English v. D.C.

• Citation: 717 F.3d 968
• Decision Date: 21 May 2013
• Docket Number: No. 11–7131.,11–7131.
• Parties: Gregory ENGLISH, Appellant v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

717 F.3d 968

Gregory ENGLISH, Appellant

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Appellees.

No. 11–7131.

United States Court of Appeals,District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Feb. 22, 2013.

Decided May 21, 2013.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 1:10–cv–01512).

Charles A. Patrizia argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Stacy L. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were Irvin B. Nathan, Attorney General, Todd S. Kim, Solicitor General, and Donna M. Murasky, Deputy Solicitor General.

Before: BROWN, Circuit Judge, and EDWARDS and SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Senior Circuit Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge:

This appeal arises from an action filed by Appellant, Gregory English, against the District of Columbia Department of Mental Health (“DMH”). Appellant has been confined at St. Elizabeths Hospital (“St. Elizabeths” or the “Hospital”) since 1982. During his confinement, Appellant has earned money at the Hospital working as part of his treatment program, and his earnings have been deposited in a patient account. In September 2010, Appellant filed suit in District Court, asserting a cause of action under, inter alia,42 U.S.C. § 1983, and alleging that DMH had violated his rights by seizing money from the patient account without affording him procedural due process. DMH responded that the Hospital had lawfully transferred Appellant's money to cover the cost of his care. DMH moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, and the District Court granted the motion. We affirm.

It is clear from the record that Appellant received proper notice before his funds were taken. We also find that Appellant's claim that he was denied due process lacks merit because he failed to invoke the remedies available to him under the D.C. Administrative Procedure Act (the “DCAPA”). Appellant was not denied due process; rather, he failed to pursue the process available to him to challenge the Hospital's action.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Appellant was involuntarily committed to St. Elizabeths by court order in 1982 after he was found not guilty of an assault charge by reason of insanity. During his hospitalization, Appellant has participated in an occupational therapy program in which he has earned wages that have been deposited into a bank account maintained by DMH. By July 2009, Appellant had accumulated $2,250 in his account.

In July 2009, Appellant signed a form entitled “Administrative Consent,” pursuant to which he acknowledged that he was “personally responsible to the Hospital and all treating physicians for all charges not paid in full by insurance coverage or in the absence of insurance coverage, the full balance.” Administrative Consent (July 14, 2009), reprinted in Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 66. Later that month, DMH sent Appellant a bill for $2,150 for services rendered between July 1, 2008 (when his Medicaid insurance lapsed) and January 31, 2009, for 215 days of care at $10 per day. See Letter from Jerome Austin, Accountant, St. Elizabeths Hospital, to Gregory English (“Invoice”) (July 28, 2009), reprinted in J.A. 63; see alsoD.C.Code § 24–501(f)(1) (requiring hospitals for the mentally ill to charge patients involuntarily committed by reason of insanity for the cost of their support). DMH notified Appellant that it suspended additional charges to ensure that English retained a $100 balance. The Invoice provided Appellant with directions for filing a written dispute. Appellant asserts that, within the prescribed time limits, he sent a letter to the Hospital challenging the bill. The Hospital maintains it never received any such letter from Appellant. In August 2009, DMH removed $2,150 of Appellant's funds from the patient account.

B. DMH Grievance

In September 2009, Appellant commenced a grievance proceeding pursuant to DMH regulations. SeeD.C.Code § 7–1231.12(a) (authorizing grievance regulations); D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 22–A, § 300.1et seq. These regulations establish a multi-tiered, non-exclusive post-deprivation review process. Under applicable local law, an aggrieved party “may pursue other legal, administrative, or informal relief in lieu of or concurrently with filing a grievance.” D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 22–A, § 304.3; accordD.C.Code § 7–1231.12(c). Appellant initially pursued his grievance before the Chief Administrative Officer of the Hospital. After his grievance was denied, Appellant appealed to an external reviewer, who rendered a non-binding advisory opinion. SeeD.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 22–A, § 308; accordD.C.Code § 7–1231.12(b). In an opinion dated November 27, 2009, the external reviewer found that Appellant's “grievance [had] merit” and recommended judicial review. Advisory Opinion of the External Review for Mr. Gregory English, Fair Case No. 09–STEH–479, 10 (Nov. 27, 2009), reprinted in J.A. 89.

DMH regulations require that, within ten days, the Director either ratify or reject the recommendations of the external reviewer in whole or in part. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 22–A, § 308.6. The Director failed to meet this regulatory deadline.

C. District Court Litigation

In September 2010, Appellant still had not received a final decision from the Director of DMH. It was then that Appellant filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Before the District Court, Appellant brought (1) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he had been deprived of property without due process of law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, (2) seven claims under D.C. law, including one for an alleged violation of the DCAPA, and (3) a claim for declaratory relief against DMH. Compl. ¶¶ 54–116, reprinted in J.A. 49–59. In relevant part, Appellant alleged that DMH had deprived him of his money, in which he had a property interest, without affording him adequate notice or an adequate opportunity to respond. He further alleged that he had “no available administrative remedies” because the Director of DMH had not yet responded to the external reviewer's Advisory Opinion. Compl. ¶ 50, reprinted in J.A. 48.

DMH moved to dismiss the constitutional claims on the grounds that, inter alia, Appellant's proper avenue of relief was review by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals pursuant to the DCAPA. See Defs.' Reply to Pl.'s Opp'n to the Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss 10, reprinted in J.A. 193. On September 30, 2011, the District Court granted Appellees' motion to dismiss, declined to take jurisdiction over Appellant's supplemental local law claims, and declined to issue a declaratory judgment in Appellant's favor. See English v. District of Columbia, 815 F.Supp.2d 254 (D.D.C.2011). This appeal followed.

D. D.C. Court of Appeals Decision

In September 2010, while this case was pending before the District Court, DMH issued its decision denying Appellant's grievance. See Director's Decision, No. 09–STEH–479 (Sept. 23, 2010), reprinted in J.A. 103–05. On the assumption that the Director's decision was final and appealable, Appellant filed a Petition for Review of DMH's decision with the D.C. Court of Appeals.

On January 26, 2012, the D.C. Court of Appeals dismissed Appellant's Petition for Review for lack of jurisdiction because there had not yet been a contested case proceeding as required by D.C.Code §§ 2–509 & 510. Order, English v. District of Columbia, No. 11–AA–1377 (D.C. Jan. 26, 2012). The court noted that its “dismissal [was] without prejudice to seeking review upon entry of a final order by the Office of Administrative Hearings.” Id.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

“We review a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)de novo.” Atherton v. D.C. Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C.Cir.2009). “[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Id. We may consider attachments to the complaint as well as the allegations contained in the complaint itself. See E.E.O.C. v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C.Cir.1997).

We review the District Court's decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for abuse of discretion. Diven v. Amalgamated Transit Union Int'l & Local 689, 38 F.3d 598, 601 (D.C.Cir.1994).

B. Appellant's Contentions Regarding the Requirements of Due Process

A procedural due process violation under the Fifth Amendment occurs when a government official deprives a person of his property without appropriate procedural protections. See Atherton, 567 F.3d at 689. The procedural due process protections under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are the same; however, only the Fifth Amendment applies to the District of Columbia. Propert v. District of Columbia, 948 F.2d 1327, 1330 n. 5 (D.C.Cir.1991). Beyond the basic requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard, the precise requirements of procedural due process are flexible. See, e.g., id. at 1332.

Appellant advances two principal claims. He first contends that the Hospital did not provide him with sufficient notice before removing funds from his patient account. Compl. ¶ 57, reprinted in J.A. 49. He also contends that the process that he received did not satisfy the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. The parties sharply disagree over whether the DMH external review procedure afforded Appellant procedural protections sufficient to satisfy the commands of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (explaining that, in assessing the requirements of procedural due process in any case, a court must weigh (1) the importance of the private interest at stake, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest because of the procedures used and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards, and (3) the government's...