Engineered Steel Concepts, Inc. v. Gen. Drivers, Warehousemen, & Helpers Union Local 142
| Decision Date | 29 February 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 45A04–1106–CT–287.,45A04–1106–CT–287. |
| Citation | 963 N.E.2d 62,162 Lab.Cas. P 61234 |
| Parties | ENGINEERED STEEL CONCEPTS, INC., ESC Group Limited, and Tom Anderson, Appellants–Plaintiffs, v. GENERAL DRIVERS, WAREHOUSEMEN, AND HELPERS UNION LOCAL 142, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and Steven Parks, Appellees–Defendants. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Richard M. Davis, Kevin G. Kerr, Hoeppner Wagner & Evans LLP, Valparaiso, IN, Attorneys for Appellants.
Paul T. Berkowitz, Paul T. Berkowitz & Associates, Ltd., Chicago, IL, Attorney for Appellees.
Engineered Steel Concepts, Inc. (“ESC”), ESC Group Limited (“Group”) (collectively, “the Company”), and Tom Anderson appeal the trial court's dismissal of their complaint against General Drivers, Warehousemen, and Helpers Union Local 142, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (collectively, “the Union”), and Steven Parks. Anderson and the Company raise three issues for our review, but we need only address the following dispositive issue: whether the trial court properly dismissed their complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.
The relevant facts stated in the complaint are as follows:
1. [Anderson] is the owner of [ESC] and [Group].
2. ESC and Group are both entities that have, at times, engaged in the business of hauling various items and commodities, including recyclable by-products of the steel-making process.
3. [The Union] is the local chapter of a national union representing laborers in a variety of industries.
4. [Parks] is, and at all relevant [times] was, the business agent for [the Union].
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6. Among [Parks'] job duties as business agent was negotiating collective bargaining agreements between the Union and various employers.
7. In October 2004, ESC purchased 100,000 tons of “c-fines,” a by-product of the steel[-]making process, from International Steel Group.
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9. At the time ESC purchased the c-fines, it did not employ any drivers or own any trucks.
10. On March 8, 2005, [Anderson] and Martin Surdell, as representatives of ESC, met with [Parks] to discuss the possibility of [ESC] entering into a contract to employ Union members to drive the trucks hauling the c-fines.
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12. At the ... meeting, Anderson described the scope of the work to be performed....
13. Anderson also informed [Parks] that the c-fines hauling project was temporary in nature[ ] and that Anderson expected the project to last about one year.
14. [Parks] stated to Anderson that there were two types of labor agreements applicable to the type of work Anderson described: a general construction agreement and a commodity hauling agreement.
15. [Parks], on behalf of [the Union], informed Anderson that, based on the scope and type of the work described by Anderson, a Section 8(f) general construction agreement, applicable to employers “engaged primarily in the building and construction industry,” was the proper labor agreement for ESC to sign with respect to the c-fines project. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (2006).
16. [Parks] stated to Anderson that the Section 8(f) agreement covered stockpile[-]to[-]stockpile movement of material, and informed Anderson that the c-fines hauling project qualified as a stockpile[-]to[-]stockpile movement project.
17. [Parks] informed Anderson that ESC could not sign a Section 9(a) commodity hauling agreement[ ] because ESC had no employees at the time the agreement would be signed.
18. [Parks] also stated to Anderson that it would be “illegal” for ESC to sign a Section 9(a) agreement because ESC had no employees.
19. Anderson informed [Parks] that ESC would not sign a contract with the Union unless the contract could be terminated at the completion of the c-fines hauling project.
20.... [Parks] stated to Anderson three (3) times that the Section 8(f) agreement could be terminated when the c-fines hauling project was complete.
21. [Parks] also told Anderson that ESC would need to sign a new Section 8(f) agreement if the c-fines project was not completed by May 31, 2006, the contract termination date specified in the Section 8(f) agreement tendered by Parks.
22.... Anderson had no reason to believe that [Parks'] statements ... contained misrepresentations of fact or were false.
23. Anderson, in reasonable reliance on [Parks'] statements ..., executed the Section 8(f) agreement tendered by [Parks].
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28. Following the completion of the c-fines hauling project in early February 2006, ESC informed [the Union employees] that the project was completed and no additional work was available.
29. On or about March 13, 2006, [the Union] filed a charge against ESC with the National Labor Relations Board [ (“NLRB”) ] ... alleging [the employees] were unjustly terminated.
30. Following an investigation by the NLRB, the case against ESC was tried in February 2007, and Administrative Law Judge Eric M. Fine [ (“the ALJ”) ] issued a ruling that ESC and Group (as ESC's alter ego) had violated Sections 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act [ (“the Act”) ], by laying off and terminating [the Union employees] in February and March 2006.
31. [The ALJ] held that ESC and Group did not qualify as employers engaged primarily in the building and constructions industry, and that the scope and nature of the c-fines hauling project did not fit within the stockpile[-]to [-]stockpile definition in the Section 8(f) agreement.
32. [The ALJ] held that the agreement signed by ESC should be treated as a Section 9(a) agreement, under which ESC could not terminate the agreement at the end of the c-fines hauling project.
33. During the trial before [the ALJ], [Parks] testified untruthfully regarding the details of the March 8, 2005, meeting....
34. [Parks'] perjury during the administrative trial was suborned by NLRB counsel ..., who either knew or reasonably should have known that she was eliciting false testimony from Parks in support of the NLRB's arguments.
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37. [The ALJ's] ruling was affirmed by the [NLRB] on May 30, 2008.
Anderson and the Company then alleged three counts against Parks and the Union. Specifically, Anderson and the Company alleged Parks and the Union made material misrepresentations of fact at the March 8, 2005, meeting and thereby engaged in fraud. Likewise, Anderson and the Company alleged that Parks and the Union committed fraud in the inducement of the Section 8(f) contract. Third, they alleged that Parks and the Union engaged in intentional deception “regarding the propriety and details of the Section 8(f) agreement....” Id. at 21. Anderson and the Company then requested the following relief:
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for a judgment that Defendants Union and Parks, individually and as agent for Union, be required to compensate Plaintiffs for actual damages, including any amounts Plaintiffs are ordered to pay [by the NLRB to the discharged Union employees and the Union], for punitive damages, for costs of this action, for attorney fees in defense of the NLRB charges, and for all other relief that is just and proper in the premises.
Id. (emphases added).
Thereafter, in early December of 2010 Parks and the Union filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to, among other things, Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(1). Attached to their motion and memorandum in support were the Union's charges against the Company filed with the NLRB; the NLRB's complaint and notice of hearing against the Company; the NLRB's decision adopting the ALJ's findings and conclusions in favor of the Union; an order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit enforcing the NLRB's decision; an e-mail exchange between the Company's attorney and counsel for the NLRB; and citations to and selected quotes from various federal statutes. Anderson and ESC filed a timely response. On May 11, 2011, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss under Rule 12(B)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.1 This appeal ensued.
Anderson and the Company appeal the trial court's grant of Parks and the Union's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As our supreme court has held:
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court may consider not only the complaint and motion but also any affidavits or evidence submitted in support. Indiana Dep't of Highways v. Dixon, 541 N.E.2d 877, 884 (Ind.1989); Borgman v. State Farm Ins. Co., 713 N.E.2d 851, 854 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied. In addition, the trial court may weigh the evidence to determine the existence of the requisite jurisdictional facts. Borgman, 713 N.E.2d at 854.
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[T]he standard of appellate review for Trial Rule 12(B)(1) motions to dismiss is ... a function of what occurred in the trial court. That is, the standard of review is dependent upon: (i) whether the trial court resolved disputed facts; and (ii) if the trial court resolved disputed facts, whether it conducted an evidentiary hearing or ruled on a “paper record.”
If the facts before the trial court are not in dispute, then the question of subject matter jurisdiction is purely one of law. Under those circumstances no deference is afforded the trial court's conclusion because “appellate courts independently, and without the slightest deference to trial court determinations, evaluate those issues they deem to be questions of law.” Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1216 (Ind.2000). Thus, we review de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss under Trial Rule 12(B)(1) where the facts before the trial court are undisputed.
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[W]here the facts are in dispute but the trial court rules on a paper record without conducting an evidentiary hearing, then no deference is afforded the trial court's factual findings or judgment because under those circumstances a court of review is “in as good a position as the trial court to...
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