Equal Emp. Opp. Com'n v. UNITED AIRCRAFT CORP., ETC.

• Decision Date: 01 October 1974
• Docket Number: Civ. No. H 74-116.
• Citation: 383 F. Supp. 1313
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v. UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, PRATT & WHITNEY AIRCRAFT DIVISION.

383 F. Supp. 1313

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v. UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, PRATT & WHITNEY AIRCRAFT DIVISION.

Civ. No. H 74-116.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

October 1, 1974.

Raymond D. Goodman, Equal Opportunity Commission Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

Abner W. Sibal, Washington, D.C., for defendant.

RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

CLARIE, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) commenced this action on April 11, 1974, pursuant to § 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3). The complaint alleges that the defendant-employer, United Aircraft Corporation, Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Division (Pratt and Whitney) has engaged in unlawful employment practices in violation of Title VII. The defendant has moved to dismiss the complaint, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, on the grounds that the Commission has failed to comply with certain procedural requirements of Title VII. The Court will treat the motion as one for summary judgment, Rule 12(b) Fed.R.Civ.P.; and after considering the pleadings, affidavits, memoranda and oral arguments of counsel, the Court finds that the motion must be denied.

The facts which form the procedural background prior to the filing of this complaint are not in dispute. In July, 1970, Samuel Henley (the Charging Party), an employee of Pratt and Whitney, filed a charge of employment discrimination, in letter form, with the EEOC. Pursuant to the provisions of § 706(b) of the 1964 Act, the charge was referred to the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities.¹ On October 12, 1970, after the expiration of the sixty day period of referral required by § 706(b), and at the request of the Charging Party, the EEOC asserted jurisdiction over the charge. Seventeen months later, on March 14, 1972, a Commission representative was assigned to investigate the charge.

On March 29, 1972, Pratt and Whitney was sent a "notice of charge" form. The EEOC investigator thereupon interviewed both the Charging Party and officials of Pratt and Whitney, and on April 13, a copy of the "Charge of Discrimination," amended to include the oath of the Charging Party, was served on Pratt and Whitney. The Commission's "findings of fact," which supported the allegations of the Charging Party, were sent to the defendant on June 14, 1972, and, pursuant to the regulations of the Commission then in effect, Pratt and Whitney filed exceptions to those findings.² The parties then engaged in voluntary settlement discussions, but without success.

Finally, on February 23, 1973, the EEOC Regional Director issued a determination that reasonable cause existed to believe the charges were true and invited the parties to enter into conciliation. This invitation was accepted by the Charging Party, but rejected by Pratt and Whitney. On November 29, 1973, the EEOC Regional Attorney notified Pratt and Whitney that the Commission had authorized the filing of suit. The Regional Attorney provided Pratt and Whitney with a copy of the proposed complaint and offered to discuss the possibility of a voluntary resolution of the issues, before suit was filed. The plaintiff's offer was again rejected and on April 11, 1974, nearly four years after the date of the last alleged act of discrimination, the Commission commenced this action.

As the chronology of events indicates, the process of resolving these charges has already extended over an extremely long period. Counsel for the plaintiff Commission has pointed out that such delays are not uncommon in Commission proceedings and that changes in the EEOC administrative structure contributed to the problem in this instance.³ The Court, however, does not find this explanation completely satisfying. Talk of case backlogs and bureaucratic delay is of little consolation either to employees with alleged grievances, in whom expectations of prompt action may have been falsely raised, or to employers, who could conceivably be prejudiced by the existence of long-pending but unproven charges. Neither side can benefit from such lengthy delays, during which witnesses may become unavailable, evidence is likely to become stale, and employment practices may undergo change. If the reason for these delays lies in inadequate staffing and funding, then the ultimate solution is to be found not in the federal courts, but in the Congress. The precise question before the Court at this time is whether or not the plaintiff has failed to comply with "specific statutory requirements" prior to the bringing of suit, thus rendering its claim "fatally defective and invalid, as a matter of law." While the statutory language itself yields no clear answer to this question, that language has received authoritative judicial interpretation; and on the basis of this interpretation, the Court must answer the question in the negative.

Pratt and Whitney argues that the complaint is insufficient on its face, because it fails to recite specifically that the Commission has performed each of the administrative steps set forth in § 706(b) prior to bringing suit.⁴ The defendant cites one case for the proposition that each step must be specifically pleaded. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Container Corp. of America, 352 F.Supp. 262 (M.D.Fla. 1972). The weight of authority, however, is so clearly to the contrary as to make the defendant's claim almost frivolous. E. g., Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Standard Forge and Axle Co., 496 F.2d 1392 (5th Cir. 1974); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wah Chang Albany Corp., 499 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1974); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Laacke and Joys Co., 375 F. Supp. 852 (E.D.Wis.1974); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 366 F. Supp. 273 (D.Md.1973); also see, Rule 9(c), Fed.R.Civ.P.

A more substantial question is raised by the defendant's position that certain time periods set forth in Title VII should be interpreted as statutes of limitations so as to defeat the Commission's right to bring this suit. The question arises with respect to two basic issues: (1) was Mr. Henley's charge still "pending" before the Commission on the date the 1972 amendment to Title VII took effect; and (2) does the Commission have the authority to bring this suit more than 180 days after the filing of the charge of discrimination.

Pending Charge

Under the original provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the EEOC did not have the authority to bring suit in its own right its enforcement powers were limited to the seeking of a voluntary resolution of charges through "informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion."⁵ The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 gave the Commission the power to bring suit on charges filed with it and § 14 of that Act provided that:

"The amendments made by this Act to section 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shall be applicable with respect to charges pending with the Commission on the date of enactment of this Act and all charges filed thereafter."

It is the defendant's contention that the charge in question was no longer pending on March 24, 1972, the date of enactment, and that therefore the Commission could not exercise its newly acquired power to sue with respect to that charge.

In support of this position, the defendant cites § 706(e) of the 1964 Act, which provided in pertinent part:

"If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission or within thirty days after expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) (except that in either case such period may be extended to not more than sixty days upon a determination by the Commission that further efforts to secure voluntary compliance are warranted), the Commission has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance with this title, the Commission shall so notify the person aggrieved and a civil action may, within thirty days thereafter, be brought against the respondent named in the charge (1) by the person claiming to be aggrieved . . . ." (Emphasis added).

Applying this language to the facts of this case, Pratt and Whitney argues that as of October 12, 1970 (the date of the expiration of the sixty day period of reference to the State Commission) the EEOC had, at the most, sixty more days in which to obtain voluntary compliance; that at the expiration of this period, on December 12, 1970, the Commission was obligated to notify the Charging Party of his right to sue; and that the Charging Party then would have had thirty days in which to institute suit. Thus, according to the defendant, the Charging Party's complaint became "stale" as of January 12, 1971, and could not have been "pending" when the Act was amended to give the Commission power to bring suit.

Despite the apparent logic of this argument, based on the literal wording of the statute itself, the defendant's interpretation of the statutory time periods as "mandatory" rather than "directory" has been generally rejected by courts construing this provision of the 1964 Act. Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. United States EEOC, 398 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1968); Cunningham v. Litton Industries, 413 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1969); Austin v. Reynolds Metal Co., 327 F.Supp. 1145 (E.D.Va.1970); EEOC v. Mobil Oil Corp., 362 F.Supp. 786 (W.D.Mo.1973).

Support for this result has been found primarily in the recognition that strict enforcement of a sixty day limitation period against the EEOC would frustrate the Congressional intent to promote voluntary conciliation of charges rather than judicial enforcement.

"The clear intent of Congress in passing this statute was to prefer private and informal conciliation. To require the EEOC to investigate a charge, determine its merits, attempt conciliation and also

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