Englehart v. Jeep Corp.

• Decision Date: 03 April 1979
• Docket Number: No. 13829-PR,13829-PR
• Citation: Englehart v. Jeep Corp., 122 Ariz. 256, 594 P.2d 510 (Ariz. 1979)
• Parties: Rosemary ENGLEHART, Appellant, v. JEEP CORPORATION, a Nevada Corporation, American Motors Sales Corporation, a Delaware Corporation, and Galloway Motors, an Arizona Corporation, Appellees.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 510

594 P.2d 510

122 Ariz. 256

Rosemary ENGLEHART, Appellant, v.JEEP CORPORATION, a Nevada Corporation, American Motors Sales Corporation, a Delaware Corporation, and Galloway Motors, an Arizona Corporation, Appellees.

No. 13829-PR.

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc.

April 3, 1979.

Rehearing Denied May 8, 1979.

Renaud, Cook & Videan by James M. Videan, Phoenix, for appellant.

Everett, Bury & Moeller by Leonard Everett, Tucson, for appellees.

HOLOHAN, Justice.

This is a products liability action in which an allegedly defective automobile overturned, killing the driver.AppellantRosemary Englehart, the driver's wife, brought an action in the superior court against the auto manufacturer and the retail dealer.Following a jury verdict in favor of both defendants, the plaintiff appealed.The Court of Appeals, Division Two, in a memorandum decision (2 CA-CIV 2761 filed April 25, 1978), affirmed the decision of the trial court.We granted plaintiff's petition for review.For the reasons which follow, the decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the judgment of the superior court is reversed.

On February 22, 1974, Gerald D. Englehart was driving home from the bar which he and his wife operated in Sahuarita, Arizona.He was driving a Jeep Wagoneer that he had purchased from defendant Galloway Motors.His wife left the bar a short time after he did, driving another car.On her way home, she came upon her husband's jeep overturned in the roadway.

The police investigation indicated that, as the jeep had been traveling north, its right wheels had left the pavement for about 100 feet, and that it had then returned to the pavement and overturned.When it came to rest, the jeep lay on its roof facing south.Its left front wheel had come off and was found about 95 feet southwest of the overturned jeep.A number of gouge marks in the pavement and the damage to the vehicle itself were the only other clues the investigators could find to reconstruct the accident.

An autopsy revealed that Mr. Englehart had been drinking rather heavily that day.His blood-alcohol level was .23 percent, considerably above the .10 level which raises a presumption of intoxication.

Plaintiff based her action on the theory of strict liability for injury caused by a defective product.The only significant fact at issue in the trial was whether the wheel came off the jeep before or after it overturned.Plaintiff theorized that the steering knuckle was defective, thereby allowing the wheel to work itself loose and come off.When the wheel came off, the victim lost control and the jeep overturned.Defendants' theory was that the victim's intoxication caused him to lose control, and that in an attempt to retain control he turned too sharply, causing the vehicle to overturn.Defendant contended that the knuckle was not defective, but that the bolts holding the wheel to the knuckle were torn out when the weight of the tumbling jeep came down with full force upon that wheel.

The trial judge refused to allow plaintiff's principal expert witness to give his opinion as to when in the course of the accident the wheel came off the jeep.The witness, Lester E. Hendrickson, was a professor of metallurgy and physics at Arizona State University.He was allowed to testify extensively regarding the metallic properties of the allegedly defective steering knuckle and other parts of the jeep damaged in the accident.Plaintiff's attorney then attempted in several different ways to lay a foundation for Dr. Hendrickson to testify regarding the path of the vehicle and, most significantly, the point at which the wheel separated from the vehicle.The defendants repeatedly objected that Dr. Hendrickson was not qualified as an accident reconstructionist, and therefore could not render such an opinion based upon the available evidence.

In an offer of proof Dr. Hendrickson identified a point on the roadway at which he believed the wheel must have broken off from the vehicle.He based his opinion on damage to the wheel, damage to the vehicle itself, the location at which each part came to rest, marks in the pavement, and certain principles of physics.The trial court nevertheless refused to admit this testimony.Plaintiffs contend that this constitutes reversible error.We agree.

Whether a witness is competent to testify as an expert is a matter primarily for the trial court and largely within its discretion.We will not overrule the trial judge's decision in this regard unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.State v. Macumber, 112 Ariz. 569, 544 P.2d 1084(1976);Allied Van Lines v. Parsons, 80 Ariz. 88, 293 P.2d 430(1956);Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence§ 23.

As defendants correctly contend, the fact that a witness has qualified as an expert on previous occasions does not make him any more qualified to testify in the case at bar.The court must determine in each case whether the expertise of the witness is applicable to the subject about which he offers to testify.A witness must indicate that his training and experience qualify him to render enlightened opinions and draw sophisticated conclusions from the particular type of evidence available in a given accident.

"(T)he only true criterion is: on This subject can a jury receive from This person appreciable help?In other words, the test is a relative one, depending on the particular subject and the particular witness with reference to that subject, and is not fixed or limited to any class of persons acting professionally: . . . 'The subjects to which this kind of evidence is applicable are not confined to classed and specified professions.It is applicable wherever peculiar skill and judgment, applied to a particular subject, are required to explain results or to trace them to their causes.'(Citation omitted.)"VII Wigmore, Evidence§ 1923.

Plaintiff's offer of proof indicates that Dr. Hendrickson's proposed testimony was based not merely upon his expertise as a metallurgist, but also upon his knowledge of mechanics and physics.Like any accident reconstructionist, Dr. Hendrickson was applying the laws of physics to observable physical evidence in order to reconstruct the sequence of events.The scientific knowledge that an accident reconstructionist has at his command in this context was likewise available to Dr. Hendrickson.He did not base his opinion upon evidence of bodily injuries, traffic conditions, the victim's driving skills or handicaps, or other evidence not directly related to the laws of physics.Where the only significant evidence available is in the form of vehicle damage, road damage, and measurements of various objects and their locations, a physicist and engineer can certainly draw conclusions more precisely and scientifically than the average juror.An expert is merely a witness...