Engelleiter v. Brevard County Sheriff's Dept.
| Decision Date | 25 July 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 6:02-CV-386-ORL22JGG.,6:02-CV-386-ORL22JGG. |
| Citation | 290 F.Supp.2d 1300 |
| Parties | William ENGELLEITER, Plaintiff, v. BREVARD COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Richard C. Singer, Esq., Singer & Johnston, LLC, Melbourne, FL, for Plaintiff.
Thomas W. Poulton, Esq., DeBevoise & Poulton, P.A., Winter Park, FL, for Defendant.
Upon the Court's review of this case, it is ORDERED as follows:
1. No objections thereto having been filed, Magistrate Judge James G. Glazebrook's Report and Recommendation (Doc. 42), entered on July 7, 2003, is APPROVED AND ADOPTED.
2. The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 30), filed April 1, 2003, is GRANTED.
3. Although the Defendant previously asserted a counterclaim, see Doc. 18, it is apparent from the parties' Final Pretrial Statement (Doc. 40) that the counterclaim has been abandoned.
4. The Clerk shall enter a final judgment providing that the Plaintiff, William Engelleiter, shall take nothing on his claims against the Defendant, Brevard County Sheriff's Department, and shall further provide that the Defendant shall recover its costs of action.
5. Any other pending motions are moot.
6. The Clerk shall close the case.
GLAZEBROOK, United States Magistrate.
This cause came on for oral argument on June 23, 2003 on the following motion:
MOTION: DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(Doc. No. 30)
FILED: April 1, 2003 [referred May 27
2003]
THEREON it is RECOMMENDED that the motion be GRANTED.
Plaintiff William Engelleiter brought this civil rights action against the Brevard County Sheriff's Office pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 First Amended Complaint, Docket No. 3 at 1; Joint Final Pretrial Statement ["PTS"], Docket No. 40 at 1, 4. Engelleiter claims that the Brevard County Sheriff's Office was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical condition—insulin-dependent diabetes —while he was incarcerated at the Brevard County Detention Center on May 24—25, 2000. PTS, Docket No. 40 at 2. Engelleiter contends that the Brevard County Sheriff's Office gave him only one shot of insulin during a period of approximately 48 hours even though Engelleiter said that he was an insulin-dependent diabetic, and that he required up to four shots of insulin per day to maintain his blood sugar at a safe level. PTS, Docket No. 40 at 2. As a result, Engelleiter contends that he was hospitalized for three days after being released. Id. The Brevard County Sheriff's Office contends that it responded reasonably to Engelleiter's diabetic condition, and that it did not have a policy or custom of being deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of inmates. Id.
The Brevard County Sheriff's Office claims that it is entitled to summary judgment on two grounds: 1.) the undisputed facts demonstrate, at most, medical negligence but not deliberate indifference to Engelleiter's diabetic condition; and 2.) the undisputed facts demonstrate that the Brevard County Sheriff's Office did not have a policy or custom of being deliberately indifferent to the serious medical conditions of inmates at the Brevard County Detention Center. Docket No. 30 at 2. In support of its motion for summary judgment, the Brevard County Sheriff's Office has submitted a memorandum of law, numerous affidavits, medical records, answers to interrogatories, and Engelleiter's deposition. Docket Nos. 29—34.
Engelleiter claims that a material issue of fact remains for trial as to whether the Brevard County Sheriff's Office was deliberately indifferent to his diabetic condition. Docket No. 37. Relying on his own deposition, Engelleiter denies that he received 24 units of insulin at approximately 7:30 p.m. on May 24, 2000,2 and instead claims that he never received a single dose of insulin after an initial dose when he first arrived at the Brevard County Detention Center. Engelleiter's Memorandum, Docket No. 37 at 2, citing Engelleiter Deposition, Docket No. 31 at 80—81.
Regarding the second issue on which defendant seeks summary judgment, Engelleiter does not contest that the Brevard County Sheriff's Office adopted a written policy that every inmate receive quality medical care throughout his incarceration and never be denied needed medical care. Docket No. 37 at 9; Affidavit of Sergeant James Dodson at 2, Docket No. 29; Affidavit of Health Services Administrator Dorothy Smith at 2, Docket No. 29. Similarly, Engelleiter does not contest that the defendant's Medical Director ordered that, in the case of a diabetic such as Engelleiter, the inmate's blood sugar level be tested twice per day, and that insulin be administered according to a sliding scale. Docket No. 37 at 9. Engelleiter does contend, however, that his own deposition testimony, in general, establishes that the Medical Director's orders were not followed as to him. Engelleiter also claims to have proved a policy or custom of deliberate indifference by showing that the Brevard County Sheriff's Office delegated to nurses the authority to comply with the physician's orders—i.e., the performance of blood testing and the administration of insulin—despite its written policy requiring adequate care. Docket No. 37 at 9— 10.
For the reasons stated below, Engelleiter is mistaken. The undisputed facts demonstrate that the Brevard County Sheriff's Office did not have a policy or custom of being deliberately indifferent to the serious medical conditions of inmates at the Brevard County Detention Center. The Brevard County Sheriff's Office's motion for summary judgment should be GRANTED.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the Court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, 64 F.3d 590, 593— 94 (11th Cir.1995); Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604 (11th Cir.1991). A moving party discharges its burden on a motion for summary judgment by showing the Court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Rule 56 permits the moving party to discharge its burden with or without supporting affidavits, and to move for summary judgment on the case as a whole or on any claim. Id. When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then "go beyond the pleadings," and by its own affidavits or by "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
In determining whether the moving party has met its burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Court must draw inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, and resolve all reasonable doubts in that party's favor. Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256 (11th Cir.1989); Samples on Behalf of Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir.1988). The Eleventh Circuit has explained the reasonableness standard:
in deciding whether an inference is reasonable, the Court must "cull the universe of possible inferences from the facts established by weighing each against the abstract standard of reasonableness." [citation omitted]. The opposing party's inferences need not be more probable than those inferences in favor of the movant to create a factual dispute, so long as they reasonably may be drawn from the facts. When more than one inference reasonably can be drawn, it is for the trier of fact to determine the proper one.
Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, 64 F.3d 590, 594 (11th Cir.1995), quoting WSB-TV v. Lee, 842 F.2d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir.1988).
Thus, if a reasonable fact finder evaluating the evidence could draw more than one inference from the facts, and if that inference introduces a genuine issue of material fact, then the court should not grant the summary judgment motion. Augusta Iron and Steel Works v. Employers Insurance of Wausau, 835 F.2d 855, 856 (11th Cir. 1988). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the "evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505. On a summary judgment motion the Court may not weigh the credibility of the parties. See Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1531 (11th Cir.1987). If the determination of the case rests on which competing version of the facts or events is true, the case should be presented to the trier of fact. Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that the party making a motion for summary judgment may submit affidavits to support its argument as to the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Rule 56(e) provides as follows regarding the materials that the non-movant must submit in response:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be...
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