Enfinger v. Baxley

Decision Date31 July 1957
Citation96 So.2d 538
PartiesDan E. ENFINGER, Petitioner, v. Loudoun Warren BAXLEY, Respondent.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Kurz, Maness & Toole, Jacksonville, for petitioner.

Bedell & Bedell, Jacksonville, for respondent.

ROBERTS, Justice.

We here review on certiorari an order of the lower court denying defendant-petitioner Enfinger's motion to dismiss for improper venue. The plea of privilege was properly made by motion to dismiss, Inverness Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. McDaniel, Fla.1955, 78 So.2d 100; and an order denying a motion to dismiss for improper venue may be reviewed by this court on certiorari. Kauffman v. King, fla.1956, 89 So.2d 24.

The facts are that the plaintiff-respondent Baxley, a resident of Polk County, Florida, filed suit in the Circuit Court of Duval County against Enfinger, also a Polk County resident, for injuries sustained in Polk County allegedly as a result of Enfinger's negligence. Joined as a party defendant was the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, Enfinger's employer. The railroad company, a foreign corporation, has an agent in and does business in both Polk County and Duval County.

The question here is whether in these circumstances the lower court erred in denying defendant Enfinger's plea of privilege to be sued in Polk County, the county of his residence and where the cause of action accrued, as granted to him by Section 46.01, Fla.Stat.1955, F.S.A. The answer to this question depends upon the effect of Section 46.02 and Section 46.04 on the rights of the parties.

Sec. 46.02 provides that 'Suits against two or more defendants residing in different counties * * * may be brought in any county * * * in which any defendant resides.' Sec. 46.04 provides that suits against a foreign corporation doing business in this state 'shall be commenced in a county * * * wherein such company may have an agent or other representative, or where the cause of action accrued * * *'.

In L. B. McLeod Const. Co. v. State, 1932, 106 Fla. 805, 143 So. 594, 596, this court applied Section 4220, C.G.L.1927 (Section 46.02, supra), in determining a venue question presented in a suit against two corporate defendants and held that 'where two corporations are otherwise properly joined as defendants in an action, the action may be maintained against both corporate defendants in a county in which one of the defendants, if a domestic corporation, 'shall have or usually keep an office for the transaction of its customary business'; or, if one of the defendants is a foreign incorporated company doing business in this state, the action may be maintained in a county wherein such codefendant company 'may have an agent or other representative'.' Accord: Inverness Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. McDaniel, Fla.1955, 78 So.2d 100.

If Section 46.02, supra, comprehends a corporate defendant and is applicable in a suit against two corporate defendants, as was held in the two cases above-cited, it is equally applicable in a suit against a corporate defendant and an individual defendant, and we so hold.

The clear import of the two cases above-cited is that a corporate defendant 'resides', within the meaning of Section 46.02, in the county or counties specified in Section 46.04, that is, if a domestic corporation 'in the county (or justice's district) where such corporation shall have or usually keep an office for the transaction of its customary business' and, if a foreign corporation doing business in this State 'in a county or justice's district wherein such company may have an agent or other representative.' Here, the Railroad Company 'resides' in Polk County as well as in Duval County. So the question here is whether the individual defendant and the corporate defendant reside 'in different counties' within the meaning of Section 46.02, supra. We have concluded that they do not.

Section 46.02 places a qualification upon the venue privilege granted to an individual defendant by Section 46.01 and to a corporate defendant by Section 46.04. Inverness Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. McDaniel, supra, 78 So.2d 100, 102. It gives a plaintiff the right to make the final...

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  • Thoman v. Ashley, 4548
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • December 18, 1964
    ...asserted that the trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction. E. g. Kauffman v. King, Fla.App.,1956, 89 So.2d 24; cf. Enfinger v. Baxley, Fla .1957, 96 So.2d 538. We recently granted the writ to review an interlocutory order at law where it appeared that the order sought to be reviewed......
  • Cicero v. Paradis
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • February 23, 1966
    ...by the defendant. Doonan v. Poole, Fla.App.1959, 114 So.2d 504. See Santa Rosa County v. Trobuck, 77 Fla. 86, 80 So. 748; Enfinger v. Baxley, Fla.1957, 96 So.2d 538; Peterson v. Kirk, Fla.App.1958, 103 So.2d 656. To hold otherwise would be to nullify the venue statute which gives the plaint......
  • Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ganey, 59-513
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • December 19, 1960
    ...by the defendant. Doonan v. Poole, Fla.App.1959, 114 So.2d 504. See Santa Rosa County v. Trobuck, 77 Fla. 86, 80 So. 748; Enfinger v. Baxley, Fla.1957, 96 So.2d 538; Peterson v. Kirk, Fla.App.1958, 103 So.2d 656. To hold otherwise would be to nullify the venue statute which gives the plaint......
  • Brown v. Nagelhout
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • March 15, 2012
    ...Specifically, we address a limitation placed on the selection of venue—known as the joint residency rule—derived from Enfinger v. Baxley, 96 So.2d 538 (Fla.1957), which held that the selection of venue based on residency was limited to the county of residence shared by the individual defend......
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