Ensley v. Barnhart, CAUSE No. 1:01-CV-219 (N.D. Ind. 1/11/2002)
| Decision Date | 11 January 2002 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE No. 1:01-CV-219. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
| Parties | GARY ENSLEY, Plaintiff, v. JO ANNE B. BARNHART,<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. |
This matter is before the Court2 for judicial review of a final decision of the defendant Commissioner of Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") terminating the Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") of the pro se plaintiff, Gary Ensley ("Plaintiff").
Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act ("the Act") provides, inter alia, It also provides, "[t]he findings of the [Commissioner] as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . ." 42 U.S.C. §405(g).
In August 1986, the Social Security Administration found the Plaintiff disabled and entitled to DIB beginning April 1, 1986. Several years thereafter, it performed a continuing disability review and determined the Plaintiff's disability ceased as of July 1, 1999, and his benefits were terminated on September 30, 1999. The decision was affirmed upon reconsideration. The Plaintiff requested a hearing, and on September 20, 2000, a hearing was held before the Administrative Law Judge Steven J. Neary ("ALJ"). The Plaintiff appeared pro se and testified at the hearing. Also testifying was Alice Ensley, the Plaintiff's wife, and Christopher Young, a Vocational Expert ("VE").
On December 28, 2000, the ALJ issued his decision wherein he made the following findings:
1. The claimant was found to be disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act beginning April 1, 1986, and he has not engaged in substantial gainful activity from that late through the date of this decision.
2. The claimant's impairment of residual effects of pneumothorax is a severe impairment, based upon the requirements in the Regulations (20 CFR § 404.1521).
3. The medical evidence establishes that the claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments which meets or equals the requirements of the Listing of Impairments in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4.
4. The impairments present as of April 1, 1986, the date of the most recent favorable medical decision that the claimant was disabled were schizophrenia and alcohol abuse.
5. The medical evidence establishes that there has been improvement in the claimant's medical impairments since the CPD of August 7, 1986.
6. This medical improvement is related to the claimant's ability to work.
7. The medical evidence establishes that the claimant currently has an impairment or combination of impairments which is severe.
8. The undersigned finds that the claimant's statements as [to] the effect of his impairments upon his ability to work are not credible.
9. Beginning July 1, 1999 and continuing through the date of this decision, the claimant has the residual functional capacity required to lift, push, or pull up to 20 pounds occasionally; lift, carry, push, or pull up to 10 pounds frequently; sit up to 6 hours of an 8 hour workday; stand and/or walk up to 6 hours of an 8 hour workday; but cannot be exposed to pulmonary irritants.
10. The claimant has no past relevant work (20 CFR § 404.1565).
11. The claimant is a 'younger individual' (20 CFR § 404.1563).
12. The claimant has 'a high school (or high school equivalent) education' (20 CFR § 404.1564).
11.[sic] The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a significant range of light work (20 CFR § 416.967).
13. Although the claimant's exertional limitations do not allow him to perform the full range of light work, using Medical-Vocational Rule 202.20 as a framework for decision-making, there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that he could perform. Examples of such jobs include work as cashier, office helper, and sales person.
14. The claimant has no transferable skills (20 CFR 404.1568).
15. In view of the claimant's age, education, work experience, and functional limitations as heretofore described, jobs which he is capable of performing exist in significant numbers in the national economy.
16. The claimant's disability ceased on July 1, 1999 (20 CFR 404.1594(f)(8)).
17. Since the date that the claimant's disability ceased, she [sic] has not had a worsening of an existing impairment or the onset of a new impairment which has resulted in disability at any time through the date of this decision.
(Tr. at 20-21.)
Based on these findings, the ALJ determined that the Plaintiff was no longer entitled to DIB as of July 1, 1999. The Plaintiff requested review by the Appeals Council, which denied it on May 7, 2001, leaving the ALJ's decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. This appeal followed.
The pro se Plaintiff filed his opening brief on September 13, 2001, and on September 25, 2001, submitted an additional filing (Docket No. 14), which we construe as a supplement to his opening brief. On December 5, 2001, the Defendant filed a memorandum in support of the Commissioner's decision. On December 20, 2001, the Court, noting that the pro se Plaintiff had not filed a reply brief extended the date with which to file, and on January 2, 2002, the Plaintiff filed his reply.
The Plaintiff was forty-five years old in July 1999, the date the ALJ determined that his disability ceased, a younger individual under the Act.3 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563.
The Plaintiff has a General Education Diploma (GED) and last worked in 1985 as a steel-groove operator.
The Plaintiff is claiming a disability based on problems due to schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. The Plaintiff's medical history is as follows:4
Between March 31 and April 13, 1981, the Plaintiff was hospitalized at Lutheran Hospital with a diagnosis of schizophrenic reaction, schizo-affective type. (Tr. at 199.) On admission, he had been drinking heavily, and his associations were loose. (Id.) During the course of hospitalization, he was treated with individual and group psychotherapy, and medications including Navane5 and Cogentin.6 (Id.)
On April 24, 1981, Plaintiff returned for hospitalization after suffering another schizophrenic reaction. (Tr. at 204.) He was treated with group and individual therapy, as well as occupational therapy. (Tr. at 204.) On May 19, 1981, he was transferred to Richmond State Hospital, where he remained until August 31,1981. (Tr. at 209.)
In May 1981, the Plaintiff's wife reported that he had been delusional and threatened her and their children before his hospitalization (Tr. at 211.) He had been drinking daily and not taking his medication as prescribed. (Tr. at 212.)
A September 4, 1981, discharge summary from Richmond State Hospital, notes that the Plaintiff was hospitalized due to stress from his divorce. (Tr. at 209.) Indeed, the Plaintiff's psychiatrist reported that the Plaintiff did not follow his prescribed medication and course of treatment, and was unable to hold his job and care for his basic needs. (Id.) While hospitalized, the Plaintiff's response to medication was "quite satisfactory" because his confusion cleared and his depression dissipated, and the Plaintiff became pleasant and cooperative. (Tr. at 210.)
Between March 23 and April 19, 1982, Plaintiff was again hospitalized at Lutheran Hospital because he was "out-of-touch," and destroying personal and family property (Tr. at 229.) During the course of hospitalization, he was treated with group psychotherapy and medication. (Id.) Upon discharge, his level of functioning was greatly improved, and he was social with staff and peers. (Id.)
Between July 12-25, 1983, the Plaintiff was hospitalized for bipolar affective disorder, manic. (Tr. at 232.)
Between July 17 and August 2, 1984, the Plaintiff was again hospitalized for bipolar affective disease, manic; intermittent alcohol abuse; and intermittent cannabis abuse. (Tr. at 235-36.)
On September 24, 1984, Plaintiff was admitted to the Lutheran Hospital from the Allen County, Indiana, Jail following a 72-hour commitment. (Tr. at 240.) He had not been taking his medications or keeping his appointments (Id.) Upon discharge, the Plaintiff was quietly social with staff and peers, with appropriate speech and behavior. (Id.) While hospitalized, the Plaintiff would typically settle down and become a "model" patient after a few days, and he indicated that he would take his medication, and attend biweekly appointments with a caseworker after discharge. (Tr. at 239-40.)
On September 11, 1985, the Plaintiff voluntarily admitted himself to Lutheran Hospital for excessive drinking and cannabis use, and to reduce his medication dosage. (Tr. at 258.) He was placed on Lithium.7 (Tr. 251).
In March 1986, Plaintiff was admitted to St. Joseph's Hospital because his mother believed that his mental health had deteriorated and he was becoming dangerous to others. (Tr. at 268.)
On July 10, 1986, the Plaintiff's psychiatrist and case manager reported that the Plaintiff had a history of refusing or not following his prescribed course of medication. (Tr. at 279.) Moreover, they reported that when not properly medicated, the Plaintiff exhibited violent and combative behavior. (Tr. at 280.)
Between September 30 and October 11, 1991, Plaintiff was hospitalized for alcohol dependence and bipolar disorder, after drinking three and one-half (3 ½) pints of gin in one day. (Tr. at 313.) The Plaintiff reported that he...
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