Epstein v. Resor, 48962.
Decision Date | 19 February 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 48962.,48962. |
Citation | 296 F. Supp. 214 |
Parties | Julius EPSTEIN, Plaintiff, v. Stanley RESOR, Secretary of the Army, Department of the Army, Department of Defense, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
McCloskey, Wilson, Mosher & Martin, Palo Alto, Cal., for plaintiff.
Cecil F. Poole, U. S. Atty., William B. Spohn, Asst. U. S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., for defendants.
Plaintiff, an historian who is now a research associate at Stanford University's Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, brings this action pursuant to Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, to enjoin the Secretary of the Army from withholding a file described as "Forcible Repatriation of Displaced Soviet Citizens —Operation Keelhaul." The file was generated by the Allied Force Headquarters of World War II and has been classified Top Secret since 1948. The classification was made pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order 10501, 3 C. F.R. 484 (Supp.1968).
Subsection (a) of Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides in part:
Subsection (b) of Section 3 provides:
"This section does not apply to matters that are— "(1) specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy; * * *."
The defendants have moved to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Plaintiff contends that the Top Secret classification on the file he seeks, is unwarranted and that this Court has the power to hold a trial de novo on the merits of this classification. He contends that such power is based on Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act. The Court is of the opinion that Congress did not intend to subject such classifications to judicial scrutiny to that extent.
Before discussing the purpose and effect of Section 3 of the Act, the Court directs its attention to the affidavit of Congressman John E. Moss, which plaintiff filed in support of his contentions. The affidavit has been introduced to give aid to the Court in interpreting the provisions of Section 3 of the Act. Congressman Moss' affidavit states:
"Specifically, it was my intent as the principal co-author of the legislation to grant to the appropriate District Court the broadest latitude to review all agency acts in this regard, including the correctness of a designation by an agency bringing documents within an exemption found in Section `(e)' of the Act; and that the powers granted to the Court and the burdens placed upon the Government in Section `(c)' were meant to include rather than exclude the exemption."
Statements made by legislators in debate can be a part of the legislative history which guides courts in statutory construction. See Bindczyck v. Finucane, 342 U.S. 76, 72 S.Ct. 130, 96 L.Ed. 100 (1951). On the other hand, statements made by a legislator after enactment of a statute and not a part of the records of the legislative body are entitled to little or no weight at all. National School of Aeronautics, Inc. v. United States, 142 F.Supp. 933, 135 Ct.Cl. 343 (1956). See also, United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947). Such statements are not offered by way of committee report and are not offered for response by other members of the law-making body. The intent which is helpful in interpreting a statute, is the intent of the legislature and not of one of its members. For purposes of statutory construction, a legislative body can only speak through a statute, with the words that are used in light of the circumstances surrounding its enactment. For this reason, the Court has not considered the affidavit prepared and submitted by the Honorable John E. Moss solely for purposes of this lawsuit after the legislation in question was enacted.
Prior to amendment of Section 3 of the Act in 1966, this Section was described by Senator Long as:
Senate Rep.No. 813, 89th Cong. 1st Sess., 111 Cong.Rec. 26821 (1965).
Senator Long went on to say in support of the amendment:
"It is the purpose of the present bill * * * to establish a general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language and to provide a court procedure by which citizens and the press may obtain information wrongfully withheld * * *." Id. at 26821
This purpose of full disclosure was accomplished by giving the United States District Courts jurisdiction to determine de novo whether information was being properly withheld with the burden of the withholding agency to sustain its action. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3). This jurisdiction does not apply to information that falls within the exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of Section 3. To hold that the agencies have the burden of proving their action proper even in areas covered by the exemptions, would render the exemption provision meaningless. If a determination de novo is made by this Court on whether the Top Secret classification by the Department of Army is proper, with the burden on the Secretary to sustain its action, the Court would be giving identical treatment to information withheld by an agency whether it fell within the exemption or not. Apparently, Congress did not intend such a result.
It may be argued that the exemptions enumerated in Section 3 are set forth merely to designate the various grounds on which information may be withheld and that the burden is on the agency to show that the information properly falls within the exception, with the district court having jurisdiction to make the determination de novo. That this position is unwarranted is shown by the clear expression of Congress in Subsection (b) of Section 3, "This section does not apply to matters that are listed below." It is further shown by the statements of Congressman Gallagher on the floor of the House:
On the other hand, it is equally without merit to say that Congress intended absolutely no effect by the Act on information that falls within the areas covered by the exemptions. The district courts at least have jurisdiction to determine whether the exemption applies in a given situation. In furtherance of this jurisdiction, it is reasonable to say that Congress intended the courts to determine whether classifications within the first exemption is clearly arbitrary and unsupportable. Otherwise, the agencies could easily frustrate the purpose of full disclosure intended by Congress merely by labeling the information to fall within the exemption.
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