Energy Mkt. 709, LLC v. City of Chesterfield

Citation614 S.W.3d 643
Decision Date22 December 2020
Docket NumberNo. ED 108244,ED 108244
Parties ENERGY MARKET 709, LLC, Respondent, v. CITY OF CHESTERFIELD, Missouri, et al., Appellants.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Missouri (US)

John B. Goss, Robert J. Droney, Brian M. Wacker, James P. Sanders, 120 S. Central Ave. Ste. 700, St. Louis, MO 63105, For Respondent.

Christopher B. Graville, 130 S. Bemiston Ste. 700, Clayton, MO 63105, For Appellants.

Peter J. Krane, Linda S. Levin, Michael E. Hughes, 41 S. Central Ave. 9th Fl., Clayton, MO 63105, For Defendant.

OPINION

Colleen Dolan, P.J.

The City of Chesterfield, Missouri (the "City") and its individual city council members and related employees (collectively, "Appellants") appeal the trial court's partial grant of Energy Market 709, LLC's ("EM") motion for partial summary judgment on EM's claims against Appellants relating to rezoning conditions that the City placed upon real property owned by EM. Appellants raise seven points on appeal asserting why the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment in favor of EM. As part of EM's response, it argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Appellants’ appeal because there is no final and appealable judgment in this case.

Finding that the judgment in this case is not final and that we therefore lack jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In May of 2009, EM entered into an agreement to purchase the 5.26-acre parcel of land located at the corner of Chesterfield Airport Road and Olive Street Road (the "Property") that is situated within the geographical boundaries of the City and St. Louis County, Missouri ("St. Louis County"). The sale of the Property was finalized in December of 2013. While the sale was being finalized, EM filed an application with the City in August of 2013 to rezone the Property.1 On November 3, 2014, the City's city council passed Ordinance No. 2820 that rezoned the Property as a "planned commercial district" (as requested by EM), but with several conditions. Notably, Ordinance No. 2820 conditioned the rezoning of the Property upon EM constructing median barriers to prohibit left turns into and out of the eastern-most access point of the Property, providing a lighting plan for the Property,2 among several other conditions.

Following the City's passage of Ordinance No. 2820, EM submitted a revised site development plan on November 22, 2016. In response, Appellants notified EM that it would need to resubmit a site development plan that reflected the no-left-turn condition, showed where along the Property streetlights would be placed by EM, and excluded the architectural archways that were part of EM's then-current site development plan; additionally, the City required that EM be responsible for installing and maintaining streetlights on the Property along Chesterfield Airport Road and Olive Street Road. EM thereafter submitted another revised site development plan and a letter from the deputy legal counsel for St. Louis County to the city attorney for the City on January 23, 2017. In the letter, the St. Louis County deputy legal counsel explained that St. Louis County had exclusive jurisdiction and control with regards to the traffic regulation of Chesterfield Airport Road as an "arterial road," pursuant to St. Louis County ordinance, and that any prohibition on left-hand turns to and from the Property would be inconsistent with the conditions established by the St. Louis County Transportation and Public Works Department. On March 2, 2017, EM delivered plans exactly matching the revised site development plan that it submitted on January 23, 2017, but excluding the architectural archways indicated by Appellants. Appellants then notified EM on March 8, 2017, that the plans submitted on March 2, 2017, were being returned because they had not been timely submitted.

On or about April 13, 2017, EM filed its petition before the trial court asserting claims related to the conditions that Appellants required in rezoning of the Property. EM filed its second amended petition on January 9, 2018, in which EM asserted claims against Appellants and St. Louis County for declaratory judgment (Count I), injunction (Count II), mandamus (Count III), damages for 42 USCA § 1983 violation of EM's due process rights (Count IV), damages for 42 USCA § 1983 violation of EM's equal protection rights (Count V), and constitutional taking (Count VI).3 Specifically, in its Counts I and II, EM argued that Appellants (1) could not prohibit left turns into and out of the Property because St. Louis County has exclusive jurisdiction in regards to regulating traffic on Chesterfield Airport Road and Olive Street Road and (2) lacked authority to require that EM submit plans showing streetlights on the Property that ran along Chesterfield Airport Road. EM therefore asked the trial court to enter declaratory judgment and an injunction reflecting such.

On January 29, 2018, EM filed its motion for partial summary judgment on its Counts I and II of its second amended petition. EM argued in its motion for partial summary judgment that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its Counts I and II because St. Louis County ordinance clearly established that St. Louis County had exclusive jurisdiction to regulate traffic on arterial roads, such as Chesterfield Airport Road and Olive Street Road, thus making the part of Ordinance No. 2820 restricting left turns invalid.4 EM further contended that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its Counts I and II because neither the city code of the City nor Ordinance No. 2820 required that EM include streetlights along Chesterfield Airport Road on the site development plan, and that such conditions required by Appellants were null and void.

After receiving further pleadings from the parties, the trial court granted EM's motion for partial summary judgment on its Counts I and II in regards to the left-turn prohibition set by Appellants. The court reasoned that St. Louis County ordinance established that St. Louis County had "exclusive right to control traffic movements and safeguard traffic safety" on St. Louis County arterial roads, including Chesterfield Airport Road and Olive Street Road. As a result, the court declared the portions of Ordinance No. 2820 restricting left-turn access to and from the eastern-most part of the Property invalid. However, the court denied EM's motion for partial summary judgment on its Counts I and II in regards to the City's streetlight requirements for the Property. Specifically, the trial found that the streetlight requirements pertained to illumination and did not constitute the control or regulation of traffic, and thus, "[t]here does not seem to be any statute or other law which conflicts with the streetlight requirements listed in [Ordinance No. 2820]." Shortly after the trial court entered its order and judgment granting in part and denying in part EM's motion for partial summary judgment, Appellants filed their motion to amend the order and judgment "to find there is no just reason for delay of an appeal from the Order and Judgment" pursuant to Rule 74.01(b), which the trial court granted.5

This appeal follows.

II. Discussion

Before addressing an appeal's merits, we have a duty to determine sua sponte whether we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Wilson v. City of St. Louis, 600 S.W.3d 763, 765 (Mo. banc 2020) ; White v. Anderssen Mobile X-Ray Srvc., 389 S.W.3d 222, 223 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012). If we lack jurisdiction to hear an appeal, it must be dismissed. Needy v. Hammond, 601 S.W.3d 312, 313 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020). One such example of when we lack jurisdiction and are required to dismiss an appeal is when there is no final and appealable judgment. Flower Valley, LLC v. Zimmerman, 575 S.W.3d 497, 501 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019).

"The right to appeal is purely statutory and, where a statute does not give a right to appeal, no right exists." Wilson, 600 S.W.3d at 767 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Dieterich v. Pointe Royale Prop. Owners’ Ass'n, Inc., 515 S.W.3d 219, 221 (Mo. banc 2017) ). "Although many statutes govern ‘the right to appeal, the only statute even potentially applicable to the present case is section 512.020(5),’ which provides that ‘final judgments’ are appealable."6 Id. (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Dieterich, 515 S.W.3d at 221 ). Typically, "[a] judgment is appealable as a ‘final judgment’ under section 512.020(5) if it resolves every claim, or at least the last unresolved claim, in a lawsuit." E.M. by and through McInnis v. Gateway Region Young Men's Christian Ass'n, ––– S.W.3d ––––, ––––, 2020 WL 1921035 at *3 (Mo. App. E.D. Apr. 21, 2020) (citing Wilson, 600 S.W.3d at 768 ).

However, Rule 74.01(b) creates an exception to what may be considered a "final judgment" for purposes of appeal:

When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may enter a judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. In the absence of such determination, any order or other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.

See also Wilson, 600 S.W.3d at 768.

In sum, a "final judgment" for purposes of appeal under § 512.020(5) must meet two criteria: (1) it must actually be a "judgment" that resolves at least one claim in a lawsuit and establishes the rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to that claim; and (2) the judgment must be "final" in that it either disposes of all claims ...

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