficient in civil cases if, after weighing the evidence on both sides, a preponderance is the one way or the other. The burden is on the plaintiff to make out his case, and he is only required to do so by a preponderance, but when he has done so he is entitled to recover." In McBee v. Bowman, 89 Tenn. 132, 14 S. W. 481, there was a contest over a will, the defense being that the will was a forgery. The court below, in speaking as to this defense, said, among other things: "It should appear with reasonable certainty that such is the case." This court, in commenting on that expression, said: "To our minds, the whole instruction means, and was intended to mean, that, to establish a charge of forgery, it was incumbent on McBee to show the fact by that degree of preponderance or weight of testimony necessary to produce conviction of its existence with reasonable certainty. The instruction is manifestly erroneous. Reasonable certainty implies the absence of reasonable doubt. Telling a jury that they must be convinced of a fact with reasonable certainty is almost, if not quite, the same as telling them they must be convinced of it beyond a reasonable doubt. In civil cases, preponderance is all that is required."

The third and fifth assignments are, in substance, the same as the second above set out; that is, they question the quantum of evidence required by the circuit judge to establish the defense that the insured committed suicide. The specific charges complained of are as follows: "(3) Such is the love of life, that the law presumes no man will commit suicide or intentionally kill himself. Therefore the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish to the satisfaction of the jury, by a preponderance of the evidence, that J. K. Steele did intentionally take a dose of morphine or other narcotic, and that it produced his death." "(5) If the facts and circumstances as proven in this case establish the fact to the satisfaction of the jury that said Steele did use opiates and narcotics, but the same were not used with the intention and purpose of producing death, then the establishing of such facts would meet the requirement of the law." We think the criticism of these portions of the charge is, in the main, correct. The meaning of the word "establish," as applied to the quantum of evidence, is to settle certainly or fix permanently what was before uncertain, doubtful, or disputed. 11 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 353. It is a term much more appropriate for criminal than civil cases, but even in criminal cases the facts do not have to be established so as to settle them certainly and leave no ground for dispute, but only beyond a reasonable doubt. In the case of Eberhardt v. Sanger, 51 Wis. 79, 8 N. W. 111, the issue was to be proven, if at all,...

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32 cases
  • Wood v. Wood
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • 7 Mayo 1917
    ... ... 577; McBee v. Bowman, 89 Tenn ... 132, 14 S.W. 481; Endowment Rank O. K. P. v. Steele, ... 63 S.W. 1126.) A preponderence of evidence ... 393, 27 A. 973, 22 ... L. R. A. 90), after stating the order of proof--first the ... prima facie case by proponent, then the ... ...
  • Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Prieto
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • 6 Abril 1935
    ...raised to this portion of the charge is based upon the use of the word `establish,' which was defined in Knights of Pythias v. Steele, 107 Tenn. 1, 7, 11, 63 S. W. 1126, 1128," The opinion fails to show whether suicide was affirmatively pleaded in the answer, or the allegation of the bill, ......
  • Morris v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • 6 Julio 1943
    ... ... 155 Ill.App. 648; Jones v. Monson, 119 N.W. 179; ... Endowment Rank of Order of K. P. v. Steele, 63 S.W ... 1126; Van Geem v. Asco ... ...
  • Scott v. Atkins
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • 12 Marzo 1957
    ...Nashville Trust Co., 178 Tenn. 437, 159 S.W.2d 81; Bryan v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 174 Tenn. 602, 130 S.W.2d 85; Knights of Pythias v. Steele, 107 Tenn. 1, 63 S.W. 1126; Pickard v. Berryman, 24 Tenn.App. 263, 142 S.W.2d 764; Gifford v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 16 Tenn.App. 21, 64 S.W.2d ......
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