Endsley v. Luna

• Decision Date: 05 August 2010
• Docket Number: No. CV 06–6961 DSF (SS).,CV 06–6961 DSF (SS).
• Citation: 750 F.Supp.2d 1074
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: Marc Anthony Lowell ENDSLEY, Plaintiff,v.Octavio LUNA, Nirbhay Singh, Jon Benson, Denise Armas–Carl, Millicent Loyarte, Jonathan Monroe, Jim Birks, Roy Bellamy, Ed Sireger and Jennifer Atkins, Defendants.

750 F.Supp.2d 1074

Marc Anthony Lowell ENDSLEY, Plaintiff,

v.Octavio LUNA, Nirbhay Singh, Jon Benson, Denise Armas–Carl, Millicent Loyarte, Jonathan Monroe, Jim Birks, Roy Bellamy, Ed Sireger and Jennifer Atkins, Defendants.

No. CV 06–6961 DSF (SS).

United States District Court, C.D. California.

Aug. 5, 2010.

Marc Anthony Lowell Endsley Atascadero, CA, pro se.Benjamin Barnouw, CAAG-California Attorney General, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

DALE S. FISCHER, District Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the Third Amended Complaint, all of the records and files herein, and the Magistrate Judge's Amended Report and Recommendation. The time for filing Objections to the Amended Report and Recommendation has passed and no Objections have been received. Accordingly, the Court accepts and adopts the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.

2. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

3. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's claims under state law.

4. Plaintiff's state law claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.

5. Plaintiff's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are DISMISSED as moot.

6. Judgment shall be entered in favor of the Defendants and against Plaintiff on the entire Complaint. Plaintiff's entire Complaint shall be dismissed with prejudice.

7. The Clerk shall serve copies of this Order and the Judgment herein by United States mail on Plaintiff and counsel for Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

SUZANNE H. SEGAL, United States Magistrate Judge.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Dale S. Fischer, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and General Order 05–07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

I.INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Marc Anthony Lowell Endsley (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed a Civil Rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which the Court dismissed with leave to amend due to various deficiencies. The Court also dismissed with leave to amend Plaintiff's subsequently filed First Amended Complaint and Second Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff filed the operative Third Amended Complaint (“Third Amended Complaint” or “TAC”) on March 20, 2008, naming ten individuals who are or were employees at Patton State Hospital (“Patton”) as defendants. By Notice of Change of Address dated June 6, 2008 (“Address Change”), Plaintiff informed the Court that he had been transferred from Patton to Atascadero State Hospital. Defendants Luna, Bellamy, Birks, Atkins, and Monroe filed a Motion to Dismiss the Third Amended Complaint (“First Motion to Dismiss”) in which Defendants Siregar and Benson later joined. Defendants Armas–Carl and Loyarte filed a separate Motion to Dismiss the Third Amended Complaint. Plaintiff opposed both Motions to Dismiss. The District Court granted Defendants' Motions to Dismiss in part, dismissing without prejudice Plaintiff's claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, as well as all of Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Singh. The remaining nine Defendants (collectively, “Defendants”) filed an Answer to the Third Amended Complaint.

Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defendants' MSJ”), along with a Proposed Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law (“Defendants' SUF”) and twelve Declarations in support of Defendants' MSJ. ¹ Defendants' MSJ was also supported by Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice in Support of the First Motion to Dismiss (“Request for Judicial Notice”). As required by Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 960–61 (9th Cir.1998), the Court issued an “Order Re Summary Judgment Protocol and Briefing Schedule” which informed Petitioner of his rights under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and attached a copy of the text of the Rule.

Plaintiff filed his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment along with a “Memorandum of Law” supporting the Motion and opposing Defendant's MSJ (“Plaintiff's MPSJ”). Plaintiff also filed a Declaration in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (“Endsley Decl.”) and a Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law (“Plaintiff's SUF”). Defendants filed a Reply in Support of Defendants' MSJ (“Reply”) and an Opposition to Plaintiff's MPSJ (“Defendants' Opposition”), which was supported by a Declaration of Benjamin Barnouw (“Second Barnouw Decl.”) and a Statement of Genuine Issues of Material Fact (“Defendants' SGI”). Plaintiff did not file a response to Defendants' Opposition.

This matter is now ready for decision. For the reasons discussed below, it is recommended that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be DENIED.

II.REMAINING ALLEGATIONS OF THE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

In 1997, Plaintiff was committed to Patton State Hospital (“Patton”), a psychiatric hospital facility operated by the California Department of Mental Health. (TAC at 6). Plaintiff was committed to Patton after being charged with murder and found not guilty by reason of insanity. ( Id.; Request for Judicial Notice, Exh. C).² In November 2004, Plaintiff's residential housing program implemented “a highly structured model of service delivery called Mall Treatment.” ³ (TAC at 6).

The following persons remain defendants: Octavio Luna, the warden/executive director at Patton; John Benson (erroneously sued as Jon Benson), Plaintiff's former psychiatrist; Denise Armas–Carl, Millicent Loyarte, Ed Sireger, Jonathan Monroe and Jennifer Atkins, psychiatric technicians; Jim Birks, a nursing coordinator; and Roy Bellamy, a unit supervisor. ( Id. at 3–5). Plaintiff sues each of these persons in his or her individual capacity. ( Id.). Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as $600,000 in compensatory damages and $290,000 in punitive damages.⁴ ( See id. at 16–18).

Plaintiff asserts three civil rights claims as well as various state law tort claims. ( Id. at 6). In Claim One, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants' implementation of Mall Treatment deprived him of adequate care in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. ( Id. at 7–9). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the Mall Treatment program, including the requirement that patients who do not participate in Mall Treatment convene in a “Refusal Room,” does not conform to professional standards nor to the terms of a Consent Judgment involving Patton. ( Id.; see also Request for Judicial Notice, Exhs. D, E). Plaintiff further complains that the revocation of his Industrial Therapy assignment ⁵ and of his right to participate in Patton's patient government constituted punishment in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. (TAC at 8).

In Claim Two, Plaintiff alleges that on seven occasions between December 2004 and July 2005 various Defendants used excessive force against Plaintiff in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. ( Id. at 10–13). One of these incidents allegedly occurred while Plaintiff was in a “Refusal Room” after refusing to attend Mall treatment and consisted of a hospital employee pulling or attempting to pull a chair out from under him. ( Id. at 10). Six other incidents of force allegedly occurred after Plaintiff balked at attending Mall Treatment and refused to go to the Refusal Room. These incidents largely consisted of hospital employees “dragg[ing]” Plaintiff from a room using physical force. ( Id. at 10–11). Plaintiff claims that these actions also constituted the torts of harassment, assault, and battery. ( Id.). In one of these incidents, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Atkins and Siregar falsely reported in his medical records that Plaintiff “swung” at them. Plaintiff accuses these Defendants of perjury. ( Id. at 11).

In Claim Three, Plaintiff contends that the overcrowded and unsanitary conditions in the Refusal Room constituted punishment designed “to ‘annoy’ patients into going to Mall” in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. ( Id. at 14–15). Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Birks “rang a radio in [P]laintiff's ear when [P]laintiff attempted to sleep in Refusal.” ( Id. at 14). Furthermore, Plaintiff claims that Defendants denied him the use of his property while in the Refusal Room, constituting “the tort of deprivation of personal property” under California Code of Regulations, title 9, section 884(b)(1). ( Id.).

III.DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's inadequate medical care claim fails because, pursuant to Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982), “the Constitution only requires that the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised” when ruling on a claim of inadequate medical care by an involuntarily confined individual. (Defendants' MSJ at 14). Defendants note that the Mall Treatment program was based upon professional judgment ( id. at 14, 15), and decisions with regard to Plaintiff's participation in the Mall program were taken in the exercise of professional judgment ( id. at 17). Defendants further note that Plaintiff could have avoided the Refusal Room and other consequences, such as the ban on his participation in Industrial Therapy and patient government, by participating in the Mall program. ( Id.). At the very least, Defendants argue, Defendant Luna is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim because his actions in structuring the Mall Treatment program did not violate clearly established law. ( Id. at 16).

Regarding Plaintiff's excessive force claims, Defendants assert that there was no constitutional violation...