England v. Meijer, Inc.
| Decision Date | 20 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 322065,322065 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
| Parties | SARAH ENGLAND, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MEIJER, INC., Defendant-Appellant. |
UNPUBLISHED
Wayne Circuit Court
Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and JANSEN and OWENS, JJ.
Defendant appeals as of right the trial court's order granting in part and denying in part its motion for summary disposition in this premises liability and negligence action. The trial court denied defendant's motion for summary disposition on plaintiff's ordinary negligence claim despite granting the motion with regard to plaintiff's premises liability claim based on the same facts, finding that a hazardous condition on defendant's premises was open and obvious, but that a question of fact existed regarding whether defendant acted reasonably to remedy the hazardous condition after it had knowledge of the hazard's existence. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred according to this Court's opinion in Buhalis v Trinity Continuing Care Services, 296 Mich App 685; 822 NW2d 254 (2012). For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reverse and remand this matter to the trial court for entry of summary disposition in favor of defendant.
This case arises from a slip and fall occurring at defendant's store on July 21, 2011. At about 8:45 p.m., an unidentified customer dropped a bottle of liquid laundry detergent in one of defendant's checkout aisles. The bottle broke open and a large amount of bright blue detergent spread about half the way across the white floor of the aisle, which was 1 of 10 aisles manned that evening by cashiers Angelica Jedro and Stacy Majtyka. Jedro noticed the spill immediately and turned off the aisle light in order to prevent foot traffic. Because Majtyka had gone on break, leaving Jedro as the sole cashier for 10 aisles, Jedro could not leave her area to obtain a wet floor sign. Although Jedro did not physically block off the aisle, she alerted her shift supervisor, JoAnne Smith, who called utility workers to clean up the spill. Shortly thereafter, Majtyka returned to the area and Jedro, noticing that the utility workers had not yet shown up, decided to grab a mop and bucket to clean up the spill herself.
At approximately 8:54 p.m., nine minutes after the spill, plaintiff and her husband were checking out after grocery shopping. As plaintiff was walking toward the front of the store, she entered the aisle where the spill was and slipped in the detergent. She fell sideways and collided with the aisle's conveyor system before hitting the ground. Plaintiff testified that she had not seen the liquid laundry detergent prior to the fall, and that her vision would not have been obstructed by anything other than her pregnant stomach.
On November 9, 2012, plaintiff filed a two-count complaint alleging premises liability and ordinary negligence on the part of defendant for the July 21, 2011 slip and fall incident. For premises liability, plaintiff claimed that defendant breached its duty to maintain a reasonably safe premises for invitees by "allowing the liquid laundry detergent, that caused [p]laintiff to slip and fall at its store, to remain on the floor where customers could slip on it, without cleaning it up, without warning customers of it, or without marking the area off with a warning or closing the area off." Plaintiff's ordinary negligence claim was couched in similar terms, alleging that defendant breached its duty to maintain its store in a safe condition and free from hazards by "allowing a dangerous condition to exist without cleaning it up, warning [p]laintiff of it or marking the area of the spilled laundry detergent off." Defendant filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) on December 3, 2013, arguing that it was entitled to summary disposition on both counts because the liquid laundry detergent spill was an open and obvious condition on the premises with no special aspects, and defendant therefore had no duty to warn plaintiff about the spill or prevent her from encountering the alleged dangerous condition.
A hearing was held on defendant's motion wherein the trial court granted defendant's motion for summary disposition, in part, dismissing the premises liability claim before moving on to consider plaintiff's ordinary negligence claim. Defendant argued that plaintiff's claim for ordinary negligence was a premises liability claim by a different name, and that under Buhalis, "a plaintiff can't plead ordinary negligence to try to avoid the application of premises liability and the open and obvious doctrine." According to defendant, plaintiff's claim arose from a condition on the land and sounded only in premises liability. The trial judge initially took the issue under advisement, adjourning the hearing to allow plaintiff time to respond on the issue of whether it could bring an ordinary negligence claim based on the same set of facts as a premises liability claim, thus defeating the application of the open and obvious doctrine. The hearing on defendant's motion for summary disposition on the ordinary negligence claim resumed February 28, 2014 with defendant again relying on Buhalis to support its assertion that because the ordinary negligence claim arose out of an alleged hazardous condition on defendant's premises, it must be analyzed under the law of premises liability, and thus, was subjected to the open and obvious doctrine. In opposition, plaintiff relied on this Court's opinion in Laier v Kitchen, 266 Mich App 482, 493; 702 NW2d 199 (2005), distinguishing a premises liability claim, which arises from a "duty as an owner, possessor, or occupier of land," from an ordinary negligence claim, which may be "based on the defendant's conduct." Id. Plaintiff argued that, under Laier, her ordinary negligence claim could survive despite the fact that it involved a hazardous condition because a lack of follow-through with the clean-up constituted conduct. The trial court agreed, denying defendant's motion for summary disposition on the negligence claim and stating:
I do think that there was a duty here once the store began to clean up and they didn't finish, that those actions, that conduct brings to a question of fact did they do, did they do it in a way that was appropriate, and here I do not believe that that was the case . . . I do believe that that duty was created, that the, there's a question of fact of how it was breached and that by allowing the spill to stay there that long those were the, you know, actions of the Defendant. [H II, pp 24-25.]
Following denial of its motion for reconsideration, defendant filed an application for leave to appeal which was granted by this Court.
This Court reviews de novo a trial court's denial of a defendant's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 561; 664 NW2d 151 (2003). This Court considers the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Liparoto Constr, Inc v Gen Shale Brick, Inc, 284 Mich App 25, 29; 772 NW2d 801 (2009). Summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10) when there is no genuine issue with respect to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). "A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds could differ." Allison v AEW Capital Mgt, LLP, 481 Mich 419, 425; 751 NW2d 8 (2008). In negligence cases, determination of the existence of duty is a question of law subject to review de novo on appeal. Fultz v Union-Commerce Assoc, 470 Mich 460, 463; 683 NW2d 587 (2004).
"Michigan law distinguishes between claims arising from ordinary negligence and claims premised on a condition of the land." Buhalis, 296 Mich App at 692. In any negligence action, a plaintiff must prove (1) that defendant owed plaintiff a duty, (2) that defendant breached that duty, (3) that the breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, and (4) that the plaintiff suffered damages. Taylor v Laban, 241 Mich App 449, 452; 616 NW2d 229 (2000). In a premises liability action, "liability arises solely from the defendant's duty as an owner, possessor, or occupier of land." Buhalis, 296 Mich App at 692. An owner "owes a duty to an invitee to exercise reasonable care to protect the invitee from an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition on the land." Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc, 464 Mich 512, 516; 629 NW2d 384 (2001). Absent special aspects such as unreasonable danger, this duty generally does not require the owner to protect an invitee from open and obvious dangers. Hoffner v Lanctoe, 492 Mich 450, 455; 821 NW2d 88 (2012). "An action in premises liability does not preclude a separate claim grounded on an independent theory of liability based on the defendant's conduct." Laier v Kitchen, 266 Mich App 482, 493; 702 NW2d 199 (2005). However, "if the plaintiff's injury arose from an allegedly dangerous condition on the land, the action sounds in premises liability rather than ordinary negligence . . . even when the plaintiff alleges that the premises possessor created the condition giving rise to the plaintiff's injury." Buhalis, 296 Mich App at 692.
As an initial matter, the fact that plaintiff has labeled her claim as an "ordinary negligence" claim does not bind the court to a negligence analysis. Courts are not bound by thelabels that parties attach to their claims, Buhalis, 296 Mich App at 691, and "[i]t is well settled that the gravamen of an action is determined by reading the complaint as a whole, and by looking beyond mere procedural labels to determine the exact nature of the claim," Adams v Adams, 276 Mich App 704, 710-711; 742 NW2d 399 (2007).
The plain words of plaintiff's...
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