Enos v. Doe

• Citation: 380 S.C. 295,669 S.E.2d 619
• Decision Date: 14 October 2008
• Docket Number: No. 4444.,4444.
• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina
• Parties: April D. ENOS, Appellant, v. John DOE and Travelers Indemnity Insurance Co., Defendants, of whom: John Doe is the, Respondent.

669 S.E.2d 619

380 S.C. 295

April D. ENOS, Appellant, v. John DOE and Travelers Indemnity Insurance Co., Defendants of whom: John Doe is the, Respondent.

No. 4444.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard October 8, 2008.

Decided October 14, 2008.

Rehearing Denied December 19, 2008.

Appeal from Chester County; Brooks P. Goldsmith, Circuit Court Judge.

Mitchell J. Williams, of Columbia, for Appellant.

William P. Davis, of Columbia, for Respondent.

ANDERSON, J.:

April D. Enos appeals the trial court granting a directed verdict in favor of defendant John Doe in an action arising out of a motor vehicle accident where the driver is unknown. We affirm.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

April Enos (Enos) and her boyfriend left her home between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m. on Friday, September 13, 2002, "to go out drinking." They rode in her 1996 Jeep Grand Cherokee, but she does not recall who drove. The couple went to the Crow Bar in Rock Hill. Enos does not remember how long they were there, but later in the afternoon they drove to the Handle Bar about ten or fifteen minutes away. Enos verified she and her boyfriend got into an argument, and her boyfriend left. Enos returned to the bar and continued to drink to the point of "getting intoxicated."

Enos maintains she eventually went to her vehicle to go to sleep. She remembers getting into the Jeep's passenger seat, reclining the seat, and dropping her keys in the cup holder. The next thing she recollects is waking up in the hospital. Enos does not know who was driving her Jeep at the time of the collision nor anything about how the wreck occurred. She is not aware of any witness who observed the accident or who was driving. She testified that she was familiar with the location of the accident. She described the curve as "a very sharp curve" and "a fifteen mile an hour curve."

Daniel Leeman, a volunteer firefighter who responded to the accident, asserted that the Jeep appeared to have hit a bridge abutment located between two curves in the roadway. He declared there is a sharp left curve before the bridge when traveling south from Rock Hill, which was seemingly the vehicle's direction of travel. Leeman found Enos on the passenger side. He saw a hole in the passenger side of the windshield consistent with her hitting the windshield.

Jeffrey Scott Burch, a paramedic with Chester County EMS, arrived at the scene and discovered Enos sitting on the passenger side of the vehicle complaining of right shoulder pain. He verified most of the damage was to the right front side of the vehicle and "the windshield was bulged out where her head hit." She had noticeable wounds to the right side of her neck, right ear, and a busted mouth and nose.

Enos brought an action against John Doe pursuant to her uninsured motorist coverage and sections 38-77-150 and 38-77-170 of the South Carolina Code, alleging that an unknown driver had driven her car into a bridge abutment while she was a passenger. Enos's insurance carrier, Travelers Indemnity Company (Travelers), answered in the name of John Doe denying the allegations and alleging comparative negligence. Travelers amended its answer to include several defenses, one of which was that Enos was without standing to prosecute the action because she failed to produce an affidavit from a witness, other than the owner or operator of the vehicle, attesting to the truth of the facts of the accident as required by section 38-77-170(2).

Travelers moved for summary judgment on the bases that (1) strict compliance with the statutes allowing an insured to recover UM benefits where damages are caused by an unknown driver is mandated; (2) S.C.Code section 38-77-150 requires the insured be "legally entitled to recover" from the owner or operator of an insured vehicle, but Enos admitted she had no information or evidence as to what actions, if any, of the alleged driver contributed to the collision and that she had not alleged any other vehicle was involved; (3) S.C.Code section 38-77-170 dictates, under the circumstances presented, the insured may not recover UM benefits unless a witness, other than the owner or operator of the insured vehicle, signs an affidavit attesting to the truth of the facts of the accident; (4) Enos confirmed she had no information or evidence that the collision in question was witnessed by anyone other than the vehicle's driver; and (5) Enos conceded she had no affidavit from any witnesses.

At the close of Enos's case, the court granted Travelers' motion for directed verdict on the grounds: (1) Enos had not complied with section 38-77-170(2) and (2) Enos failed to present evidence that the defendant proximately caused her injuries.

ISSUES

1. Did the trial court err in ruling that Enos was required to comply with the affidavit requirement of section 38-77-170(2) by submitting an affidavit from a witness, other than the vehicle's owner or operator, attesting to the facts of the accident?

2. Did the trial court err in directing a verdict on the additional ground that Enos failed to prove that her injuries were proximately caused by any negligence or recklessness on the part of the unknown driver of her vehicle?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a trial court's ruling on a directed verdict, this Court will reverse if no evidence supports the trial court's decision or the ruling is controlled by an error of law. Law v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 368 S.C. 424, 434-35, 629 S.E.2d 642, 648 (2006); McMillan v. Oconee Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 367 S.C. 559, 564, 626 S.E.2d 884, 886 (2006). The appellate court must determine whether a verdict for the party opposing the motion would be reasonably possible under the facts as liberally construed in his or her favor. Pye v. Estate of Fox, 369 S.C. 555, 564, 633 S.E.2d 505, 509 (2006); Erickson v. Jones St. Publishers, L.L.C., 368 S.C. 444, 463, 629 S.E.2d 653, 663 (2006). If the evidence as a whole is susceptible to more than one reasonable inference, a jury issue is created and the motion should be denied. Proctor v. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 368 S.C. 279, 292, 628 S.E.2d 496, 503 (Ct.App.2006). A motion for directed verdict goes to the entire case and may be granted only when the evidence raises no issue for the jury as to liability. Huffines Co. v. Lockhart, 365 S.C. 178, 187, 617 S.E.2d 125, 129 (Ct.App.2005). When considering directed verdict motions, neither the trial court nor the appellate court has authority to decide credibility issues or to resolve conflicts in the testimony or evidence. Wright v. Craft, 372 S.C. 1, 19, 640 S.E.2d 486, 496 (Ct.App.2006) (citing Erickson, 368 S.C. at 463, 629 S.E.2d at 663).

LAW/ANALYSIS

Section 38-77-170 of the South Carolina Code, entitled "Conditions to sue or recover under uninsured motorist provision when owner or operator of motor vehicle causing injury or damage is unknown" and known as the John Doe statute, states:

If the owner or operator of any motor vehicle which causes bodily injury or property damage to the insured is unknown, there is no right of action or recovery under the uninsured motorist provision, unless:

(1) the insured or someone in his behalf has reported the accident to some appropriate police authority within a reasonable time, under all the circumstances, after its occurrence;

(2) the injury or damage was caused by physical contact with the unknown vehicle, or the accident must have been witnessed by someone other than the owner or operator of the insured vehicle; provided however, the witness must sign an affidavit attesting to the truth of the facts of the accident contained in the affidavit;

(3) the insured was not negligent in failing to determine the identity of the other vehicle and the driver of the other vehicle at the time of the accident.

The following statement must be prominently displayed on the face of the affidavit provided in subitem (2) above: A FALSE STATEMENT CONCERNING THE FACTS CONTAINED IN THIS AFFIDAVIT MAY SUBJECT THE PERSON MAKING THE FALSE STATEMENT TO CRIMINAL PENALTIES AS PROVIDED BY LAW.

S.C.Code Ann. § 38-77-170 (2002).

I. Statutory Interpretation

The issue of interpretation of a statute is a question of law for the court. Univ. of S. Cal. v. Moran, 365 S.C. 270, 275, 617 S.E.2d 135, 137 (Ct.App.2005); see also Catawba Indian Tribe v. State, 372 S.C. 519, 524, 642 S.E.2d 751, 753 (2007), cert. denied, Oct. 1, 2007; Charleston County Parks & Recreation Comm'n v. Somers, 319 S.C. 65, 67, 459 S.E.2d 841, 843 (1995).

The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to determine the intent of the legislature. Bass v. Isochem, 365 S.C. 454, 459, 617 S.E.2d 369, 377 (Ct.App.2005); Georgia-Carolina Bail Bonds, Inc. v. County of Aiken, 354 S.C. 18, 22, 579 S.E.2d 334, 336 (Ct.App.2003); Smith v. S.C. Ins. Co., 350 S.C. 82, 87, 564 S.E.2d 358, 361 (Ct.App. 2002); see also Gordon v. Phillips Utils., Inc., 362 S.C. 403, 406, 608 S.E.2d 425, 427 (2005) ("The primary purpose in construing a statute is to ascertain legislative intent."). All rules of statutory construction are subservient to the one that legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used, and that language must be construed in the light of the intended purpose of the statute. McClanahan v. Richland County Council, 350 S.C. 433, 438, 567 S.E.2d 240, 242 (2002); Ray Bell Constr. Co. v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville County, 331 S.C. 19, 26, 501 S.E.2d 725, 729 (1998); State v. Morgan, 352 S.C. 359, 365-66, 574 S.E.2d 203, 206 (Ct.App.2002); State v. Hudson, 336 S.C. 237, 246, 519 S.E.2d 577, 581 (Ct.App. 1999). "Once the legislature has made [a] choice, there is no room for the courts to impose a different judgment based upon their own notions of public policy." S.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mumford, 299 S.C. 14, 19, 382 S.E.2d 11, 14 (Ct.App.1989).

The legislature's intent should be ascertained primarily from the plain language of the statute. State v. Landis, 362 S.C. 97, 102, 606 S.E.2d...