Enriquez v. Sec'y
| Decision Date | 25 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 6:14-cv-470-Orl-31GJK |
| Parties | JAVIER ENRIQUEZ, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner initiated this action for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). Respondents filed a response to the petition for writ of habeas corpus in compliance with this Court's instructions (Doc. 7). Petitioner filed a reply to the response (Doc. 16).
Petitioner asserts five grounds for relief. For the following reasons, the petition is denied.
Petitioner was charged with burglary of a dwelling (Count One) and grand theft (Count Two). (Doc. 8-1 at 21-22). Petitioner proceeded to trial. At the close of the State's case, the trial court granted Petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal as to grand theft and reduced the charge to petit theft. (Doc. 8-3 at 24). The jury found Petitioner guilty of Count One and petit theft as to Count Two. (Doc. 8-1 at 80-81). The trial court sentenced Petitioner as a prison release reoffender to a fifteen-year term of imprisonment for Count One and to sixty days in jail for petit theft. (Id. at 82-87). Petitioner appealed. The Fifth District Court of Appeal of Florida ("Fifth DCA") affirmed per curiam. (Doc. 8-6 at 25).
Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, which he amended. (Doc. 8-4 at 16-47). The state court denied the motion. (Doc. 8-5 at 23-28). Petitioner appealed, and the Fifth DCA affirmed per curiam. (Doc. 8-6 at 25).
Petitioner filed a state habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (Id. at 29-70; Doc. 8-7 at 1-11). The Fifth DCA summarily denied the petiion. (Doc. 8-8 at 8).
Pursuant to the AEDPA, federal habeas relief may not be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the claim:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The phrase "clearly established Federal law," encompasses only theholdings of the Supreme Court of the United States "as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).
"[S]ection 2254(d)(1) provides two separate bases for reviewing state court decisions; the 'contrary to' and 'unreasonable application' clauses articulate independent considerations a federal court must consider." Maharaj v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 432 F.3d 1292, 1308 (11th Cir. 2005). The meaning of the clauses was discussed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 835 (11th Cir. 2001):
Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the United States Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the United States Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the 'unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the United States Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
Even if the federal court concludes that the state court applied federal law incorrectly, habeas relief is appropriate only if that application was "objectively unreasonable." Id.
Finally, under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if the state court's decision "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." A determination of a factual issue made by a state court, however, shall be presumed correct, and the habeas petitioner shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. See Parker, 244 F.3d at 835-36; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
The Supreme Court of the United States in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), established a two-part test for determining whether a convicted person is entitled to relief on the ground that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance: (1) whether counsel's performance was deficient and "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness"; and (2) whether the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.1 Id. at 687-88. A court must adhere to a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689-90. "Thus, a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Id. at 690; Gates v. Zant, 863 F.2d 1492, 1497 (11th Cir. 1989).
As observed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the test for ineffective assistance of counsel:
has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would have done. We ask only whether some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial. Courts also should at the start presume effectiveness and should always avoid second guessing with the benefit of hindsight. Strickland encourages reviewing courts to allow lawyers broad discretion to represent their clients by pursuing their own strategy. We arenot interested in grading lawyers' performances; we are interested in whether the adversarial process at trial, in fact, worked adequately.
White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220-21 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). Under those rules and presumptions, "the cases in which habeas petitioners can properly prevail on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel are few and far between." Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 386 (11th Cir. 1994).
Petitioner asserts counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately object to the amendment of the information and argue for a judgment of acquittal on the basis of an uncharged offense. (Doc. 1 at 6). In support of this ground, Petitioner complains that the information charged him with burglary of a dwelling and grand theft as to the victim Melinda Fay Webb ("Webb"), but the State was permitted to amend the information during the trial to add George Morales ("Morales") as a victim. (Id. at 6-7).
Petitioner raised this ground in his Rule 3.850 motion. The state court denied relief. (Doc. 8-5 at 24). The state court noted that counsel did move for a judgment of acquittal on the basis that Petitioner was not charged with burglary of a dwelling or grand theft of Morales and counsel did object to the amendment of the information. (Id.).
Petitioner has not established that the state court's denial of this ground is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Strickland. Pursuant to Florida law, "the state may amend its information pre-trial or even during trial, either as to substantive ornon-substantive matters, unless the defendant is prejudiced thereby." State v. Clifton, 905 So. 2d 172, 178-79 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (citing Lackos v. State, 339 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1976); State v. Anderson, 537 So. 2d 1373, 1375 (Fla. 1989); Rivera v. State, 745 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); State v. Garcia, 692 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Sanders v. State, 669 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)). "Therefore, the central inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the amended information." Id.
The information charged Petitioner with the burglary of Webb's home and grand theft of Webb's property. (Doc. 8-1 at 21-22). Webb did not testify at trial. However, Webb's fiancé, Morales, testified that someone broke into the residence in which he and Webb lived. (Doc. 8-2 at 109-15). Morales further testified that items were taken from their home, including his ring and bracelet, a money jar from his daughter's room, and a DVD player. (Id. at 115). Thus, as noted by the State at trial, evidence was presented from which the trier of fact could have determined that Webb was in fact a victim as charged in the information. (Doc. 8-3 at 34-35). In an abundance of caution, however, the State alternatively moved to amend the information to add Morales as a victim. (Id. at 35, 37). Counsel objected to the amendment of the information and renewed the motion for judgment of acquittal on this basis. (Id. at 35-37). Consequently, counsel was not deficient for failing to raise this argument.
Furthermore, Petitioner has not demonstrated that prejudice resulted from the amendment of the information. As noted supra, Morales testified that Webb lived in thehome at the time of the burglary, and there was no testimony definitively establishing to whom the DVD player or money jar belonged. Moreover, Morales was listed as a witness, and counsel knew the nature of his testimony prior to trial. See Doc. 8-3 at 35. Therefore, even assuming counsel had made further objections or arguments concerning the amendment of the information, a reasonable probability does not exist that the trial court would have sustained the objection or granted a judgment of acquittal on this basis. Accordingly, ground one is denied pursuant to Section 2254(d).
Petitioner maintains counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and prepare a meaningful defense. (Doc. 1 at 9). According to Petitioner, he told counsel prior to trial that he and Webb were having an affair, Webb was scared that...
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