Ennis v. Stanley

• Decision Date: 04 September 1956
• Docket Number: No. 11,11
• Citation: 78 N.W.2d 114,346 Mich. 296
• Parties: Kenneth L. ENNIS and Katherine H. Ennis, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Orvie STANLEY, Carrie E. Stanley, Bobby Nelson and Lois Nelson, Defendants and Appellees.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 114

78 N.W.2d 114

346 Mich. 296

Kenneth L. ENNIS and Katherine H. Ennis, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Orvie STANLEY, Carrie E. Stanley, Bobby Nelson and Lois Nelson, Defendants and Appellees.

No. 11.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Sept. 4, 1956.

Kenneth A. Fricke, Kalamazoo, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Crum, Allen & Mullen, Kalamazoo, for defendants and appellees.

Before the Entire Bench.

CARR, Justice.

Plaintiffs instituted this suit in circuit court for the purpose of obtaining injunctive relief and to quiet title to a parcel of land in the township of Comstock, Kalamazoo County. The bill of complaint filed asserted title by adverse possession on the part of plaintiffs and their predecessors in title for more than 15 years and, further, that a fence had been established as the boundary line by acquiescence, for a like period of time, between the property claimed by them and land owned by defendants. Defendants filed answer denying plaintiffs' claims. The trial resulted in a finding by the circuit judge that the proofs introduced did not establish the right of the plaintiffs to the equitable relief sought. Decree was entered dismissing the bill of complaint, with costs to defendants. Plaintiffs have appealed, claiming that the trial court was in error in entering said decree.

In 1928, and for some period of time prior thereto, Gustave T. Alm was the owner of land described as the east one-half of the northwest quarter of section one, town two south, range ten west, in Kalamazoo County. It appears from the testimony of a surveyor who was a witness on the trial of the cause that the description embraced a farm containing approximately 86 acres. In the year mentioned Gustaf E. Freedland went into possession of the southeast quarter of the quarter section on a contract basis between himself and Alm. The record does not show when Freedland obtained a deed to the property, but apparently he did so and in 1944 he negotiated a sale of the said southeast quarter to the plaintiffs. In connection with the financing of the transaction a deed was given to Fred Ritsema, Jr. Freedland vacated the premises and plaintiffs moved in, in accordance with the arrangement between the parties. Under date of July 20, 1945, Ritsema and wife deeded to plaintiffs, thus vesting them with legal title to said southeast quarter of the quarter section.

In August, 1938, Alm and wife by warranty deed conveyed to defendants Stanley property described as:

'The east one-half of the northwest quarter of section one, town two south, range ten west; Except the south forty acres thereof.'

The land in dispute in the instant case is six acres of the property embraced within the description contained in the deed to defendants Stanley, and is immediately adjacent to the north line of the 40 acres of which Freedland was the owner, assuming that Alm had previously given to him a conveyance of title to the southeast quarter as described in the subsequent conveyance from Ritsema to plaintiffs.

On the trial of the cause Freedland, testifying as a witness for the plaintiffs, claimed that during the time that he lived on the land described in the contract and subsequent deed by Alm he used the parcel in question up to a certain fence that he assumed was the north boundary of his farm. Specifically, he claimed that in different years he had worked portions of the six acre tract and had raised crops thereon. It does not appear that during this period there was any dispute between Freedland and defendants Stanley with reference to the ownership of the land in question. It is conceded that defendants Stanley held the record title. It is equally clear that plaintiffs' claim that they acquired ownership by adverse possession required them to establish that Freedland held possession of the property openly and adversely to all others, that they did likewise when, as they claimed, they succeeded to his rights, and that they were entitled to tack his alleged adverse holding to their own.

McVannel v. Pure Oil Co., 262 Mich. 518, 525, 526, 247 N.W. 735, 737, after referring to prior decisions involving claims of title by adverse possession, summarized the following general principles:

'(a) Constructive possession of land is in the holder of a record title;

'(b) A mere claim of title, no matter how long asserted, will not ripen into title;

'(c) Occasional or periodical entry upon land does not constitute actual possession;

'(d) In order to make good a claim of title by adverse holding, the true owner must have actual knowledge of the hostile claim; or,

'(e) The possession must be so open, visible, and notorious as to raise the presumption of notice to the world that the right of the true owner is invaded intentionally, and with the purpose to assert a claim of title adversely to his, so that if the true owner remains in ignorance it is his own fault;

'(f) There must be such continuity of possession as will furnish a cause of action for every day during the whole period required to perfect title by adverse possession;

'(g) The possession must be more than a possession which will enable a person on the ground of a possessort title to maintain trespass or ejectment against a stranger;

'(h) Occasional trespasses or acts of ownership do not constitute such continuous possession as will ripen into title by adverse possession, though extending over the statutory period;

'(i) Casual hay cutting, amounting to a little more than an annual trespass, is not sufficient to warn the owner of the record title of a claim of adverse possession.'

Bankers Trust Company of Muskegon v. Robinson, 280 Mich. 458, 463, 273 N.W. 768, 769, pointed out that the constructive possession of land in dispute is in the title holder, and further stated that:

'Title by adverse possession, in the absence of color of title, can extend no farther than the boundaries of that land which is actually used and occupied for the statutory period by those claiming title by adverse possession. They can acquire nothing beyond that which is actually possessed, used, controlled, and occupied by them for the statutory period.'

In an annotation in 97 A.L.R. at page 14, et seq., the general subject is considered at length and rules commonly recognized and applied in such cases are indicated. In accordance therewith, and with prior decisions of this Court, the burden rested on the plaintiffs in the instant case to establish their claim that the possession of themselves and of their predecessors in title was actual, continued, visible, notorious and hostile. The trial judge, in discussing the matter in a written opinion filed by him, indicated his conclusions, based on the conflicting testimony of the parties and their witnesses, as follows:

'Viewing the testimony in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we have at most the following: Witness Freedland testified that from 1928 on he used to the fence, but further examination and cross-examination indicated only the following uses by Freedland: In 1928 a garden in the northwest corner, a crop in the hollow, and a crop in the northeast corner. 1929, wheat or clover in the northwest corner, wheat or clover in the hollow, and wheat or clover in the northeast corner. In 1934 wheat in the hollow that again in 1935. Between 1935 and 1944 witnesses Freedland could only recall one crop of alfalfa and one crop of clover on the northwest corner, and corn in 1943 in the hollow.

'Oats were grown in 1944 on the northeast corner. Since 1944, the evidence discloses that part or all of the property was fertilized three times. Clover was grown once on the northwest corner and one crop of alfalfa. In 1952 and 1953 corn was grown in the hollow.'

On the basis of the facts as found the trial judge came to the conclusion that the requisite degree of continuity in...