Ensey v. Cate, 1:10-cv—002 93-LJO-SKO-HC
| Decision Date | 08 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | 1:10-cv—002 93-LJO-SKO-HC |
| Parties | WILLIAM LEON ENSEY, Petitioner, v. MATTHEW C. CATE, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
THIRTY (30) DAYS
Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rules 302 and 304. Pending before the Court is the petition, which was filed on February 11, 2010, and transferred to this division on February 20, 2010. Respondent filed an answer on June 23, 2010, along with the state court record. Petitioner filed a traverse on August 2, 2010.
Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, theeffective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the AEDPA applies in this proceeding. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Furman v. Wood, 190 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999).
A district court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that the custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 n.7 (2000); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. -, -, 131 S.Ct. 13, 16 (2010) (per curiam).
Petitioner claims that in the course of the proceedings resulting in his conviction, he suffered violations of his right to due process of law. Thus, violations of the Constitution are alleged. The conviction challenged arises out of the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Tuolumne (TCSC), which is located within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), 2241(a), (d).
On May 20, 2010, Respondent's counsel filed a notice of appearance for Respondent Matthew C. Cate, who is the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Petitioner has thus named as a respondent a person who has custody of the Petitioner within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2242 and Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the District Courts (Habeas Rules). See, Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894-95 (9th Cir. 1996); Stanley v. California Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994).
Accordingly, it is concluded that this Court hasjurisdiction over the subject matter of this action and over the person of Respondent Cate.
On January 18, 2008, information number CRF25795 was filed in the TCSC, charging Petitioner William Ensey and two co-defendants, Rickey Jones and Traci Ann Hawkins, with one count each of second degree burglary in violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 459, and with possession of a forged check with the intent to defraud in violation of § 475(a). The information further alleged that Petitioner had previously suffered two prior serious or violent felony convictions within the meaning of § 667(b) through (i), and that he had previously served five prior prison terms within the meaning of § 667.5(b). (1 CT 14-19.)
Jury trial began on May 7, 2008. The issues of the prior conviction and prison term allegations were bifurcated for the purposes of trial. (1 CT 41-43.) On May 9, 2008, Petitioner and Traci Hawkins were found guilty as charged. (1 CT 52, 98-99; 3 RT 765-766.) The jury deadlocked on both counts alleged as to Ricky Jones, and a mistrial was declared as to him. (3 RT 765-768.)
On May 12, 2008, a court trial was held on the special allegations, and they were all found to be true. (1 CT 100.)
Petitioner was sentenced on June 4, 2008. Pursuant to a defense motion, the court dismissed one of the prior felony convictions in the interests of justice. The court selected count I, burglary, as the principal term and imposed the upper term of three years, doubled to six years under the three strikes law. This sentence was enhanced by consecutive terms of one yearfor each of Petitioner's five prior prison terms. The court stayed Petitioner's sentence on count II under Cal. Pen. Code § 654. The total term imposed was eleven years. (1 CT 143.)
Petitioner appealed from the judgment of his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District (DCA) in case number No. F055431. (Lodged Doc. A.) The DCA issued an opinion in Petitioner's direct appeal on August 3, 2009, awarding Petitioner additional custody credits but otherwise affirming Petitioner's judgment and sentence.
Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court in case number S176054. (Lodged Doc. C.) The California Supreme Court denied the petition on October 14, 2009. (Lodged Doc. D.)
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides in pertinent part:
Clearly established federal law refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of the decisions of the Supreme Court as of the time of the relevant state court decision. Cullen v.Pinholster, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1399 (2011); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). It is, therefore, the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the pertinent time. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 71-72.
A state court's decision contravenes clearly established Supreme Court precedent if it reaches a legal conclusion opposite to, or substantially different from, the Supreme Court's or concludes differently on a materially indistinguishable set of facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). The state court need not have cited Supreme Court precedent or have been aware of it, "so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [it]." Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). A state court unreasonably applies clearly established federal law if it either 1) correctly identifies the governing rule but applies it to a new set of facts in an objectively unreasonable manner, or 2) extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in an objectively unreasonable manner. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002); see, Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. An application of clearly established federal law is unreasonable only if it is objectively unreasonable; an incorrect or inaccurate application is not necessarily unreasonable. Williams, 529 U.S. at 410.
A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief as long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court's decision. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011).Even a strong case for relief does not render the state court's conclusions unreasonable. Id. To obtain federal habeas relief, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on a claim was "so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id. at 786-87. The standards set by § 2254(d) are "highly deferential standard[s] for evaluating state-court rulings" which require that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt, and the Petitioner bear the burden of proof. Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398.
In assessing under section 2254(d)(1) whether the state court's legal conclusion was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law, "review... is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits." Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398. Evidence introduced in federal court has no bearing on review pursuant to § 2254(d)(1). Id. at 1400. Further, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) provides that in a habeas proceeding brought by a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of a state court, a determination of a factual issue made by a state court shall be presumed to be correct; the petitioner has the burden of producing clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of correctness.
The last reasoned decision must be identified to analyze the state court decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), which limits habeas relief with respect to "any claim that wasadjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings...." Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1092 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005); Bailey v. Rae, 339 F.3d 1107, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2003).
A state has adjudicated a claim on the merits within the meaning of § 2254(d) when it decides the petitioner's right to relief on the basis of the substance of the constitutional claim raised, rather than denying the claim because of a procedural or other rule precluding state court review of the merits. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, the DCA decided Petitioner's claims on the basis of their substance; thus, the DCA's decision was a decision on the merits.
The later decision of the California Supreme Court denying Petitioner's petition for discretionary review of the DCA's decision was not a decision on the merits, but only a...
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