Engel v. Engel

Decision Date21 June 2022
Docket Number3:21-CV-03020-RAL
PartiesENECA LOVETT ENGEL, Plaintiff, v. DEREK ENGEL, MILLER POLICE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF MILLER, SOUTH DAKOTA, JIM HENSON, MILLER POLICE DEPARTMENT, OFFICIALLY AND INDIVIDUALLY; SHANNON SPECK, MILLER POLICE DEPARTMENT, OFFICIALLY AND INDIVIDUALLY; AND VARIOUS JOHN AND JANE DOES, MILLER POLICE DEPARTMENT, OFFICIALLY AND INDIVIDUALLY; Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Dakota
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

ROBERTO A. LANGE, CHIEF JUDGE.

The Defendants in this case have filed motions to dismiss. Although Plaintiff appears to have legitimate state-law claims against at least one defendant, the absence of a viable claim within federal court jurisdiction requires dismissal of the case.

I. Factual Background[1]

This case arises from an incident that occurred in Hand County South Dakota, in the fall of 2019. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 3, 12. Plaintiff Seneca Lovett Engel (Seneca), an African American female, alleges that Derek Engel (Derek), her then husband[2] and one of the Defendants named in the complaint, believed Seneca was involved in an extra-marital affair. Doc. 1 at ¶ 12. Seneca alleges that Derek took her phone while she was grocery shopping in Miller, South Dakota, on October 29, 2019. Doc. 1 at ¶ 13. Later that day, Seneca and Derek met at the Miller airport and began arguing about the phone and alleged infidelity. Doc. 1 at ¶ 14. Seneca claims that Derek grabbed her by the neck and slammed her against the side of a pickup truck ripping her coat, cutting her finger, and causing pain in her back and neck. Doc. 1 at ¶ 14.

After the altercation and with Derek still possessing her phone, Seneca traveled to the Miller Police Department to report the incident. Doc. 1 at ¶ 15. Derek, while following Seneca to the police department, called Defendant Jim Henson (Henson), an officer for Defendant Miller Police Department, to report that Derek and Seneca would be arriving at the police department to discuss a domestic incident. Doc. 1 at ¶ 15.

When they arrived at the police department, Henson spoke with both Derek and Seneca about the incident. According to Seneca, Derek admitted to taking her phone and grabbing and shoving her at the airport. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 16-17. She said the couple's four-year-old son witnessed the altercation and verified to police her claims. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 14, 20. She also told Henson that she had been the victim of physical abuse repeatedly throughout the relationship and requested law enforcement take action to return her phone and to pursue a domestic assault criminal complaint. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 18-19. Henson consulted with Defendant Shannon Speck, Chief of the Miller Police Department. Doc. 1 at ¶ 21. According to Seneca, the Miller Police Department ultimately failed to take any action. Doc. 1 at ¶ 22.

According to Seneca, Derek accessed personal material including social media accounts and email on her phone after he was allowed to leave the police station with possession of it. Doc. 1 at ¶ 23. Seneca claims that Derek used this access to impersonate her while contacting third parties on Snapchat, Facebook and Instagram. Doc. 1 at ¶ 26. Derek also accessed other personal content on the phone such as photos of her that were sexual in nature and personal information about her private life, sending such material to Seneca's family, friends and others in the Miller community. Doc. 1 at ¶ 27. According to Seneca, Derek told friends, family, co-workers, and church and community members that Seneca was a drug addict and prostitute with mental health issues. Doc. 1 at ¶ 30. Seneca thereafter felt that this allegation forced her to resign from her positions at a church and as a board member at a daycare. Doc. 1 at ¶ 31. She claims the allegations compromised her EEOC complaint against a former employer resulting in a less favorable settlement. Doc. 1 at ¶ 33. She also claims Derek harassed her by sending her photos of dead animals, setting off her car alarm, and being verbally abusive when exchanging custody of their son. Doc. 1 at ¶35. Seneca felt forced to seek home employment due to fear for her safety. Doc. 1 at ¶ 35.

Seneca obtained a temporary restraining order against Derek on October 30, 2019, and began staying in a nearby town. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 24-25. Seneca reported Derek's behavior to Henson and Speck. Doc. 1 at ¶ 28. Despite these reports, the Miller Police Department failed to properly act upon and investigate the matter. Doc. 1 at ¶ 29. Seneca received another temporary restraining order against Derek on January 21, 2020. Doc. 1 at ¶ 36.

Seneca filed this action against Engel, the Miller Police Department, City of Miller, Henson, Speck and the various John and Jane Does of the Miller Police Department officially and in their individual capacities (collectively Defendants). Doc. 1. Seneca asserts multiple causes of action including assault and battery (against Derek), defamation (against Derek), invasion of privacy (against all Defendants), intentional infliction of emotional distress (against all Defendants), negligent infliction of emotional distress, (against Miller Police Department, City of Miller, Henson, Speck and various John and Jane Does of Miller Police Department (collectively “the Miller Defendants)), negligent hiring, training, supervision and retention (against the Miller Defendants), conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (against all Defendants), and conspiracy under 42 U.S.C § 1983 (against all Defendants). Doc. 1 at¶¶ 38-100. The Miller Defendants answered, Docs. 9, 15, and Derek and the Miller Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss and supporting briefs. Docs. 16, 17, 24, 25. Seneca opposed the motions to dismiss.[3] Docs. 18, 26, to which Defendants replied. Docs. 21, 30. After reviewing the files and records, this Court grants Defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for the reasons set forth below.

II. Standard of Review

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Courts must accept the plaintiffs factual allegations as true and construe all inferences in the plaintiffs favor, but need not accept the plaintiffs legal conclusions. Retro Television Network, Inc, v. Luken Commc'ns, LLC, 696 F.3d 766, 768-69 (8th Cir. 2012). Although detailed factual allegations are unnecessary, the plaintiff must plead enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[, ] meaning “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp, v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Therefore, the “factual allegations must be sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Cook v. George's, Inc., 952 F.3d 935, 938 (8th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up and citation omitted). Courts are to construe complaints liberally. Id.

III. Discussion
A. 42 U.S.C § 1983

Section 1983 provides that [e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.” 42 U.S.C § 1983. Seneca claims that the Defendants acted with reckless indifference to her constitutional rights. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 92-100. “Liability for damages for a federal constitutional tort is personal, so each defendant's conduct must be independently assessed.” Faulk v. City of St. Louis, 30 F.4th 739, 744 (8th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Therefore, this Court will address each Defendant in turn, grouping them together when appropriate.

1. Derek

Derek asserts that as a private individual, he cannot be held liable under § 1983. Docs. 17, 21. Seneca responds that Derek acted under the color of state law because he acted with the help, and in conspiracy with, the Miller Defendants. Doc. 18. The parties agree that a § 1983 claim requires that the Defendants: 1) acted under the color of state law, and 2) deprived the plaintiff of a federal right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Docs. 17, 18 (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). However, the parties disagree on what test this Court should apply to determine whether Derek acted under the color of state law. See Docs. 17, 18. Derek also contests whether he deprived Seneca of any constitutional rights. Doc. 17.

Derek cites to Jackson v, Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974), for the proposition that a private individual only acts under the color of state law if “there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the [actor] so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” See Doc. 17. However, Seneca cites to Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137 1142 (3rd Cir. 1995), to contend the Supreme Court has at times applied different tests and to argue that this Court should instead ask “whether the private party has acted with the help of or in concert with state officials.” Doc. 18 (citing Mark, 51 F.3d at 1142). The Eighth Circuit has stated that a private actor “may be liable under § 1983 only if she is a willing participant in joint action with the State or its agents.” Miller v. Compton, 122 F.3d 1094, 1098 (8th Cir. 1997) (cleaned up and citations omitted). This requires alleging at least a meeting of the minds to overcome a motion to dismiss....

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