Eng, Application of

• Decision Date: 03 August 1989
• Docket Number: No. 54804-8,55245-2 and 55246-1
• Citation: Eng, Application of, 776 P.2d 1336, 113 Wn.2d 178 (Wash. 1989)
• Parties: In the Matter of the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus of Raymond Moy ENG, Appellant. CITY OF SEATTLE, Respondent, v. Jeanetta LOUIS, Petitioner. CITY OF SEATTLE, Respondent, v. Richardo BOWMAN, Petitioner.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 178

113 Wn.2d 178

776 P.2d 1336

In the Matter of the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

of Raymond Moy ENG, Appellant.

CITY OF SEATTLE, Respondent, v. Jeanetta LOUIS, Petitioner.

CITY OF SEATTLE, Respondent, v. Richardo BOWMAN, Petitioner.

No. 54804-8, 55245-2 and 55246-1.

Supreme Court of Washington En Banc.

Aug. 3, 1989.

Associated Counsel for the Accused, Suzanne Lee Elliott, Seattle, for petitioners.

Douglas N. Jewett, Seattle City Atty., Isabel R. Safora, Charlotte Clark-Mahoney, Asst. City Attys., Seattle, for respondent.

UTTER, Justice.

This case consolidates three cases--one habeas corpus petition and two direct appeals--all arising from municipal offenses in the City of Seattle (the City) and tried in that city's municipal court. The Superior Court for King County heard the original habeas petition and reviewed the latter two cases under its appellate powers over courts of limited jurisdiction. The Superior Court in each case found in the City's favor. The Court of Appeals declined to take discretionary review of the latter two cases. We accepted review of them along with the appeal of the Superior Court's denial of the habeas petition, brought directly to this court.

Appellant Eng and petitioners Louis and Bowman (hereinafter appellants) contend that the creation of departments 4, 5, and 7 under RCW 35.20 represents an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power prohibited by Const. art. 4, § 10 (amend. 65). In addition they argue that, even if the departments are constitutional, they nonetheless were created in violation of state statute and city charter. For these reasons, appellants argue that the municipal judges did not have the jurisdiction to convict and sentence them.

We find that RCW 35.20 is constitutional and that the City created departments 4 and 5 validly. Department 7 however, was not validly created. Nonetheless, because the appellant convicted in that department concedes that the judge had de facto authority, his conviction still stands.

The relevant facts of each case are brief. In In re Eng, the City charged Raymond Eng with theft, Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 12A.08.060, on February 24, 1987 in department 7 of Seattle Municipal Court. The City later amended the charge to possession of a meter key, SMC 12A.08.105. The Municipal Court found him guilty and sentenced him to 1 year in jail, with 245 days of this sentence suspended. The court later suspended the remainder of Mr. Eng's sentence upon his agreement to inpatient alcohol treatment at Thunderbird House. Because of an incident at this treatment center, Mr. Eng was again charged with theft and the court reimposed the unserved portion of his suspended meter key sentence. Mr. Eng subsequently sought a writ of habeas corpus from the King County Superior Court in which he contested the legitimacy and jurisdiction of department 7. He now appeals the denial of his petition.

In Seattle v. Louis, Jeanetta Louis faced a charge of theft, SMC 12A.08.060, in Seattle Municipal Court department 4 on September 24, 1987. At trial, she moved for a change of venue to departments 1, 2, or 3 or, in the alternative, dismissal. She argued that these were the only constitutionally and/or legally created departments in the Seattle municipal court system. The municipal judge denied this motion, the case proceeded to trial, and Ms. Louis was found guilty and sentenced to 1 year in jail.

In Seattle v. Bowman, Richardo Bowman was found guilty of driving while intoxicated, SMC 11.56.020, and negligent driving, SMC 11.58.005, in a jury trial before Seattle Municipal Court department 5 on April 20, 1987. Rather than raise the issue at the outset--as Ms. Louis had--Mr. Bowman first challenged the legality and constitutionality of department 5 in his appeal before King County Superior Court.

I

Appellants challenge the constitutionality of portions of RCW 35.20, which creates municipal courts in cities of over 400,000. In particular, appellants find RCW 35.20.100 constitutionally infirm. This statute states in part:

There shall be three departments of the municipal court, which shall be designated as Department Nos. 1, 2 and 3: Provided, That when the administration of justice and the accomplishment of the work of the court make additional departments necessary, the legislative body of the city may create additional departments as they are needed.

Appellants base their argument on the premise that the judges in Seattle's municipal court system are, for constitutional purposes, "justices of the peace." This premise would place the municipal court under the strictures of Const. art. 4, § 10 (amend. 65), which states in relevant part:

The legislature shall determine the number of justices of the peace to be elected and shall prescribe by law the powers, duties and jurisdiction of justices of the peace: ...

This provision, appellants argue, places upon the Legislature the responsibility for setting the number of justices of the peace. Such responsibility cannot be delegated to a municipal legislative body.

The City, on the other hand, argues that the Seattle municipal court system was created pursuant to a different constitutional provision, Const. art. 4, § 12, which states:

The legislature shall prescribe by law the jurisdiction and powers of any of the inferior courts which may be established in pursuance of this Constitution.

The language of this provision, the City argues, does not restrict the Legislature's ability to delegate certain aspects of the authority to create and maintain "inferior courts." Among these, the City claims, is the ability to add additional departments to the Seattle Municipal Court. At the heart of this constitutional dispute, then, is whether the Seattle municipal court system is an "inferior court" under Const. art. 4, § 12 or a manifestation of justices of the peace under Const. art. 4, § 10 (amend. 65).

The constitution does not provide a definition for "justice of the peace." Appellants contend that the drafters intended the term to apply to judges of lesser jurisdiction in incorporated cities. Appellants construe this definition from a statute roughly contemporary to the constitution's passage, the territorial Legislature's Act of 1888 providing for elections of justices of the peace. This act located justices of the peace in "precincts" within cities. The act stated in part:

Each incorporated city in this Territory, together with any adjoining precincts, if any there are, lying partly within and partly without said city, shall, for the purposes of this act, and for fixing and limiting the number of justices of the peace to be elected in such city, be deemed and considered one precinct ...

Laws of 1887-88, ch. 68, § 3, at 120.

Using their definition as a frame of reference, appellants trace the development of the justice of the peace statutes through the years. Not surprisingly, appellants interpret this history of the justice of the peace courts to include the Seattle municipal court system. Because these municipal judges, so the argument goes, are in actuality "justices of the peace," their number can only be set by the Legislature.

In response to the City's argument that the municipal court system represents an "inferior court," appellants contend that the Legislature must create "inferior courts" with specific language to that effect. As an example, appellants cite RCW 3.50.010, which authorizes cities of under 400,000 to create municipal courts outside of the state district court system: "Any city or town with a population of four hundred thousand or less may by ordinance provide for an inferior court to be known and designated as a municipal court ..." Because the Legislature did not make such a designation in RCW 35.20, they conclude that Seattle's municipal courts are "justices of the peace," apparently by default.

In addition, appellants argue that because RCW 3.50.040 provides for municipal court judges to be appointed by the mayor of the city, appellants maintain that "inferior court" judges are appointed, not elected. Based on this assumption, appellants conclude that if a "judge in an incorporated city" is elected to office, he or she is a justice of the peace.

Appellants' historical argument fails because it takes only a limited and selective view of the constitution's language and of the body of statutes creating Washington's court system. This court has long held that in construing a constitutional provision, one must view the instrument as a whole and give effect to all of its provisions harmoniously. See State ex rel. Wolfe v. Parmenter, 50 Wash. 164, 96 P. 1047 (1908); Sears v. Western Thrift Stores of Olympia, Inc., 10 Wash.2d 372, 116 P.2d 756 (1941); Farris v. Munro, 99 Wash.2d 326, 662 P.2d 821 (1983). With this rule in mind, it follows that neither Const. art. 4, § 10 (amend. 65) nor Const. art. 4, § 12 can be construed to bypass the other. Section 10 cannot prohibit the flexibility implied by section 12, and section 12 cannot bypass and render meaningless the strict requirements of section 10.

A complete understanding of these two constitutional provisions requires a careful reading of the unifying section of the constitution's judicial article, Const. art. 4, § 1:

The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, superior courts, justices of the peace, and such inferior courts as the legislature may provide.

(Italics ours.) As the emphasized words of section 1 indicate, the Legislature is mandated to create the justice of the peace courts. Along with this mandate comes the Legislature's responsibility for setting the number of justices of the peace in section 10. The constitution, however, gives the Legislature more flexibility in creating other kinds of "inferior courts" as the need arises. Part of this flexibility is the ability to delegate the power to set the number of judges in these courts.

Because the constitution mandates...