Enos v. Indus. Trust Co.
| Decision Date | 24 March 1939 |
| Docket Number | No. 1418.,1418. |
| Citation | 4 A.2d 915 |
| Parties | ENOS v. INDUSTRIAL TRUST CO. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Philip C. Joslin, Judge.
Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Margaret A. Enos, employee, opposed by the Industrial Trust Company, employer. From a decree of the superior court dismissing her petition, the employee appeals.
Appeal dismissed, decree appealed from affirmed, and cause remanded to superior court for further proceedings.
Edward M. Sullivan and John J. Sullivan, both of Providence, for petitioner.
Haslam, Arnold & Sumpter and Harry A. Tuell. all of Providence, for respondent.
This is an appeal by an employee of the respondent from a decree of the superior court denying and dismissing a petition for compensation under the workmen's compensation act, general laws 1923, chapter 92 and amendments thereto.
It is conceded by the respondent that the petitioner, a woman about forty-four years old, who was employed at night in cleaning offices in the respondent's building in the city of Providence, suffered an accidental injury in the course of her employment. The controlling question at issue is whether there is causal connection between that injury and the complaint she now makes.
The evidence shows that in her work the petitioner carried water in a large iron pail on three small wheels, the pail being pulled by her from place to place as required. On the evening of March 9, 1936, she opened a spring door that separated two offices, and, holding the door open with one hand, she backed through the doorway, pulling the pail after her with the other hand. Her testimony as to what happened while she was in this position is that "in lifting the pail over the threshold it had a tendency to slip and I had to let go of the door behind me and grab the pail with both hands, and as I did the door knob swung to, and struck me in the left side." (italics ours) This occurrence caused her faintness and vomiting, but, after a short rest, she did some light work for the rest of the evening. Thereafter she continued doing her regular work until June of that year.
The petitioner further testified that when she stopped work, some three months after the accident, she was suffering with pain in the lower back and that she then consulted a Dr. Hale, who was not more definitely identified and who, according to the witness, had since gone to Texas. Doctor Hale strapped her back and advised that X rays be taken. This was done. She was also permitted to testify, without objection, that Dr. Hale found her back discolored and bruised when he first examined her, and that, following the taking of the X rays, he told her that her trouble was due to a displaced right kidney, that she needed an operation, and that in the meanwhile she should wear a belt to correct this condition as far as possible without operation.
The only medical testimony offered by the petitioner was that of Dr. William A. Mahoney, who examined her only once, on December 27, 1937, over twenty-one months after the date of the accidental injury. He testified that she complained of a dull ache in the left lower back, with sharp pain "from back to front in this region" when she moved; that in the course of his examination he palpated "a freely movable small mass" at the anterior end of the tenth rib on the left side, which mass was "probably the non-united cartilage attached to this rib"; and that the pain described by the petitioner traveled "backward from this point along the course of this rib." On being asked by petitioner's counsel whether the condition at the tenth rib was consistent with "having been caused by such a blow as the patient in her statement to you declared to be the cause ?", his answer was: "I think it could happen that way", and, in cross-examination, admitted that "it is uncommon."
Doctor Mahoney knew that the X ray showed a displaced right kidney. Respondent's inquiry as to the probable cause of the petitioner's pain in the left lower back at the time of Dr. Mahoney's examination elicited the following testimony:
The petitioner was examined in behalf of the respondent by Dr. William H. Palmer on July 13, 1936, some four months after the accident and more than seventeen months before Dr. Mahoney's examination. Doctor Palmer testified that at that time the only complaint made by the petitioner was of pain in the lower back on the left side; that he then made a complete physical examination; that palpation revealed no movable mass at the anterior portion of the left tenth rib, nor did the petitioner make any complaint of pain upon pressure in that region. He further testified positively that the X ray showed a displacement of the right kidney; that this condition had absolutely no causal connection with the accidental injury in question; that the soreness resulting from the blow that the petitioner received might persist for not more than ten or twelve weeks; that an injury to the anterior portion of the tenth rib would be a "most improbable" result of the accident, and that an injury to that "rib or its cartilage would not cause the pain, of the kind and location of the pain that she complained of at the time" he examined her.
The petition, which the petitioner signed, contains the following allegations in paragraph 9: ...
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