English v. Apache Corp.
| Decision Date | 03 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | NO: 10-4419,: 10-4419 |
| Parties | STANLEY STEVEN ENGLISH AND GINNY ENGLISH v. APACHE CORPORATION |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 43) and Plaintiffs' Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 65), on supporting memoranda, without oral argument. Having considered the motion and legal memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 43) should be GRANTED. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND FACTS:
Defendant Apache Corporation ("Apache") is an oil and gas exploration and production company that owns and operates platforms in the Gulf of Mexico, in both state and federal waters. Apache sub-contracts with Linear Controls, Inc. ("Linear"), which specializes in the maintenance and repair ofinstruments, gauges, compressors, control valves, meters, electronics, computers, and other items necessary to the functionality of the platforms. Apache and Linear entered into a Master Service Contract ("MSC') dated September 11, 2002. On October 11, 2007, the MSC was amended via "Exhibit E" and a related Letter Agreement, which anticipate the potential application of Louisiana law, most notably the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act (LWCA). The amendment acknowledges that Linear's work for Apache is an integral part of and essential to Apache's ability to generate its goods, products, and services; and that Apache is deemed the statutory employer of Linear's employees in the performance of work under the MSC:
In all cases where Contractor's [Linear's] employees . . . are covered by the Louisiana Workers Compensation Act, La. Rev. State. [sic] §§ 23:1021, et seq., Company [Apache] and Contractor acknowledge and agree that all Work and operations performed by Contractor and its subcontractors and their employees pursuant to this Contract are an integral part of and are essential to the ability of Company to generate Company's good [sic], products or services. Without limiting any of the provisions set forth in the Contract, Company and Contractor agree that Company is and shall be deemed to be a statutory employer of Contractor's employees and its subcontractor's employees for the sole purposes of La. Rev. Stat. § 23-1061(A)(3), as the same may be amended from time to time.
On the morning of September 27, 2010, Linear employee and Plaintiff Steven English participated in a shift change on theApache fixed platform at issue, Main Pass 69-G. Plaintiff met with Mr. Lois Langlinais (whom Plaintiff was to replace) and Apache Assistant Foreman Ernest Russell; the three discussed Plaintiff's orientation to work on the platform. Mr. Langlinais took Plaintiff on a tour of the platform in order to familiarize him with the layout of the platform and showed him the work that needed to be performed, including the relocation of a gas line. The two men then headed toward an operation shack to fill out a job safety analysis. At this time, Plaintiff's foot was allegedly caught on some aspect of the platform's deck; he fell and was injured. The amended MSC was in effect on the date of the incident.
Plaintiff has filed a workers' compensation claim against Linear1 and has received benefits. Plaintiffs have filed the instant lawsuit against Apache, seeking damages resulting from the alleged disabling injury that resulted from the fall on the platform.2 Defendant moved for summary judgment. The issue is whether Defendant qualifies for the tort immunity that emanates from classification as Plaintiff's statutory employer underLouisiana workers' compensation law.
THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS:
Defendant argues that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to its liability and that it is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of LWCA statutory employer immunity. Defendant asserts entitlement to the exclusive remedy protections of the LWCA, and resultant dismissal of Plaintiffs' case.
Defendant asserts that the fixed platform upon which Plaintiff was injured is located in state waters immediately off the coast of Louisiana. It argues that Louisiana law, and in particular the LWCA, applies. The Act grants a party classified as a "principal," who also meets the definition of a "statutory employer," the exclusive workers' compensation remedy protection. Such a statutory employment relationship is presumed when a written contract between the principal and the contractor recognizes it. This presumption may be overcome only by a showing that "the work is not an integral part of or essential to the ability of the principal to generate that individual principal's goods, products, or services." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1061(A)(3).
Defendant argues that in this case the MSC is a written contract that recognizes the statutory employment relationshipbetween Defendant Apache and Linear's employees. Thus, Defendant argues the presumption of a statutory employment relationship cannot be overcome insofar as "[a]lmost every aspect of every system on Apache's platforms are thus dependent on Linear's work as an integral part of and essential to Apache's ability to operate its platforms in the production and transportation of oil and gas." Rec. Doc. 43-1, at 7. The specific activities in which Plaintiff was engaged were necessary to ensure Apache's platform's functionality; Plaintiff needed orientation to be able to perform maintenance and repair work. Moreover, Defendant adds that the Louisiana courts liberally interpret what activities are considered integral to a principal's trade, such that the principal is considered a statutory employer. In the end, Defendant argues that there are no material facts in dispute and that it is fully entitled to the exclusive remedy protections of the LWCA because Plaintiff cannot overcome the presumption that Apache was his statutory employer.
In opposition, Plaintiffs claim that Apache is not entitled to summary judgment because Apache is not Plaintiff's statutory employer. They initially argue that the contract's own terms choose general maritime, not Louisiana, law. Plaintiffs argue that the MSC amendment of October 11, 2007 did not change theparties' original choice of general maritime law. Plaintiffs point to an alleged ambiguity in the amended contract: the amendment expresses nothing concerning the plenary choice of general maritime law. They ask that this ambiguity be construed against Apache as the drafter of the contract so that the state law tort immunity will not apply.
Their next argument is that Mr. English is not covered by the state act. They invoke a portion of the LWCA that forbids state compensation payment to any employee covered by the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA). They contend that because Plaintiff elected and is receiving LHWCA benefits, he is prohibited from coverage under the LWCA. Because Mr. English is not covered by the LWCA, and because the MSC provides that Apache is his statutory employer only if he is covered by the LWCA, Defendant Apache is not his statutory employer. Plaintiffs also argue that to the extent the MSC purports to make Apache a statutory employer, the provision is null because Apache secures the benefits of statutory employment without any of the attendant responsibility. Namely, because the MSC requires Linear to bear the full cost of workers' compensation insurance and to indemnify Apache, the MSCimpermissibly purports to eliminate the solidary liability of employers for workers' compensation obligations.
Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that Apache does not qualify as Mr. English's statutory employer because at the time of his accident, he was not performing work that is essential or integral to Apache's line of business. He was on his way to a pre-job safety meeting; job safety is not integral or essential to the generation of particular goods, products, or services. Moreover, Mr. English was merely preparing to install a clamp, a minor task that is not essential or integral to Apache's ability to explore for or produce oil and gas.
DISCUSSION:
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). When assessing whether a dispute as to any material fact exists, the Court considers "all of the evidence inthe record but refrains from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence." Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2008). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, but a party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated assertions. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. A court ultimately must be satisfied that "a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Delta, 530 F.3d 399.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party "must come forward with evidence which would 'entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.'" Int'l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263-64 (5th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). The nonmoving party can then defeat the motion by either countering with sufficient evidence of its own, or "showing that the moving party's evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party." Id. at 1265.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party maysatisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the...
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