Ennis v. KMART CORP.
Decision Date | 21 June 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 20,977.,20,977. |
Citation | 33 P.3d 32,131 N.M. 32,2001 NMCA 68 |
Parties | Cloyd ENNIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KMART CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Geoffrey R. Romero, Law Offices of Geoffrey R. Romero, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.
Thomas C. Bird, David W. Peterson, Keleher & McLeod, P.A., Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.
Certiorari Denied, No. 27,101, September 6, 2001.
{1} This is a case involving error by a court clerk, neglect by a courier service, the result that a complaint was not file-stamped prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, and a trial court's practical ruling permitting the case to proceed, which we affirm notwithstanding Defendant's several technical, procedural arguments. Defendant appeals from a judgment, finding it liable for personal injuries sustained by Plaintiff as the result of an accident at Defendant's store and awarding Plaintiff $700,000 for pain and suffering. On appeal, Defendant raises four issues: (1) whether the trial court had the authority to treat Plaintiff's complaint as timely filed when the court clerk refused to accept Plaintiff's original complaint due to an error in the caption and Plaintiff was unable to file a corrected complaint until after the limitations period had expired; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss, given that the complaint showed a filing date that was after the limitations period had expired; (3) if the trial court converted Defendant's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment by considering material outside of the complaint, whether (a) the court erred by failing to give Defendant express notice that it intended to convert the motion and (b) the court committed plain error by considering hearsay evidence included in the affidavit and letter attached to Plaintiff's response; and (4) whether the $700,000 award for pain and suffering is excessive as a matter of law. We affirm the judgment in its entirety.
{2} This case arises from a slip-and-fall accident at Defendant's store, which resulted in Plaintiff suffering serious injuries to his neck and back, right leg, and right arm. The accident occurred on January 14, 1995. On January 12, 1998, Plaintiff delivered his complaint to a courier service to file in the First Judicial District. Although the body of the complaint correctly pleaded jurisdiction and venue as proper in the First Judicial District, the caption mistakenly identified Quay County. As a result of this error, the court clerk refused to file the complaint. The courier service failed to inform Plaintiff that the complaint had not been filed until January 16, 1998, which was after the statute of limitations period had run. See NMSA 1978, § 37-1-8 (1976) ( ). Upon learning of the error, Plaintiff corrected the mistaken county identification and immediately filed the complaint with the clerk. At the same time, Plaintiff's counsel wrote a letter to the court explaining the situation and asking the court to consider the complaint as timely filed.
{3} Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, alleging expiration of the limitations period. In his response to Defendant's motion, Plaintiff again requested that the court treat the complaint as timely filed, either by issuing an order nunc pro tunc or by expanding the limitations period under Rule 1-006 NMRA 2001. Plaintiff attached an affidavit from the courier service owner, as well as the letter Plaintiff's counsel had written to the court. Three weeks after Plaintiff filed his response, the court held a hearing on Defendant's motion. At the hearing, Defendant indicated that it had read Plaintiff's response, the affidavit, and the letter, and that it understood Plaintiff's claim that the clerk had erred in refusing to accept the complaint. Defendant did not challenge the truth of Plaintiff's claim, nor did it challenge the admissibility of the affidavit and letter. Instead, Defendant argued that the clerk's actions were irrelevant because Plaintiff had a duty to submit proper pleadings and because the court lacked the authority to grant the relief requested by Plaintiff. The court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss, but refused to give a reason for its ruling:
{4} At trial, Plaintiff sought damages for pain and suffering only. Plaintiff did not seek compensation for lost wages, because he had continued to work after suffering his injuries. In addition, Plaintiff did not seek damages related to medical costs, because Defendant had paid all medical costs through 1999.
{5} The jury found in favor of Plaintiff and awarded damages for pain and suffering in the amount of $700,000.
{6} Rule 1-005(E) NMRA 2001 prohibits a court clerk from refusing "to accept for filing any paper presented for that purpose solely because it is not presented in proper form as required by these rules or any local rules or practices." The question of whether Rule 1-005(E) authorizes a court to treat as timely filed a pleading improperly rejected by a court clerk is an issue of first impression in New Mexico. Because the language of the rule mirrors its federal counterpart, Fed. R.Civ.P. 5(e), we find federal authority instructive. See Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Boise, Inc., 121 N.M. 738, 741, 918 P.2d 17, 20 (Ct.App.1996).
{7} The federal courts have consistently interpreted Rule 5(e) to allow this remedy. See McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 190 (3d Cir.1996); McClellon v. Lone Star Gas Co., 66 F.3d 98, 101 (5th Cir.1995); Dielsi v. Falk, 916 F.Supp. 985, 990 (C.D.Cal.1996). These cases have recognized that Rule 5(e) removes from the clerk any discretion in the decision to accept a technically deficient pleading. See McClellon, 66 F.3d at 101. The advisory committee notes following the 1991 amendment of the federal rules describe this removal of discretion as necessary because the rejection of pleadings for technical violations or insufficiencies is "not a suitable role for the office of the clerk, and ... exposes litigants to the hazards of time bars[.]" Instead, the rule delegates to the trial court the task of evaluating the sufficiency of pleadings, and grants to the trial court the discretion to determine whether to permit a party to correct any defect or to order the pleading stricken if warranted under the circumstances. Id. at 101; see also Fed R. Civ. P. 5(e) advisory committee notes ("The enforcement of [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] and of the local rules is a role for a judicial officer."). "Accordingly, the clerk does not possess the power to reject a pleading for lack of conformity with form requirements, and a pleading is considered filed when placed in the possession of the clerk of the court." McClellon, 66 F.3d at 101.
{8} The federal cases are consistent with New Mexico case law, which recognizes that a document is deemed filed when it is delivered to the court clerk to be kept on file. See Town of Hurley v. N.M. Mun. Boundary Comm'n, 94 N.M. 606, 608, 614 P.2d 18, 20 (1980) (); Gallagher v. Linwood, 30 N.M. 211, 217-18, 231 P. 627, 629 (1924). It is not necessary for the clerk to endorse a pleading upon its receipt to effect the filing. See Town of Hurley, 94 N.M. at 608, 614 P.2d at 20. "`[A] person filing an instrument should not be responsible for the failure of a receiving public official to perform his duty.'" Id. (quoting Thorndal v. Smith, Wild, Beebe & Cades, 339 F.2d 676, 679 (8th Cir.1965)).
{9} In Castillo v. Northwest Transport Service, 113 N.M. 119, 119-20, 823 P.2d 919, 919-20 (Ct.App.1991), we held that a complaint was timely filed when a court clerk rejected a pro se complaint on the ground that the claimant was represented by counsel in another proceeding. The pro se complaint had been filed within the limitations period, but the second filing, made by the claimant's counsel, was filed six days late. Id. Because the first claim was timely filed, and the facts showed that the claimant had done everything necessary to file his pleading within the limitations period, we held that the claim was effectively filed within the limitations period. Id. Similarly, in State v. Aaron, 103 N.M. 138, 139-40, 703 P.2d 915, 916-17 (Ct.App. 1985), we considered a notice of appeal as timely filed where the defendant mailed the notice within the limitations period but the court clerk delayed filing the notice for another month. We held that these circumstances provided "a basis ... for avoiding the effect of the rules." Id. (quoting State v. Martinez, 84 N.M. 766, 767, 508 P.2d 36, 37 (Ct.App.1973)).
{10} We hold that, under Rule 1-005(E), a court clerk lacks the discretion to reject pleadings for technical violations and that a pleading will be considered filed when delivered to the clerk. It is then up to the trial court to decide whether to allow a party to correct any deficiencies or to strike the pleadings. Under this rule, Plaintiff's complaint was effectively filed on January 12, 1998, which was within the statute of limitations period.
{11} As a final note, Defendant argues that it would be improper for us to rely on Rule 1-005(E), because neither the trial court nor Plaintiff identified the rule as the basis for the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss. However, a decision by a trial court will be upheld if it is...
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