Eneas McFaul, Plaintiff In Error v. James Ramsey
| Decision Date | 01 December 1857 |
| Citation | 20 How. 523,15 L.Ed. 1010,61 U.S. 523 |
| Parties | ENEAS MCFAUL, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. JAMES C. RAMSEY |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
THIS case was brought up, by writ of error, from the District Court of the United States for the district of Iowa.
The case is stated in the opinion of the court.
It was argued by Mr. Reverdy Johnson and Mr. Reverdy Johnson, jun., for the plaintiff in error, and by Mr. Norris for the defendant.
Ramsey, the plaintiff below, instituted this suit in the District Court of the United States for the district of Iowa. The parties have been permitted by that court to frame their pleadings, not according to the simple and established forms of action in courts of common law, but according to a system of pleadings and practice enacted by that State to regulate proceedings in its own courts. This code commences by abolishing 'all technical forms of actions,' prescribing the following curt rules for all cases, whether of law or equity:
'Any pleading which possesses the following requisites shall be deemed sufficient:
'1st. When to the common understanding it conveys a reasonable certainty of meaning.
'2d. When, by a fair and natural construction, it shows a substantial cause of action or defence.
'If defective in the first of the above particulars, the court, on motion, will direct a more specific statement; if in the latter, it is ground of demurrer.'
If the right of deciding absolutely and finally all matters in controversy between suitors were committed to a single tribunal, it might be left to collect the nature of the wrong complained of, and the remedy sought, from the allegations of the party ore tenus, or in any other manner it might choose to adopt. But the common law, which wisely commits the decision of questions of law to a court supposed to be learned in the law, and the decision of the facts to jury, necessarily requires that the controversy, before it is submitted to the tribunal having jurisdiction of it, should be reduced to one or more integral propositions of law or fact; hence it is necessary that the parties should frame the allegations which they respectively make in support of their demand or defence into certain writings called pleadings. These should clearly, distinctly, and succinctly, state the nature of the wrong complained of, the remedy sought, and the defence set up. The end proposed is to bring the matter of litigation to one or more points, simple and unambiguous. At one time, the excessive accuracy required, the subtlety of distinctions introduced by astute logicians, the introduction of cumbrous forms, fictions, and contrivances, which seemed only to perplex the investigation of truth, had brought the system of special pleading into deserved disrepute, notwithstanding the assertion of Sir William Jones, that 'it was the best logic in the world, except mathematics.' This system is said to have come to its perfection in the reign of Edward III. But in more modern times it has been so modified by the courts, and trimmed of its excrescences, the pleadings in every form of common-law action have been so completely reduced to simple, clear, and unambiguous forms, that the merits of a cause are now never submerged under folios of special demurrers, alleging errors in pleading, which, when discovered, are immediately permitted to be amended. This system, matured by the wisdom of ages, founded on principles of truth and sound reason, has been ruthlessly abolished in many of our States, who have rashly substituted in its place the suggestions of sciolists, who invent new codes and systems of pleading to order. But this attempt to abolish all species, and establish a single genus, is found to be beyond the power of legislative comnipotence. They cannot compel the human mind not to distinguish between things that differ. The distinction between the different forms of actions for different wrongs, requiring different remedies, lies in the nature of things; it is absolutely inseparable from the correct administration of justice in common-law courts.
The result of these experiments, so far as they have come to our knowledge, has been to destroy the certainty and simplicity of all pleadings, and introduce on the record an endless wrangle in writing, perplexing to the court, delaying and impeding the administration of justice. In the case of Randon v. Toby, (11 Howard, 517,) we had occasion to notice the operation and result of a code similar to that of Iowa. In a simple action on a promissory note, the pleadings of which, according to common-law forms, would not have occupied a page, they were extended...
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Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Elliott
... ... defendant removed the case by writ of error into this court ... Clifford ... L. ackson, for plaintiff in error ... William ... T ... of the United States. McFaul v. Ramsey, 20 How. 523, ... 15 L.Ed. 1010; ... ...
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Drexel v. True
... ... Webster, for plaintiffs in error ... Carroll ... S. Montgomery ... 909; Woods v. Young, 4 Cranch, 237; McFaul v ... Ramsey, 20 How. 523 ... under which the plaintiff claims. No such defense was set up ... in the ... ...
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Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Nelson
...procuring testimony should be tested by the laws of the United States rather than by the practice in the state courts. The case of McFaul v. Ramsey, supra, is with approval in the case of Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22-24, 9 S.Ct. 696, in which the court says: 'By the statutes of the territo......
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Ross v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co. of N.Y.
...and the defense set up. The end proposed is to bring the matter of litigation to one or more points, simple and unambiguous.” McFaul v. Ramsey, 61 U. S. 523, 524. “The object of pleading is to concentrate the controversy upon the questions of fact and of law, which should control the result......