Enung v. Sabhnani
| Citation | 772 F.Supp.2d 437 |
| Decision Date | 25 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 08–cv–2970 (ADS)(WDW).,08–cv–2970 (ADS)(WDW). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
| Parties | SAMIRAH & Enung, Plaintiffs,v.Varsha Mahender SABHNANI and Mahender Murlidhar Sabhnani, Defendants. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Fish & Richardson P.C., by: Karen Yeh, Esq., of Counsel, Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, by:
Ivy O. Suriyopas, Esq., of Counsel, New York, N.Y., for Plaintiffs, Samirah and Enung.Sam P. Israel, Esq., New York, N.Y., for Defendants Varsha Sabhnani and Mahender Sabhnani.
The plaintiffs in this case, each known only by a single name, Samirah and Enung, were the victims of the defendants' criminal efforts to force them to work as mistreated and underpaid domestic servants in the defendants' home. On December 17, 2007, the defendants were convicted of a number of federal crimes related to their mistreatment of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed the present civil suit shortly thereafter, asserting various causes of action and seeking monetary damages from the defendants. The plaintiffs now move for summary judgment on all of their causes of action-except for certain claims that they have withdrawn—on the basis that the defendants' criminal convictions collaterally estop the defendants from contesting the plaintiffs' civil claims. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the plaintiffs' motion in part and denies it in part.
The history of the criminal matter related to the present case has been extensively chronicled by this Court and the Second Circuit. See United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215 (2d Cir.2010) (“ Sabhnani Verdict Appeal ”); United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63 (2d Cir.2007); United States v. Sabhnani, 539 F.Supp.2d 617 (E.D.N.Y.2008). In addition, the Court has issued two prior decisions in this case, Samirah & Enung v. Sabhnani, No. 08–cv–2970, 2010 WL 2629770 (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 28, 2010) and Samirah & Enung v. Sabhnani, No. 08–cv–2970, DE # 75 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010). Although the Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the criminal matter and this related civil case, a brief review is in order.
The defendants in this case, Varsha Sabhnani and Mahender Sabhnani, are husband and wife. Prior to May 2007, they lived together with their children and the plaintiffs in a home in Syosset, New York. In December 2007, the defendants were convicted, after a jury trial, of two counts each of forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a), harboring aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), holding a person in a condition of peonage in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1581(a), and document servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1592(a), as well as conspiracy to commit each of these substantive offenses. In reaching this verdict, the jury essentially found Varsha and Mahender had forced the plaintiffs to work as domestic servants in the Sabhnani home while being physically abused for little pay and under very poor conditions. Neither defendant testified at the trial.
Following the defendants' convictions, the Court awarded the plaintiffs restitution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1593, which provides for mandatory restitution in cases of peonage, slavery and trafficking. Under Section 1593, the Court calculates restitution as the payment that a victim of peonage, slavery, or trafficking should have been given for her labor pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. (“FLSA”). Applying this law, the Court awarded Samirah $310,371.91 and awarded Enung $157,901.20 in back wages. The Court also awarded Samirah and Enung an additional $310,371.91 and $157,901.20, respectively, as liquidated damages. See U.S. v. Sabhnani, 566 F.Supp.2d 139, 147 (E.D.N.Y.2008), overruled in part by Sabhnani Verdict Appeal, 599 F.3d at 256.
The defendants appealed their convictions and the award of restitution to the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit affirmed the convictions and restitution award except as to one aspect. This Court had awarded back wages to Samirah and Enung based on a calculation of overtime pay for each hour they worked over forty hours per week. However, the Second Circuit found that Samirah and Enung were not entitled to overtime pay under the FLSA because, as domestic servants residing in their employer's household, they were exempt employees. Sabhnani Verdict Appeal, 599 F.3d at 256. The Second Circuit therefore remanded the restitution award calculation, with directions to recalculate the restitution without including overtime payments. The Second Circuit affirmed all other aspects of the verdict and restitution award.
On July 22, 2008, after the verdict and restitution award were entered, but before the Second Circuit issued its decision in the Sabhnani Verdict Appeal, the Plaintiffs commenced the instant civil lawsuit. The plaintiffs originally asserted eleven causes of action against both of the defendants, seeking money damages under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1595, federal and state wage laws, and the common law. The plaintiffs have since withdrawn certain of these causes of action. On July 1, 2010, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on all of their remaining causes of action, asserting that the defendants' criminal convictions collaterally estop the defendants from challenging any of the plaintiffs' claims. The defendants oppose the plaintiffs' motion in its entirety.
It is well-settled that summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) is proper only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, “if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A fact is “material” within the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 when its resolution “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue is “genuine” when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. In determining whether an issue is genuine, “[t]he inferences to be drawn from the underlying affidavits, exhibits, interrogatory answers, and depositions must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir.1995) ().
Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' ” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). However, the nonmoving party cannot survive summary judgment by casting “mere metaphysical doubt” upon the evidence produced by the moving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party can show that “little or no evidence may be found in support of the nonmoving party's case.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., 22 F.3d 1219, 1223–24 (2d Cir.1994) (citations omitted).
Collateral estoppel is the legal doctrine stating that a party may not re-litigate an issue after having once been given a full opportunity to do so. This case involves use of a type of collateral estoppel sometimes termed “offensive collateral estoppel”, whereby a person not party to an original lawsuit attempts in a subsequent lawsuit to collaterally estop a party to the original lawsuit from re-litigating an issue it lost in the original suit. Thus, here, Samirah and Enung were not parties to the criminal proceeding against Varsha and Mahender. However, Samirah and Enung nevertheless assert that Varsha and Mahender are estopped from re-litigating any of the issues resolved in the criminal case.
In Gelb v. Royal Globe Insurance Co., 798 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.1986), the Second Circuit generally approved the use of this type of collateral estoppel by victims of crimes asserting civil claims against convicted criminals. The court reasoned that, “[b]ecause mutuality of estoppel is no longer an absolute requirement under federal law, a party other than the Government may assert collateral estoppel based on a criminal conviction.” Id. at 43 (internal quotations omitted). The Gelb court then articulated four requirements that must be satisfied in applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel:
(3) there must have been a full and fair opportunity for litigation in the prior proceeding, and
(4) the issue previously litigated must have been necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits.
Id. at 44; see also City of New York v. Venkataram, No. 06–cv–6578, 2009 WL 1938984, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 7, 2009) (applying Gelb); Crum & Forster Ins. Co. v. Goodmark Industries, Inc., 488 F.Supp.2d 241, 245 (E.D.N.Y.2007) (Spatt, J.) (same); Doe v. City of Waterbury, 453 F.Supp.2d 537, 550 (D.Conn.2006) (same). The Court will apply these requirements to the present motion for summary judgment in this case.C. As to the Defendants' General Objections' to the Application of Collateral Estoppel to the Present Case
The defendants assert numerous objections to specific causes of action for which the plaintiffs seek summary judgment. However, the defendants also assert two general objections that apply to all of the plaintiffs'...
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