Epstein v. Dozier

• Decision Date: 12 January 2018
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO.: 5:17-cv-107
• Parties: MICHAEL ANTHONY EPSTEIN, Plaintiff, v. GREGORY DOZIER; BREANNA HOLLOWAY; WARDEN OF GEORGIA CLASSIFICATION PRISON; WARDEN HILTON HALL; COUNSELOR DUTCH OF GEORGIA CLASSIFICATION PRISON; and GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

MICHAEL ANTHONY EPSTEIN, Plaintiff, v. GREGORY DOZIER; BREANNA HOLLOWAY; WARDEN OF GEORGIA CLASSIFICATION PRISON;

WARDEN HILTON HALL; COUNSELOR DUTCH OF GEORGIA CLASSIFICATION PRISON;

and GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 5:17-cv-107

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA WAYCROSS DIVISION

January 12, 2018

ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, who is currently housed at Coffee Correctional Facility in Nicholls, Georgia, filed a Complaint, as amended, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docs. 1, 5.) Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. (Doc. 2.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion. For these same reasons, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's Complaint based on his failure to state a claim, DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case and enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal, and DENY Plaintiff in forma pauperis status on appeal.

BACKGROUND

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff contends his Seminole County, Georgia, parole was revoked, even though that portion of his sentence expired. Plaintiff asserts he wrote grievances about receiving credit against his sentence while he was housed at the Georgia Diagnostic & Classification Prison, as well as while he has been housed at Coffee Correctional. (Doc. 5.) He seeks monetary damages and his immediate release from confinement.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Plaintiff seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the Court may authorize the filing of a civil lawsuit without the prepayment of fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all of his assets, shows an inability to pay the filing fee, and also includes a statement of the nature of the action which shows that he is entitled to redress. Even if the plaintiff proves indigence, the Court must dismiss the action if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity. Upon such screening, the Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion thereof, that is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or which seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

The Court looks to the instructions for pleading contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when reviewing a Complaint on an application to proceed in forma pauperis. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ("A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain [among other things] . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10 (requiring that claims be set forth in numbered paragraphs, each limited to a single set of circumstances). Further, a claim is frivolous under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) "if it is 'without arguable merit either in law or fact.'" Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)).

Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Thompson v. Rundle, 393 F. App'x 675, 678 (11th Cir. 2010). Under that standard, this Court must determine whether the complaint contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff must assert "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not" suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Section 1915 also "accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).

In its analysis, the Court will abide by the long-standing principle that the pleadings of unrepresented parties are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys and, therefore, must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) ("Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys . . . .") (quoting Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003)). However, Plaintiff's unrepresented status will not excuse mistakes regarding procedural rules. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) ("We have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.").

DISCUSSION

I. Whether Venue is Proper in This Court

A district court may raise the issue of defective venue sua sponte. Collins v. Hagel, No. 1:13-CV-2051-WSD, 2015 WL 5691076, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 28, 2015) (citing Kapordelis v. Danzig, 387 F. App'x 905, 906-07 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming sua sponte transfer, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), of pro se prisoner's civil rights action from New York to Georgia); Berry v. Salter, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1350 (M.D. Ala. 2001); cf. Lipofsky v. New York State Workers Comp. Bd., 861 F.2d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 1988); and Nalls v. Coleman Low Fed. Inst., 440 F. App'x 704, 706 (11th Cir. 2011)). When venue is improper, a court "shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district . . . in which it could have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). "The court may transfer the case if (1) the proposed transferee court is one in which the action 'could have been brought' and (2) transfer would be 'in the interest of justice.'" Leach v. Peacock, Civil Action No. 2:09cv738-MHT, 2011 WL 1130596, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 25, 2011) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)). Trial courts generally have broad discretion in determining whether to transfer or dismiss a case. Id. (citing England v. ITT Thompson Indus., Inc., 856 F.2d 1518, 1520 (11th Cir. 1988)).

This Court is not the proper venue to hear Plaintiff's claims against the named Defendants, except as to Defendant Hall. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) sets forth the applicable venue provisions:

A civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

Plaintiff complains, in part, about events occurring in Seminole County and Butts County, which are within the Middle District of Georgia. 28 U.S.C. § 90(b). Ordinarily, this Court would transfer this case, in the interest of justice, as venue is not proper in this Court.

However, as explained below, in this case, because Plaintiff fails to state a claim, the interest of justice would not be served by transferring this case to the Middle District of Georgia. Plaintiff's claims would be subject to dismissal in that court, and thus, transferring this case to another district would be futile. Accordingly, the Court should DISMISS Plaintiff's Complaint.

II. Dismissal Pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey and Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

The allegations contained in Plaintiff's Complaint center around criminal proceedings in Seminole County, Georgia. There is no indication from his Complaint that Plaintiff's conviction has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, or otherwise overturned. (Doc. 5.) Consequently, this Court is precluded from reviewing his claims by the decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

In Heck, a state prisoner filed a Section 1983 damages action against the prosecutors and investigator in his criminal case for their actions which resulted in his conviction. The United States Supreme Court analogized the plaintiff's claim to a common-law cause of action for malicious prosecution, which requires as an element of the claim that the prior criminal proceeding be terminated in favor of the accused. 512 U.S. at 484. The Supreme Court reasoned:

We think the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement, just as it had always applied to actions for malicious prosecution (footnote omitted).

We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whoseunlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, (footnote omitted), a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of

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