Epstein v. Washington Energy Co., Nos. 94-35873

CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
Writing for the CourtTROTT
Citation83 F.3d 1136
Parties, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 99,222, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3383, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5527 Mark G. EPSTEIN; Samuel C. Arsers, on behalf of themselves & all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WASHINGTON ENERGY CO.; James A. Thorpe, Defendants-Appellees.
Decision Date14 May 1996
Docket NumberNos. 94-35873

Page 1136

83 F.3d 1136
64 USLW 2734, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 99,222,
96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3383,
96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5527
Mark G. EPSTEIN; Samuel C. Arsers, on behalf of themselves
& all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
WASHINGTON ENERGY CO.; James A. Thorpe, Defendants-Appellees.
Nos. 94-35873.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Oct. 19, 1995.
Decided May 14, 1996.

Page 1137

Steve W. Berman, Hagens & Berman, Seattle, Washington, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Douglas M. Schwab, Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe, San Francisco, California, for defendants-appellees Washington Energy Company and James P. Torgerson.

Evan L. Schwab, Bogle & Gates, Seattle, Washington for defendant-appellee James A. Thorpe.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington; Carolyn R. Dimmick, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-94-00245-CRD.

Before: REINHARDT and TROTT, Circuit Judges, and SCHWARZER, District Judge. *

TROTT, Circuit Judge:

OVERVIEW

Plaintiffs Mark Epstein and Samuel Arsers, purchasers of Washington Energy Company's common stock, appeal from the district court's order dismissing their securities fraud class action suit. In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Washington Energy Company and two of its senior officers violated §§ 10(b) & 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and various state laws by stating the potential benefits of a rate increase for its subsidiary Washington Natural Gas, a regulated public utility, without disclosing: 1) that the Washington State Utilities and Transportation Commission had previously disapproved of Defendants' wrongful allocation of costs and attempts to subsidize unregulated operations, and 2) that the 1992 rate increase request was predicated on the same condemned practices. In the vernacular, Plaintiffs alleged that they were the victims of a "fraud on the market." The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Affirmed.

I
FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiffs brought this class action suit against Washington Energy Company (WEC) and two of its senior officers, defining the class as all persons who purchased WEC common stock during the period of July 27, 1992 to September 28, 1993 (the Class Period). During the Class Period, Defendants represented that WEC's subsidiary Washington Natural Gas (WNG) had filed for a substantial rate increase from the Washington State Utilities and Transportation Commission (WUTC). The securities market allegedly believed that a rate increase in some material amount was likely and priced WEC stock higher as a result. Ultimately, the WUTC rejected the rate increase and ordered Washington Natural Gas to lower its rates, finding that the rate increase proposal inappropriately sought to recover costs associated with WEC's non-utility subsidiaries. WEC's stock fell from a high of $25-3/8 per share during the Class Period to $17 per share at the close of the Class Period.

A. Defendants' Statements Regarding the Rate Increase

Plaintiffs assert their fraud on the market theory based on the following statements:

July 1992 Press Release. Defendants announced Washington Natural Gas's filing for a general rate increase requesting an additional 13%, or approximately $41 million, in revenues annually.

Registration Statement. On September 10, 1992, Defendants filed a Form S-3 Registration Statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) representing that Washington Natural Gas had "historically been allowed general rate increases primarily to offset increased operating costs

Page 1138

attributable to inflation." The statement noted that the "WUTC has until June 1993 to act on the filing."

Letter to Shareholders. On December 4, 1992, Defendants sent a letter to WEC shareholders portraying the rate request filing as "designed to enable us to earn a proposed 10.68 percent rate of return at our utility," and that "if approved it would increase our annual revenues by up to $41 million, or 13%." The letter stated that it was the first request in eight years for an increase in basic rates. The letter's discussion of business as a regulated activity acknowledged that "government regulation can be a major factor in Washington Energy's ability to perform," and that "[r]egulation can make or break us." The letter explained the WUTC's role in the rate increase request and stated that "[t]he commission has until October 1993 to act upon our proposal."

April 1993 Press Release. Defendants issued a press release and filed a Form 8-K with the SEC noting that the WUTC staff had recommended a rejection of the proposed rate increase. The press release stated that "WNG strongly disagrees with the majority of the staff's proposals and will contest them to the maximum extent possible."

June 1993 Announcement. Defendants announced that Washington Natural Gas had lowered its rate increase request to 4.6%, and that the revised request was expected to raise $14.8 million annually.

B. Market's Perception of the Rate Increase Request

The following observations by analysts exemplify the market's perception of the proposed rate increase:

July 1992 Ragen MacKenzie Report. A research report from Ragen MacKenzie observed that "based on future rate relief and more normal weather, we believe the common stock dividend may again be increased in late calendar 1993." This report concluded by upgrading its investment opinion on WEC.

March 1993 Ragen MacKenzie Report. An analyst noted that "we believe earnings could rebound to the $1.75 per share range or higher, depending on the level of rate increase granted and the level of weather-related heating sales next winter."

April 1993 Ragen MacKenzie Report. Following the WUTC staff's recommended rejection of the proposed rate increase, Ragen MacKenzie issued a report stating:

The staff proposed to disallow (among other things) $30 million of water heaters on lease that have historically been allowed in rate base.

The staff of the WUTC has in recent years carried an extremely adversarial position in many utility rate cases. We consider this to be the "opening volley" of the rate case, whereby the staff postures for its position. The WUTC has been known to differ quite often with staff recommendations.

Nevertheless, this negative proposal highlights the "tougher" regulatory climate arising in most states as many utilities benefit from lower interest rates but face slower economies.

Ultimately, we believe Washington Energy will receive a rate increase in October (enough to retain the current $1.40 dividend), but will not receive the majority of its $34.4 million (13%) request in additional revenues.

April 1993 Merrill Lynch Report. A Merrill Lynch research report also attempted to explain the difference in the commission staff's filing versus WEC's:

That staff has requested that $80 million be removed from WNG's rate base which would result in $14 million in lower tariff revenues. The $80 million pertains to working capital differences and leased merchandise. At the commission's request (some time ago) WNG purchased water heaters for customers to lease and allowed WNG to include this investment in the rate base and provide a tariff accordingly. It is not known at this time if the commission has changed its position on this issue.

...

While WNG has been allocating costs according to functions, activities, businesses, etc., it is not clear why the staff has recommended

Page 1139

a different approach, or which method will ultimately be approved by the Washington Commission.

...

We believe several of these issues deal with philosophical differences.... Although the outcome remains uncertain, we believe that even if some costs are ultimately excluded, WNG earnings outlook remains positive. It is important for investors to realize that certain businesses could ultimately be excluded from WNG's rate base.

Several other market reports emphasized that WEC's future profits and dividends depended on the proposed rate increase.

C. WUTC...

To continue reading

Request your trial
564 practice notes
  • United Energy Trading, LLC v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., Case No. 15-cv-02383-RS
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Northern District of California
    • November 20, 2015
    ...inferences,” however, “are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co. , 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.1996) ; see also Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (“threadbare recitals of the elements of the claim for relief, supported ......
  • Low v. Linkedin Corp., Case No. 11–CV–01468–LHK.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Eastern District of California
    • July 12, 2012
    ...law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.1996); accord Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949–50.C. Leave to Amend Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave t......
  • Mull v. Motion Picture Indus. Health Plan, Case No. CV 12–06693–VBF–MAN.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Central District of California
    • December 20, 2012
    ...to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.’ ” Caviness, 590 F.3d at 812 (quoting Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.1996)). While “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement’ ... it asks for more than a sheer possibility that......
  • Roe ex rel. Preschooler II v. Nevada, No. CVS040348-RLH(PAL).
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. District of Nevada
    • August 10, 2004
    ...set forth in the complaint "are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to [p]laintiffs." Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.1996). The Ninth Circuit has further defined this rule explaining that courts only accept as true the well-pleaded facts, and ig......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
563 cases
  • United Energy Trading, LLC v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., Case No. 15-cv-02383-RS
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Northern District of California
    • November 20, 2015
    ...inferences,” however, “are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co. , 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.1996) ; see also Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (“threadbare recitals of the elements of the claim for relief, supported ......
  • Low v. Linkedin Corp., Case No. 11–CV–01468–LHK.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Eastern District of California
    • July 12, 2012
    ...law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.1996); accord Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949–50.C. Leave to Amend Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave t......
  • Mull v. Motion Picture Indus. Health Plan, Case No. CV 12–06693–VBF–MAN.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Central District of California
    • December 20, 2012
    ...to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.’ ” Caviness, 590 F.3d at 812 (quoting Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.1996)). While “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement’ ... it asks for more than a sheer possibility that......
  • Accuimage Diagnostics Corp v. Terarecon, Inc., No. C 02-5029 MHP.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Northern District of California
    • April 18, 2003
    ...law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th DISCUSSION Each ground for dismissal will be considered in turn. I. Claim Seven—Conspiracy As a threshold matter, civil conspirac......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT