English v. Dickey
Decision Date | 28 April 1891 |
Docket Number | 16,074 |
Parties | English v. Dickey |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Decatur Circuit Court.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
J. S Scobey, for appellant.
S. A Bonner, for appellee.
McBride J. Miller, J., took no part in the hearing and decision of this cause.
The appellant and the appellee were opposing candidates for the office of sheriff of Decatur county, at the general election in November, 1890. The board of canvassers declared the appellee elected, and thereupon the appellant instituted this proceeding to contest the election. The necessary preliminary steps having been taken, the auditor of the county issued and caused to be served on the board of county commissioners a notice convening them in special session on the 4th day of December, 1890, to try such proceeding, and also issued and caused the service on the contestee of notice, as required by section 4760, R. S. 1881. At the time fixed the board of commissioners convened, the parties, contestor and contestee, appeared in person and by counsel, and such steps were taken from time to time as carried the cause to the 22d day of December, 1890, which time was set for the commencement of the trial proper. On the 22d day of December, 1890, the parties appeared, and the contestor moved for a postponement of the cause to Friday, December 26th, 1890, which motion was sustained.
The record entry of this motion, and of the order postponing the cause, is as follows:
"Comes now the contestor by his attorney, and in person, and asks that the hearing of the cause at issue be postponed until Friday, December 26th, 1890, to which the contestee interposes no objections, and which was accordingly done."
On the 26th day of December, 1890, the board again convened, the parties appeared, and the contestee moved the court to discontinue the cause for the reason that more than twenty days had elapsed since the board of commissioners were called to try and determine the same.
The board sustained the motion. The contestor thereupon appealed to the circuit court. In the circuit court the motion to discontinue was renewed, and sustained by the court. The court thereupon rendered judgment confirming the contestee in his office, and against the contestor for costs.
The contestor, in his appeal to this court, assails the action of the court below upon two grounds:
1st. That the court erred in sustaining the motion to discontinue.
2d. That the court erred in rendering judgment against the appellant for costs.
Whether the motion to discontinue the cause was rightly sustained or not depends upon the construction to be given to sections 4760 and 4761, R. S. 1881. The two sections in question are as follows:
The controversy between the parties is over the twenty-day limitation contained in section 4761. Appellant's position is that it is not an absolute limitation, but is merely directory, and applies solely to the trial proper, after the cause has been submitted and the parties have commenced the introduction of testimony; while the appellee contends that it is mandatory, is an absolute limitation, and embraces the entire proceeding, beginning with the day when the board is convened and organized to enter upon the investigation, and that when twenty days have elapsed the board has no longer jurisdiction to proceed. But little authority has been cited bearing upon this question, and we are inclined to think the authorities are somewhat meagre; indeed, we not only know of no case wherein the precise question has been decided, but no authority has come to our attention wherein the questions decided have sufficient analogy to make them of much value as authority, except as they serve to indicate the rule by which to construe the statute. The policy of the law seems to be to compel prompt action in hearing and disposing of contested elections.
The learned author of McCrary on Elections places much emphasis on this. He says: Section 392.
Again: "The courts should require the parties to speed the cause, so that the official term which is in dispute may not expire, either in whole or in large part, before the final decision is reached." Section 396.
Again: Section 407.
Again: "As we have already seen, there are strong reasons for requiring the parties to an election contest to use great diligence in preparing for an early trial." Section 408; of similar tenor is section 421.
The case of Bull v. Southwick, 2 N.M. 321, was an election contest. The statute limited...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Kramer v. Jarvis
...Temple v. Cotton Transfer Co., 126 Neb. 287, 253 N. W. 349; Alexander v. Haffner, 323 Mo. 1197, 20 S.W.2d 896; English v. Dickey, 128 Ind. 174, 27 N.E. 495, 13 L.R.A. 40; Town of West Hartford v. Willetts, 125 Conn. 266, 5 A.2d 13. It may not be said with accuracy that an action remaining u......
-
Jenkins v. Hughes, 32744
...a holdover office-occupancy before a term has wholly or in great part expired seems to be the policy of the law. English v. Dickey, 128 Ind. 174, 27 N.E. 495, 13 L.R.A. 40; Walton v. Olson, 40 N.D. 571, 170 N.W. 107; Whitney v. Blackburn, 17 Or. 564, 21 P. 874, 11 Am.St.Rep. 857. And a prov......
-
Backer v. Pyne
... ... State, ex rel., v. Thorn, 28 Ind. 306; ... Towell v. Hollweg, 81 Ind. 154; ... English v. Dickey, 128 Ind. 174, 27 N.E ... 495. The decision in Liggett v. Firestone, ... 96 Ind. 260, was not directed to the question of the rule for ... ...
-
Howeisen v. Chapman
... ... the familiar maxim, expressio unius est exclusio ... alterius, all days not specified in the statute are ... excluded from its provision. English v ... Dickey (1891), 128 Ind. 174, 27 N.E. 495, 13 L.R.A ... 40; Board, etc., v. Tincher, etc., Co ... (1912), 49 Ind.App. 221, 26, 97 N.E. 22 ... ...