Environmental Landscape Design Specialist v. Shields

• Decision Date: 18 June 1985
• Docket Number: No. 8422DC920,8422DC920
• Citation: Environmental Landscape Design Specialist v. Shields, 75 N.C.App. 304, 330 S.E.2d 627 (N.C. App. 1985)
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: ENVIRONMENTAL LANDSCAPE DESIGN SPECIALIST, a partnership comprising of Jack Rupplin and Keith Whitfield v. John SHIELDS and Chattie Shields.

Page 627

330 S.E.2d 627

75 N.C.App. 304

ENVIRONMENTAL LANDSCAPE DESIGN SPECIALIST, a partnership comprising of Jack Rupplin and Keith Whitfield v. John SHIELDS and Chattie Shields.

No. 8422DC920.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

June 18, 1985.

David P. Shouvlin, Greensboro, for plaintiff-appellee.

Henry P. Van Hoy, II, Mocksville, for defendants-appellants.

JOHNSON, Judge.

The first question we address is whether the court erred in denying defendants' motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The purpose of a motion for directed verdict is to test the sufficiency of the evidence to go to the jury. Cutts v. Casey, 278 N.C. 390, 180 S.E.2d 297 (1971). In ruling upon a motion for directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence, the court must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, including evidence elicited from the defendant favorable to the plaintiff. Tate v. Bryant, 16 N.C.App. 132, 191 S.E.2d 433 (1972). The same principles and standards apply to motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Dickinson v. Pake, 284 N.C. 576, 201 S.E.2d 897 (1974).

Plaintiff alleged two claims in its complaint: (1) breach of an express contract; and (2) unjust enrichment. At the conclusion of all the evidence, the court granted a directed verdict for defendants on the express contract claim. Although the better practice would have been for plaintiff to plead both express and implied contract, plaintiff could still recover in quantum meruit in the absence of proof of an express contract, if a contract could be implied from the evidence. Paxton v. O.P.F., Inc., 64 N.C.App. 130, 306 S.E.2d 527 (1983). To recover in quantum meruit, plaintiff must show: (1) services were rendered to defendants; (2) the services were knowingly and voluntarily accepted; and (3) the services were not given gratuitously. Johnson v. Sanders, 260 N.C. 291, 132 S.E.2d 582 (1963). In short, if plaintiff alleged and proved acceptance of services and the value of those services, it was entitled to go to the jury on quantum meruit. Carolina Helicopter Corp. v. Cutter Realty Co., 263 N.C. 139, 139 S.E.2d 362 (1964).

Taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff the evidence tends to show that Mr. Bill Adams, a general contractor, referred Mr. Keith Whitfield, a partner in plaintiff landscape design and landscaping business, to the defendants regarding the possibility of performing landscaping services for defendants. Mr. Whitfield met with defendant Mr. Shields and Mr. Shields requested Whitfield to present designs and ideas to him for landscaping his yard. Whitfield thereupon prepared drawings for various designs and presented these drawings to Mr. Shields, who indicated he liked a design with waterfalls and fountains and directed Whitfield to prepare a finalized design. The next day, Bill Adams contracted plaintiff and told him the deal was off because the Shields thought the plans were too pretentious and offered to pay plaintiff up to $1,500 on behalf of the Shields as settlement. Whitfield then contacted Mr. Shields, who told him to continue with his drawings but to make them less pretentious. Whitfield met with Mr. Shields for a third time, at which time Mr. Shields examined Whitfield's drawings and instructed Whitfield to finalize them. When the Shields would not return his calls, Whitfield discovered another landscape contractor was working on their yard.

Mr. Shields conceded on cross-examination that he requested various drawings and that he understood there would be a charge for design work even if there were no implementation of the designs. There also was evidence that defendants were aware plaintiff was charging by the hour. Whitfield testified that he told defendants he was charging $30.00 per hour. The evidence thus showed that defendants requested and accepted plaintiff's services with knowledge that they were not being performed gratuitously.

Defendants argue there was insufficient evidence of damages because plaintiff's bill, standing alone, was insufficient to show the reasonable value or market value of plaintiff's services. See Harrell v. Construction Co., 41 N.C.App. 593, 255 S.E.2d 280 (1979), aff'd, 300 N.C. 353, 266 S.E.2d 626 (1980). While a bill for services rendered, standing alone, is insufficient to support an award of damages, it is some evidence of the value of one's services. Hood v. Faulkner, 47 N.C.App. 611, 267 S.E.2d 704 (1980). Moreover, the reasonable value of services rendered is determined largely by the nature of the work and the customary rate of pay for such work in the community...