Engle v. City of Cuyahoga Falls

CourtUnited States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Court of Northern District of Ohio
PartiesKATHRYN E. ENGLE, PLAINTIFF, v. CITY OF CUYAHOGA FALLS, et al., DEFENDANTS.
Docket NumberCASE NO. 5:14-cv-1161
Decision Date22 June 2015

KATHRYN E. ENGLE, PLAINTIFF,
v.
CITY OF CUYAHOGA FALLS, et al., DEFENDANTS.

CASE NO. 5:14-cv-1161

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

June 22, 2015


JUDGE SARA LIOI

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court are two motions. By the first motion, defendants, Dr. Daniel Celik, Summa Akron City, and St. Thomas Hospitals, identified in the original complaint as St. Thomas Hospital Emergency Room (collectively "Summa defendants"), seek dismissal of all claims against them (Doc. No. 12 ["MTD"]). In the second motion, defendants, City of Cuyahoga Falls ("city"), Cuyahoga Falls City Development Department ("CFDD"), Cuyahoga Falls Police Department ("CFPD"), Charles Nettle ("Nettle"), Cuyahoga Falls Police Officers Robert Schmidt, James McGowan, Officer "McIlvain," Mark Ralston, Daniel Randall, David Holzapfel, Richard Garinger and Sergeant Michael Heinl ("city officers") (collectively "city defendants"), seek partial judgment on the pleadings (Doc. No. 14 ["PMJP']). Plaintiff Kathryn Engle ("plaintiff") filed an opposition to city defendants' motion (Doc. No. 16 ["Opp'n"]). Summa defendants' motion stands unopposed.

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For the reasons set forth below, Summa defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED. City defendants' motion for partial judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this pro se action on April 15, 2014 in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. (Doc. No. 1-1 ["St. Ct. Compl."].) Styled a "CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT," the state court pleading contained a running narrative of an incident in 2013 wherein city officers purportedly broke into plaintiff's home under the guise of facilitating the removal of property belonging to plaintiff's estranged son, Kory Engle ("Kory"), and Kory's girlfriend, Tanya Hess ("Tanya"). (St. Ct. Compl. at 7.1)

On May 30, 2014, city defendants removed this action to federal court. (Doc. No. 1.) Following removal, city defendants moved for a more definite statement (Doc. No. 3), and plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on all claims (Doc. No. 5). After reviewing the original complaint, the Court issued an order advising plaintiff that her pleading did not appear to contain allegations which could be construed as setting forth a valid federal claim. (Doc. No. 8.) Plaintiff was afforded leave to file an amended complaint, which she did file on October 14, 2014.2 (Doc. No. 10 ["Am. Compl."].)

According to the amended complaint, prior to April 15, 2013, plaintiff had affixed a sign to a vehicle parked in front of her residence "advising the public that Kory

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Engle did not reside [at her residence] and arrangements would be made to pick up any personal property of Kory[,] or his girlfriend, Tanya Hess[,] and further advised the officers that Kory Engle had no right to be in or on the property." (Id. ¶ 7.) Notwithstanding the sign, on April 15, 2013, plaintiff alleges that Officers Schmidt and Holzapel told Kory that he could enter plaintiff's residence "without [plaintiff's] consent or approval." (Id.) It is unclear whether Kory, or any other individual, gained entry to plaintiff's residence that day.

What is evident from the allegations in the amended complaint is that plaintiff contends that certain city officers, including Officers Garinger and McGowan, returned to plaintiff's residence two days later (on April 17, 2014). (Id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges that these officers, "with force and violence and with reckless disregard for the rights of the Plaintiff, forcibly entered the Plaintiff's residence through a rear door causing damage to the door and other personal property of the Plaintiff and conducted a search of the residence." (Id.)

Plaintiff avers that certain city officers permitted Tanya to follow them into the premises. (Id. ¶ 9.) Once inside, the city officers and Tanya observed plaintiff "in a state of partial undress and nudity." (Id. ¶ 10.) Officers Garinger and other city officers "physically prevented" plaintiff from stopping Tanya from taking plaintiff's personal property. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 12.) During the encounter, Officer Garinger and others also purportedly threatened plaintiff with arrest, and "advised her that they intended to and did 'pink slip' her for mental evaluation at St. Thomas Hospital Mental Health Unit, where she was taken by a friend as an alternative to transport by the" city officers. (Id. ¶ 12.)

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Plaintiff further alleges that her home was subsequently condemned by Nettle, who appears to be an employee of CFDD. (Id. ¶ 31.)

Applying a liberal construction to the amended complaint, the Court finds that plaintiff has attempted to raise federal claims for excessive force, unlawful search and seizure, and due process. She also appears to assert state law claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, trespass, and civil conspiracy. Additionally, she seeks to hold the city liable for implementing and/or permitting a pattern or practice of unlawful conduct by its employees. (Id. ¶¶ 15-16.) Summa defendants request dismissal from the action, while city defendants seek judgment on the pleadings in their favor on all claims except the Fourth Amendment search and seizure claim.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summa defendants bring their dispositive motion under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, maintaining that the complaint fails to state a cause of action against them. To satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8, a complaint "must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In reviewing a complaint in the context of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all well-pleaded material allegations in the complaint as true. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).

A complaint need not set down in detail all the particulars of a plaintiff's claim. However, "Rule 8 . . . does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79, 129 S. Ct.

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1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (This standard requires "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.") "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see Gregory v. Shelby Cnty., 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir. 2000) (the court should not accept conclusions of law or unwarranted inferences couched in the form of factual allegations). The complaint "must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988) (quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

Although the pleading standard of Rule 8 does not require great detail, the factual allegations in the complaint "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). In other words, "Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a 'showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief." Id. at 556 n.3 (criticizing the Twombly dissent's assertion that the pleading standard of Rule 8 "does not require, or even invite, the pleading of facts").

City defendants move under Rule 12(c) for partial judgment on the pleadings. Rule 12(c) provides "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The Court reviews a motion under Rule 12(c) in the same manner it would review a motion under Rule 12(b)(6). See Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 761 (6th Cir. 2006).

In considering the pending dispositive motions, the Court is mindful that pro se complaints must be held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

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by lawyers[.]" Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972); see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976). Nonetheless, "pro se plaintiffs are not automatically entitled to take every case to trial." Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). "As [the Sixth Circuit] has noted, the lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits." Id. (citing Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991)). For example, where "a complaint consist[s] of nothing more than naked assertions, and set[s] forth no facts upon which a court could find a violation of the Civil Rights Acts, [it] fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)." Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 713 (2d Cir. 1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989) (the court is not required to "guess at the nature of the claims asserted"), abrogated on other grounds, Moore v. City of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc). Indeed, courts have been unwilling to "abrogate basic pleading essentials in pro se suits." Wells, 891 F.2d at 594.

In other words, there are limits to the court's "liberal construction" of a pro se complaint. As the Court observed in Rogers v. Detroit Police Dep't, 595 F. Supp. 2d...

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